@misc{akerlof_ea_2002,
title = {{The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998: An Economic Analysis}},
author = {George A. Akerlof and Kenneth J. Arrow and Timothy Bresnahan and James M. Buchanan and Ronald Coase and Linda R. Cohen and Milton Friedman and Jerry R. Green and Robert W. Hahn and Thomas W. Hazlett and C. Scott Hemphill and Robert E. Litan and Roger G. Noll and Richard L. Schmalensee and Steven Shavell and Hal R. Varian and Richard J. Zeckhauser},
year = {2002},
month = {5},
url = {http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=16},
note = {Brief 02-1}
}
@book{aghion_ea_1998,
title = {{Endogenous Growth Theory}},
author = {Aghion, Phillipe and Howitt, Peter},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {1998}
}
@article{allison_ea_1974,
title = {{Productivity Differences Among Scientists: Evidence for Accumulative Advantage}},
author = {Allison, Paul and Stewart, John},
journal = {American Sociological Review},
volume = {39},
number = {4},
year = {1974},
month = {8},
pages = {596-606}
}
@article{ansari_ea_1994,
author = {Ansari, Asim and Economides, Nicholas and Ghosh, Avijit},
title = {{Competitive Positioning in Markets with Nonuniform Preferences}},
journal = {Marketing Science},
year = 1994,
volume = {13},
number = {3},
pages = {248-273},
month = {}
}
@inproceedings{arrow_1962,
title = {{Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention}},
author = {Arrow, Kenneth},
booktitle = {{The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors}},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {1962},
pages = {619-625}
}
@article{arundel_ea_1998,
title = {{What Percentage of Innovations are Patented? Empirical Estimates for European Firms}},
author = {Arundel, A. and Kabla, I.},
journal = {Research Policy},
volume = {27},
year = {1998},
pages = {127-141}
}
@article{arundel_2001,
title = {{Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy}},
author = {Arundel, A.},
journal = {Beleidstudies Technology Economie},
volume = {37},
pages = {67-88},
year = {2001}
}
@article{bessen_2004,
title = {{Hold-up and Patent Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private Information}},
author = {Bessen, James},
journal = {Economics Letters},
volume = {82},
number = {3},
year = {2004},
pages = {321-326}
}
@misc{bessen_ea_1999,
title = {{Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation}},
author = {Bessen, James and Maskin, Eric},
year = {2000},
note = {Working paper (MIT Econ WP 00-01)}
}
@misc{bessen_ea_2004,
title = {{An Empirical Look at Software Patents}},
author = {Bessen, James and Hunt, Robert},
year = {2004},
month = {4},
url-src = {http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf},
note = {WORKING PAPER NO. 03-17/R (though new version of 2004). Original version August 2003.}
}
@misc{blackburn_2004,
title = {{Online Piracy and Recorded Music Sales}},
author = {Blackburn, David},
year = {2004},
month = {12},
url-src = {http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~dblackbu/papers/blackburn\_fs.pdf},
note = {Job Market Paper (Harvard PhD Programme)}
}
@misc{boldrin_ea_2003,
title = {{Perfectly Competitive Innovation}},
author = {Boldrin, Michele and Levine, David},
year = {2003},
month = {1},
note = {Unpublished working paper. First version 1997-10-03}
}
@techreport{boldrin_ea_2005,
author = {Boldrin, Michele and Levine, David},
title = {{IP} and Market Size},
year = 2005,
month = jul,
institution = {UCLA Department of Economics},
type = {Levine's Working Paper Archive},
number = {618897000000000836},
url = {http://www.dklevine.com/papers/scale22.pdf}
}
@article{breyer_1970,
title = {{The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs}},
author = {Breyer, Stephen},
journal = {Harvard Law Review},
volume = {84},
number = {2},
year = {1970},
pages = {281-351}
}
@article{brynjolfsson_ea_2000,
title = {{Frictionless Commerce? A comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers}},
author = {Brynjolfsson, Erik and Smith, Michael},
journal = {Management Science},
volume = {46},
number = {4},
year = {2000},
pages = {563-585}
}
@article{brynjolfsson_ea_2003,
title = {{Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers}},
author = {Brynjolfsson, Erik and Hu, Y.J. Smith, Michael },
journal = {Management Science},
volume = {49},
number = {11},
year = {2003}
}
@misc{chaudhuri_ea_2003,
title = {{Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India}},
author = {Chaudhuri, Shubham and Goldberg, Penelopi and Jia, Panle},
year = {2003},
month = {12},
url-src = {http://www.econ.yale.edu/~pg87/TRIPS.pdf}
}
@article{dasgupta_ea_1980,
title = {{Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R\&D}},
author = {Dasgupta, Partha and Stiglitz, Joseph},
journal = {The Bell Journal of Economics},
volume = {11},
number = {1},
year = {1980},
pages = {1-28},
abstract = {This paper studies the nature and consequences of competition in R\&D and the relationship between this form of competition and competition in the product market, by focusing on comparisons of speed of research, number of independent research laboratories, and level of risk undertaken. Among the results: competition in the current product market reduces the level of innovation (relative to monopoly); competition in R\&D increases the level of innovation, possibly beyond the socially optimal level. Under certain conditions, it pays a monopolist to preempt potential competitors, thereby enabling the monopoly to persist. Market equilibrium may entail excessively fast research with insufficient risk-taking.}
}
@article{dasgupta_ea_1987,
title = {{The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios}},
author = {Dasgupta, Partha and Maskin, Eric},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
volume = {97},
number = {387},
year = {1987},
pages = {581-595}
}
@article{dasgupta_ea_1994,
title = {{Towards a New Economics of Science}},
author = {Dasgupta, Partha and David, Paul},
journal = {Research Policy},
volume = {23},
number = {5},
year = {1994},
pages = {487-521}
}
@article{denicolo_2000,
title = {{Two-Stage Patent Races and Patent Policy}},
author = {Denicolo, Victor},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {31},
year = {2000},
pages = {488-501}
}
@article{dixit_1988,
title = {{A General Model of R\&D Competition and Policy}},
author = {Dixit, Avinish},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume = {19},
number = {3},
year = {1988},
pages = {317-326}
}
@article{dosi_1988,
title = {{Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation}},
author = {Dosi, Giovanni},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
year = {1988},
pages = {1120-1171}
}
@book{dosi_ea_1988,
title = {{Technical Change and Economic Theory}},
editor = {Dosi, G. and Freeman, R. and Nelson, R. and Silverberg, G. and Soete, L.},
publisher = {Pinter Publishers (London)},
year = {1988}
}
@book{dosi_ea_1998,
title = {{Technology, Organization, and Competitiveness}},
editor = {Dosi, Giovanni and Teece, David and Chytry, Josef},
publisher = {OUP},
year = {1998}
}
@book{dutton_1984,
title = {{The Patent System and Inventive Activity during the Industrial Revolution 1750-1852}},
author = {Dutton, Henry},
publisher = {Manchester},
year = {1984}
}
@article{eisenberg_ea_1998,
title = {{Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research}},
author = {Eisenberg, R. and Heller, M.},
journal = {Science},
volume = {280},
number = {5364},
year = {1998},
month = {5},
pages = {690-701}
}
@article{ethier_1982,
title = {{National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade}},
author = {Ethier, William},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {72},
number = {3},
year = {1982},
month = {6},
pages = {389-405}
}
@book{foray_2004,
title = {{The Economics of Knowledge}},
author = {Foray, Dominique},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {2004}
}
@article{gallini_1992,
title = {{Patent Policy and Costly Imitation}},
author = {Gallini, Nancy},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {23},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {52-63}
}
@article{geist_2005,
title = {{Piercing the peer-to-peer myths: An Examination of the Canadian Experience}},
author = {Geist, Michael},
journal = {First Monday},
volume = {10},
number = {4},
year = {2005},
month = {4},
url-src = {http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10\_4/geist/}
}
@misc{ghose_ea_2004,
title = {{Internet Exchanges for Used Books: An Empirical Analysis of Product Cannibalization and Welfare Impact}},
author = {Ghose, A. and Smith, M.D. and Telang, R.},
year = {2004},
url-src = {http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=584401}
}
@article{gilbert_ea_1987,
title = {{Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development}},
author = {Gilbert, Richard and Griliches, Zvi and Klevorick, Alvin and Levin, Richard and Nelson, Richard and Winter, Sidney},
journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity},
volume = {1987},
number = {3},
year = {1987},
pages = {783-831}
}
@article{gordon_1982,
title = {{Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors}},
author = {Gordon, Wendy},
journal = {Columbia Law Review},
volume = {82},
number = {8},
year = {1982},
pages = {1600-1657}
}
@article{gort_ea_1983,
title = {{Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product Innovations}},
author = {Gort, Michael and Klepper, Steven},
journal = {Economic Journal},
volume = {92},
number = {367},
year = {1982},
pages = {630-653}
}
@article{green_ea_1995,
title = {{On the Division of Profit between Sequential Innovators}},
author = {Green, Jerry and Scotchmer, Suzanne},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {26},
number = {1},
year = {1995},
pages = {20-33}
}
@article{griffiths_ea_1991,
title = {{Political Components of the Industrial Revolution: Parliament and the English Cotton Textile Industry, 1660-1774}},
author = {Griffiths, T. and Hunt, P. and O'Brien, P.},
journal = {Economic History Review},
year = {1991},
pages = {395-423}
}
@article{griffiths_ea_1992,
title = {{Inventive Activity in the British Textile Industry, 1700-1800}},
author = {Griffiths, T. and Hunt, P. and O'Brien, P.},
journal = {Journal of Economic History},
year = {1992},
pages = {881-906}
}
@article{griffiths_ea_1995,
title = {{There is Nothing Outside the Text, and There is No Safety in Numbers: A Reply to Sullivan}},
author = {Griffiths, T. and Hunt, P. and O'Brien, P.},
journal = {Journal of Economic History},
year = {1995},
pages = {671-672}
}
@article{griliches_1990,
title = {{Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey}},
author = {Zvi Griliches},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
year = {1990},
pages = {1661-1707}
}
@incollection{griliches_1995,
title = {{R\&D and productivity: Econometric Results and measurement issues}},
author = {Griliches, Zvi},
booktitle = {{Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change}},
editor = {P. Stoneman},
publisher = {Blackwell},
year = {1995}
}
@article{hadfield_1992,
title = {{The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective}},
author = {Gillian K. Hadfield},
journal = {Copyright Law Symposium},
volume = {38},
pages = {1-46},
year = 1992
}
@misc{hahn_ea_2003,
title = {{A Review of Bessen and Hunt's Analysis of Software Patents}},
author = {Hahn, Robert and Wallsten, Scott},
year = {2003},
month = {11},
url-src = {http://www.researchineurope.org/policy/hahn\_wallsten.pdf},
note = {AEI-Brookings Joint Center. From the acknowledgements: 'The authors gratefully acknowledge the support' of Microsoft.}
}
@misc{hall_2003,
title = {{Business Method Patents, Innovation and Policy}},
author = {Hall, Bronwyn},
year = {2003},
month = {5},
url-src = {http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/papers/BHH\%20on\%20BMP\%20May03WP.pdf}
}
@misc{hong_2004,
title = {{The Effect of Napster on Recorded Music Sales: Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey}},
author = {Hong, Seung-Hyun},
year = {2004},
month = {1},
url-src = {http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/03-18.pdf},
note = {SIEPR Policy paper No. 03-018}
}
@article{jaffe_1989,
title = {{Real Effects of Academic Research}},
author = {Jaffe, Adam},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {79},
year = {1989},
pages = {957-970}
}
@article{johnson_1985,
title = {{The Economics of Copying}},
author = {Johnson, William},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {93},
number = {1},
year = {1985},
pages = {158-174}
}
@book{kamien_ea_1982,
title = {{Market Structure and Innovation}},
author = {Kamien, M. and Schwartz, N.},
publisher = {CUP},
year = {1982}
}
@article{klein_ea_2002,
title = {{The Economics of Copyright Fair Use in a Networked World}},
author = {Klein, Benjamin and Lerner, Andres and Murphy, Kevin},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {92},
number = {2},
year = {2002},
month = {5},
pages = {205-208}
}
@article{klemperer_1990,
title = {{How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?}},
author = {Paul Klemperer},
journal = {RAND Journal of Economics},
volume = {21},
number = {1},
year = {1990},
pages = {113-130}
}
@article{klepper_ea_2000,
title = {{The Making of an Oligopoly: Firm Survival and Technological Change in the Evolution of the U.S. Tire Industry}},
author = {Klepper, Steven and Simons, K.},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {108},
number = {4},
year = {2000},
pages = {728-760}
}
@article{kretschmer_2005,
title = {{Artists' earnings and copyright: A review of British and German music industry data}},
author = {Kretschmer, Martin},
journal = {First Monday},
volume = {10},
number = {1},
year = {2005},
month = {1},
url-src = {http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10\_1/kretschmer/index.html}
}
@article{landes_ea_1989,
title = {{An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law}},
author = {Landes, William and Posner, Richard},
journal = {Journal of Legal Studies},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
year = {1989},
pages = {325-363}
}
@book{levin_ea_1984,
title = {{Survey Research on R \& D appropriability and technological opportunity. Part 1: Appropriability.}},
author = {Levin, Richard},
publisher = {New Haven, CT: Yale U. Press},
year = {1984}
}
@article{levin_ea_1985,
title = {{R \& D Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New Evidence on some Schumpeterian Hypotheses}},
author = {Cohen, Wesley and Levin, Richard and Mowery, David},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {1985},
pages = {20-24}
}
@article{levin_ea_1987,
author = {Levin, Richard and Klevorick, A. and Nelson, R. and Winter, S. and Gilbert, R. and Griliches, Z.},
title = {{Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development}},
journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity},
year = {1987},
volume = {3},
pages = {783-831}
}
@article{liebowitz_1985,
title = {{Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals}},
author = {Liebowitz, Stan},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {93},
number = {5},
year = {1985},
pages = {945-957}
}
@article{liebowitz_ea_2005,
title = {{Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, \& Network Effects}},
author = {Liebowitz, Stan and Margolis, Stephen},
journal = {Harvard Journal of Law and Technology},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
year = {2005},
pages = {435-457}
}
@book{macleod_1988,
title = {{Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System, 1660-1800}},
author = {Macleod, C.},
publisher = {Cambridge},
year = {1988}
}
@article{macleod_1991,
title = {{The Paradoxes Of Patenting: Invention And Its Diffusion In 18th And 19th Century Britain, France And North America.}},
author = {Macleod, C.},
journal = {Technology and Culture},
volume = {32},
year = {1991},
pages = {885-910}
}
@article{mansfield_1985,
title = {{How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out?}},
author = {Edwin Mansfield},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {34},
number = {2},
year = {1985},
pages = {217-223}
}
@article{mansfield_1995,
title = {{Academic Research Underlying Industrial Innovations: Sources, Characteristics and Financing}},
author = {Mansfield, E.},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
volume = {77},
year = {1995},
pages = {55-65}
}
@article{matutues_ea_1996,
title = {{Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations}},
author = {Matutues, Carmen and Regibeau, Pierre and Rockett, Katharine},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {27},
number = {1},
year = {1996},
pages = {60-83}
}
@misc{menell_ea_2005,
title = {{Intellectual Property}},
author = {Menell, Peter and Scotchmer, Suzanne},
year = {2005},
month = {6},
url-src = {http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~scotch/ms\_06\_10\_2005.pdf},
note = {forthcoming, Handbook of Law and Economics. Mitch Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier.}
}
@article{merges_1999,
title = {{As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights For Business Concepts and Patent System Reform}},
author = {Merges, Robert},
journal = {Berkeley Technology Law Journal},
volume = {14},
year = {1999},
pages = {577-615}
}
@article{merges_ea_1990,
title = {{On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope}},
author = {Merges, Robert and Nelson, Richard},
journal = {Columbia Law Review},
volume = {90},
year = {1990},
month = {5},
pages = {839-916},
url-src = {http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/IPCoop/90merg2.html}
}
@book{mokyr_1990,
title = {{The Lever of Riches}},
author = {Mokyr, Joel},
publisher = {OUP},
year = {1990}
}
@incollection{mokyr_1994,
title = {{Technological Change, 1700-1830}},
author = {Mokyr, Joel},
booktitle = {{The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, 2nd ed., vol. 1, 1700-1860}},
editor = {R. Floud and D. McCloskey},
year = {1994},
pages = {12-43},
publisher = {CUP}
}
@book{nber_1962,
title = {{The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors}},
author = {National Bureau of Economic Research},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {1962},
note = {A report of the NBER being papers given at a conference}
}
@book{nelson_ea_1982,
title = {{An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change}},
author = {Nelson, Richard and Winter, Sidney},
publisher = {Harvard University Press},
year = {1982}
}
@book{nordhaus_1969,
title = {{Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change}},
author = {Nordhaus, William},
publisher = {M.I.T. Press},
year = {1969}
}
@article{nordhaus_1972,
title = {{The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply}},
author = {Nordhaus, William},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {62},
number = {3},
year = {1972},
pages = {428-431}
}
@article{novos_ea_1984,
title = {{The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach}},
author = {Novos, Ian and Waldman, Michael},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {92},
number = {2},
year = {1984},
pages = {236-246}
}
@misc{oberholzer_ea_2004,
title = {{The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis}},
author = {Oberholzer, Felix and Strumpf, Koleman},
year = {2004},
url-src = {http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing\_March2004.pdf}
}
@article{oberholzer_ea_2007,
title = {{The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis}},
author = {Oberholzer, Felix and Strumpf, Koleman},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {115},
number = {1},
year = {2007},
pages = {1-42}
}
@article{odonoghue_ea_1998,
title = {{Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Improvement}},
author = {O'Donoghue, Ted and Scotchmer, Suzanne and Thisse, Jacques},
journal = {Journal of Economics and Management Strategy},
volume = {7},
year = {1998},
pages = {1-32}
}
@article{peitz_ea_2004,
title = {{The Effect of Internet Piracy on Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence}},
author = {Peitz, Martin and Waelbroeck, Patrick},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
volume = {1},
number = {2},
year = {2004},
pages = {71-79},
url-src = {http://www.serci.org/docs\_1\_2/waelbroeck.pdf}
}
@article{plant_1934,
title = {{The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions}},
author = {Plant, Arnold},
journal = {Economica},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
year = {1934},
month = {2},
pages = {30-51}
}
@article{plant_1934b,
title = {{The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books}},
author = {Plant, Arnold},
journal = {Economica},
volume = {1},
number = {2},
year = {1934},
month = {5},
pages = {167-195}
}
@misc{quah_2002,
title = {{Almost Efficient Innovation By Pricing Ideas}},
author = {Quah, Daniel},
year = {2002},
month = jun,
note = {Unpublished LSE working paper}
}
@misc{rob_ea_2004,
title = {{Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students}},
author = {Rob, Rafael and Waldfogel, Joel},
year = {2004},
url-src = {http://www.law.upenn.edu/polk/dropbox/waldfogel.pdf}
}
@misc{rob_ea_2006,
title = {{Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students}},
author = {Rob, Rafael and Waldfogel, Joel},
journal = {Journal of Law and Economics},
vol = {XLIX},
year = 2006,
month = apr,
pages = {29-62}
}
@article{romer_1990b,
title = {{Endogenous Technological Change}},
author = {Romer, Paul},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {98},
number = {5(2)},
year = {1990},
month = {10},
pages = {S71-S102},
note = {The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 5, Part 2: The Problem of Development: A Conference of the Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Systems. (Oct., 1990), pp. S71-S102.}
}
@article{romer_1994,
title = {{The Origins of Endogenous Growth}},
author = {Romer, Paul},
journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume = {8},
number = {1},
year = {1994},
pages = {3-22}
}
@article{romer_1994b,
title = {{New Goods, Old Theory, and the Welfare Costs of Trade Restrictions}},
author = {Romer, Paul},
journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
volume = {43},
number = {1},
year = {1994},
pages = {5-38}
}
@article{sah_ea_1987,
title = {{The Invariance of Market Innovation to the Number of Firms}},
author = {Sah, Raaj and Stiglitz, Joseph},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume = {18},
number = {1},
year = {1987},
pages = {98-108}
}
@article{scherer_1972,
title = {{Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation}},
author = {Scherer, Frederic},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {62},
number = {3},
year = {1972},
pages = {422-427}
}
@book{scherer_1984,
title = {{Innovation and Growth: Schumpeterian Perspectives}},
author = {Scherer, Frederic},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {1984}
}
@book{scotchmer_2004,
title = {{Innovation and Incentives}},
author = {Scotchmer, Suzanne},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {2004}
}
@article{sullivan_1985,
title = {{The Timing and Pattern of Technological Development in English Agriculture, 1611-1850}},
author = {Sullivan, Richard},
journal = {Journal of Economic History},
year = {1985},
pages = {305-314}
}
@article{sullivan_1989,
title = {{England's 'Age Of Invention': The Acceleration Of Patents And Patentable Invention During The Industrial Revolution}},
author = {Sullivan, Richard},
journal = {Explorations in Economic History},
volume = {26},
year = {1989},
pages = {424-52}
}
@article{sullivan_1990,
title = {{The Revolution of Ideas: Widespread Patenting and Invention During the English Industrial Revolution}},
author = {Sullivan, Richard},
journal = {Journal of Economic History},
year = {1990},
pages = {349-362}
}
@article{tabuchi_ea_1995,
author = {Tabuchi, Takatoshi and Thisse, Jacques-Francois},
title = {{Asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition}},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
year = 1995,
volume = {13},
number = {2},
pages = {213-227},
month = {},
note = {available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/indorg/v13y1995i2p213-227.html}
}
@article{takeyama_1994,
title = {{The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities}},
author = {Takeyama, L.},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {42},
number = {2},
year = {1994},
pages = {155-166}
}
@misc{zentner_2004,
title = {{Measuring the Effect of Music Downloads on Music Purchases}},
author = {Zentner, Alejandro},
year = {2004},
url-src = {http://home.uchicago.edu/~alezentn/musicindustrynew.pdf}
}
@article{RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:44:y:2001:i:2:p:525-47,
author = {Shavell, Steven and van Ypersele, Tanguy},
title = {{Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights}},
journal = {Journal of Law \& Economics},
year = {2001},
volume = {44},
number = {2},
pages = {525-47},
month = {October}
}
@article{RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:113:y:1998:i:4:p:1137-1167,
author = {Michael Kremer},
title = {{Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism For Encouraging Innovation}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 1998,
volume = {113},
number = {4},
pages = {1137-1167},
month = {November}
}
@misc{cohen_ea_2000,
author = {Cohen, W. and Nelson, R. and Walsh, P.},
title = {{Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)}},
year = {2000},
note = {NBER Working Paper No. W7552}
}
@article{mansfield_ea_1981,
author = {Mansfield, Edwin and Schwartz, Mark and Wagner, Samuel},
title = {{Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study}},
journal = {Economic Journal},
year = {1981},
volume = {91},
number = {364},
pages = {907-918}
}
@article{mansfield_1986,
author = {Mansfield, E.},
title = {{Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study}},
journal = {Management Science},
year = {1986},
volume = {32},
number = {2},
pages = {173-181}
}
@article{RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:4:p:705-729,
author = {Amil Petrin},
title = {{Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan}},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
year = 2002,
volume = {110},
number = {4},
pages = {705-729},
month = {August}
}
@book{cornish_ea_2003,
author = {Cornish, William and Llewelyn, David},
title = {{Patents, Copyrights, Trade Marks and Allied Rights}},
edition = {5th},
publisher = {Sweet and Maxwell, London},
year = {2003}
}
@article{RePEc:eee:indorg:v:24:y:2006:i:5:p:907-913,
author = {Peitz, Martin and Waelbroeck, Patrick},
title = {{Why the music industry may gain from free downloading -- The role of sampling}},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
year = 2006,
volume = {24},
number = {5},
pages = {907-913},
month = {September}
}
@book{watt_2000,
author = {Watt, Richard},
title = {{Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends or Foes?}},
year = {2000},
publisher = {Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK}
}
@article{watt_2004,
author = {Watt, Richard},
title = {{The Past and the Future of the Economics of Copyright}},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
year = {2004},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
pages = {151--171}
}
@article{bharat_ea_2000,
repec-id = {RePEc:bla:jindec:v:48:y:2000:i:1:p:103-35},
author = {Anand, Bharat N and Khanna, Tarun},
title = {{The Structure of Licensing Contracts}},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = 2000,
volume = {48},
number = {1},
pages = {103-35},
month = {March}
}
@techreport{bessen_ea_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:cla:najeco:321307000000000021},
author = {James Bessen and Eric Maskin},
title = {{Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Innovation}},
year = 2006,
month = may,
institution = {www.najecon.org},
type = {NajEcon Working Paper Reviews},
number = {321307000000000021},
note = {Forthcoming in the Rand Journal of Economics}
}
@misc{cockburn_2005,
author = {Cockburn, Iain},
title = {{Blurred Boundaries: Tensions Between Open Scientific Resources and Commercial Exploitation of Knowledge in Biomedical Research}},
year = {2005},
note = {mimeo}
}
@article{hall_ea_2001,
author = {Hall, Bronwyn and Ziedonis, Rosemarie},
title = {{The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry, 1979-1995}},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
year = {2001},
volume = {32},
number = {1},
pages = {101-128}
}
@article{RePEc:eee:respol:v:29:y:2000:i:4-5:p:531-557,
author = {Jaffe, Adam B.},
title = {{The U.S. patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation process}},
journal = {Research Policy},
year = {2000},
volume = {29},
number = {4-5},
pages = {531-557},
month = {April}
}
@article{waterson_1990,
author = {Waterson, Michael},
title = {{The Economics of Product Patents}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 1990,
volume = {80},
number = {4},
pages = {860-69},
month = {September}
}
@article{RePEc:bla:jindec:v:39:y:1990:i:2:p:113-30,
author = {Waterson, Michael},
title = {{Product Differentiation and Profitability: An Asymmetric Model}},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = 1990,
volume = {39},
number = {2},
pages = {113-30},
month = {December}
}
@article{RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:93:y:1985:i:5:p:837-58,
author = {Horstmann, Ignatius and MacDonald, Glenn M and Slivinski, Alan},
title = {{Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent}},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
year = 1985,
volume = {93},
number = {5},
pages = {837-58},
month = {October}
}
@techreport{RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0511002,
author = {Alex Gaudeul},
title = {{Public provision of a private good: What is the point of the BSD license?}},
year = 2005,
month = nov,
institution = {EconWPA},
type = {Industrial Organization},
note = {available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpio/0511002.html},
number = {0511002}
}
@article{rochet_ea_2003,
repec-id = {RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:1:y:2003:i:4:p:990-1029},
author = {Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole},
title = {{Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets}},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = 2003,
volume = {1},
number = {4},
pages = {990-1029},
month = {06}
}
@techreport{rochet_ea_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:ide:wpaper:2145},
author = {Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean},
title = {{Two-Sided Markets : A Progress Report}},
year = 2005,
month = nov,
institution = {Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse},
type = {IDEI Working Papers},
note = {Forthcoming in the RAND Journal of Economics},
number = {275}
}
@article{RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:3:p:691-711,
author = {Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean},
title = {{Efficient Patent Pools}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2004,
volume = {94},
number = {3},
pages = {691-711},
month = {June}
}
@misc{aoki_ea_1999,
title = {{The Economics of Number Portability: SCs and Two Part Tariffs}},
author = {Aoki, R. and Small, J.},
year = {2001},
note = {Working Paper, University of Auckland.}
}
@article{arthur_1989,
title = {{Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events}},
author = {Arthur, Brian},
journal = {Economic Journal},
volume = {99},
year = {1989},
pages = {106-131}
}
@article{baker_2003,
title = {{The Case for Antitrust Enforcement}},
author = {Baker, J.},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {17},
number = {4},
year = {2003},
pages = {3-26}
}
@misc{bresnahan_2001,
title = {{The Economics of The Microsoft Case}},
author = {Bresnahan, T.},
year = {2001},
note = {Unpublished discussion paper}
}
@article{chakravorti_2003,
title = {{Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature}},
author = {Chakravorti, Sujit},
journal = {Review of Network Economics},
volume = {2},
number = {2},
year = {2003},
pages = {50-68}
}
@article{choi_1997,
title = {{The Provision of (Two-Way) Converters in the Transition Process to a New Incompatible Technology}},
author = {Choi, Jay-Pil},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {45},
number = {2},
year = {1997},
pages = {139-153}
}
@article{church_ea_1992,
title = {{Network Effects, Software Provision and Standardization}},
author = {Church, Jeffrey and Gandal, Neil},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {85-103}
}
@misc{church_ea_2003,
title = {{Indirect Network Effects and Adoption Externalities}},
author = {Church, Jeffrey and Gandal, Neil and Krause, David},
year = {2003},
note = {mimeo}
}
@article{crandall_ea_2003,
title = {{Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence}},
author = {Crandall, R. and Winston, C.},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {17},
number = {4},
year = {2003},
pages = {3-26}
}
@article{davis_ea_2000,
title = {{A Competitive Perspective on Internet Explorer}},
author = {Davis, Stephen and Murphy, Kevin},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
volume = {90},
number = {2},
year = {2000},
pages = {184-187}
}
@misc{doj_1994,
title = {{COMPLAINT (For Violations of Sections 1 \& 2 of the Sherman Act)}},
author = {Department of Justice Antitrust Division.},
year = {1994},
month = {07},
note = {US DOJ complaint in the Microsoft OEM licensing case}
}
@article{economides_1989,
title = {{Symmetric Equilibrium Existence and Optimality in Differentiated Products Markets}},
author = {Economides, Nicholas},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
volume = {47},
number = {1},
pages = {178-194},
year = {1989},
tags = {io-theory}
}
@article{economides_ea_1992,
title = {{Competition and Integration Among Complements, and Network Market Structure}},
author = {Economides, Nicholas and Salop, Steven},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {105-123},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{farrell_2003,
title = {{Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
year = {2003},
pages = {420-424},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@misc{farrell_2004,
title = {{A Simple Price-Theory Model of Anticompetitive Exclusive Dealing}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph},
year = {2004},
note = {mimeo}
}
@article{farrell_ea_1985,
title = {{Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Saloner, G.},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {16},
year = {1985},
pages = {70-83},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{farrell_ea_1986,
title = {{Installed Base And Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, And Predation}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Saloner, G.},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {76},
year = {1986},
pages = {940-955},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{farrell_ea_1992,
title = {{Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Saloner, G.},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {9-35},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{farrell_ea_2000,
title = {{Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Katz, Michael},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {48},
number = {4},
year = {2000},
pages = {413-432},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@misc{farrell_ea_2001,
title = {{Competition and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Klemperer, Paul},
year = {2001},
note = {mimeo. Dated 2001 but latest version is 2003. Preliminary draft chapter for Handbook of Industrial Organization. Also available from Farrell's web page (but in a different pagination).},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{fisher_2000,
title = {{The IBM and Microsoft Cases: What's the Difference}},
author = {Fisher, Franklin},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
volume = {90},
number = {2},
year = {2000},
month = {5},
pages = {180-183},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@article{fudenberg_ea_2000,
title = {{Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry}},
author = {Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J.},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {48},
number = {4},
year = {2000},
pages = {373-90},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{gilbert_1992,
title = {{Symposium on Compatibility: Incentives and Market Structure}},
author = {Gilbert, R.},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {1-8},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{gilbert_ea_2001,
title = {{An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft}},
author = {Gilbert, R. and Katz, Michael},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
year = {2001},
pages = {25-44},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@article{hall_ea_2000,
title = {{Toward a Quantification of the Effects of Microsoft's Conduct}},
author = {Hall, C. and Hall, R.},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
volume = {90},
number = {2},
year = {2000},
month = {5},
pages = {188-191},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@misc{jackson_1999,
title = {{Findings of Fact in the case of United States vs. Microsoft}},
author = {Jackson, R.},
year = {1999},
month = {11},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@article{katz_ea_1985,
title = {{Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility}},
author = {Katz, Michael and Shapiro, Carl},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {75},
year = {1985},
pages = {424-440},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{katz_ea_1986b,
repec-id = {RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:94:y:1986:i:4:p:822-41},
author = {Katz, Michael L and Shapiro, Carl},
title = {{Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities}},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
year = 1986,
volume = {94},
number = {4},
pages = {822-41},
month = {August},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v94y1986i4p822-41.html}
}
@article{klein_2001,
title = {{The Microsoft Case: What Can a Dominant Firm Do to Defend Its Market Position?}},
author = {Klein, Benjamin},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
year = {2001},
pages = {45-62},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@book{laffont_ea_2000,
title = {{Competition in Telecommunications}},
author = {Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tirole, Jean},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {2000}
}
@book{liebowitz_ea_1999,
title = {{Winner, Losers and Microsoft: Competition And Antitrust in High Technology}},
author = {Liebowitz, S. and Margolis, S.},
publisher = {Independent Institute},
year = {1999},
tags = {network-effects microsoft}
}
@misc{pollock_2005,
title = {{Network Effect Models: A Summary}},
author = {Pollock, R.},
year = {2005},
note = {Working Paper},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{saloner_ea_1995,
title = {{Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines}},
author = {Saloner, G. and Shepard, S.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume = {26},
number = {3},
year = {1995},
pages = {479-501},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{schmalensee_2000,
title = {{Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries}},
author = {Schmalensee, Richard},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
volume = {90},
number = {2},
year = {2000-05},
pages = {192-196},
tags = {antitrust microsoft}
}
@article{whinston_1990,
title = {{Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion}},
author = {Whinston, M.},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {80},
number = {4},
year = {1990},
pages = {837-859},
tags = {tying}
}
@article{whinston_2001,
title = {{Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know}},
author = {Whinston, M.},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
year = {2001},
pages = {63-80},
tags = {microsoft tying}
}
@misc{cipil_2006,
title = {{Review of the Economic Evidence Relating to an Extension of the Term of Copyright in Sound Recordings}},
author = {CIPIL},
year = 2006,
month = 12,
note = {Prepared for the Gowers Review on Intellectual Property},
url-src = {http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/B/4/gowers_cipilreport.pdf}
}
@misc{odlyzko_ea_2005,
title = {{A refutation of Metcalf's Law and a Better Estimate for the Value of Networks and Network Interconnections}},
author = {Odlyzko, Andrew and Tilly, Benjamin},
year = {2005},
url-src = {http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/metcalfe.pdf},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@misc{citeulike:71459,
title = {{The Dynamics of Book Sales: Endogenous versus Exogenous Shocks in Complex Networks}},
author = {Deschatres, F. and Sornette, D.},
citeulike-article-id = {71459},
eprint = {physics/0412171},
month = {December},
priority = {2},
url-src = {http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0412171},
year = {2004},
tags = {books copyright}
}
@misc{RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9085,
author = {Goolsbee, Austan and Chevalier, Judith},
title = {{Measuring Prices and Price Competition Online: Amazon and Barnes and Noble}},
year = 2002,
month = jul,
institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc},
note = {NBER Working Papers},
number = {9085}
}
@article{leguel_ea_2005,
title = {{P2P Music-Sharing Networks: Why the Legal Fight Against Copiers May be Inefficient?}},
author = {Le Guel, Fabrice and Rochelandet, Fabrice},
year = {2005},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
vol = {2},
number = {2},
pages = {69-82}
}
@article{png_2006,
author = {Png, Ivan},
title = {{Copyright: A Plea for Empirical Research}},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
volume = {3},
number = {2},
year = 2006,
pages = {3-13}
}
@article{holmstrom_1982,
number = {2},
title = {{Moral Hazard in Teams}},
volume = {13},
issn = {0361915x},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X\%28198223\%2913\%3A2\%3C324\%3AMHIT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-G},
abstract = {This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. This new role is essential for controlling incentives and suggests that firms in which ownership and labor are partly separated will have an advantage over partnerships in which output is distributed among agents. A new characterization of informative (hence valuable) monitoring is derived and applied to analyze the value of relative performance evaluation. It is shown that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally. Competition per se is worthless. The role of aggregate measures in relative performance evaluation is also explored, and the implications for investment rules are discussed.},
journal = {The Bell Journal of Economics},
author = {Bengt Holmstrom},
year = {1982},
pages = {324-340}
}
@article{loury_1979,
repec_id = {RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:93:y:1979:i:3:p:395-410},
author = {Loury, Glenn C},
title = {{Market Structure and Innovation}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 1979,
volume = {93},
number = {3},
pages = {395-410},
month = {August}
}
@article{hunt_2004,
repec_id = {RePEc:bla:jindec:v:52:y:2004:i:3:p:401-425},
author = {Robert M. Hunt},
title = {{Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation}},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = 2004,
volume = {52},
number = {3},
pages = {401-425},
month = {09}
}
@article{harris_ea_1985,
repec_id = {RePEc:bla:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:2:p:193-209},
author = {Harris, Christopher and Vickers, John},
title = {{Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race}},
journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
year = 1985,
volume = {52},
number = {2},
pages = {193-209},
month = {April},
abstract = {This paper investigates perfect equilibrium in a model of a race in which two players are competing for an indivisible prize. The winner is the first player to reach the finishing line. It is shown that the behaviour of the winner of the race is often exactly as if he were the only player: the rival makes no difference. Even if competition does affect the winner's behaviour, it does so only in the first stage of the race and not thereafter. It is shown how several factors combine to determine which player will win: relative valuations of the prize, discount rates, efficiency at making progress and initial distances from the finishing line. Insofar as the model applies to patent race, it suggests that the potential competition faced by one firm in a patent race (e.g. an incumbent monopolist) may be of little or no consequence.}
}
@article{lee_ea_1980,
repec_id = {RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:94:y:1980:i:2:p:429-36},
author = {Lee, Tom and Wilde, Louis L},
title = {{Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 1980,
volume = {94},
number = {2},
pages = {429-36},
month = {March}
}
@article{scherer_1967,
author = {Scherer, Frederic M.},
title = {{Research and Development Resource Allocation Under Rivalry}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 1967,
volume = {81},
number = {2},
pages = {349--394}
}
@article{grossman_ea_1986,
title = {{Optimal Dynamic R\&D Programs}},
author = {Gene M Grossman and Carl Shapiro},
number = {4},
volume = {17},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198624\%2917\%3A4\%3C581\%3AODRP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
abstract = {We study the optimal pattern of outlays for a single firm pursuing an R\&D program over time. In the deterministic case (a) the amount of progress required to complete the project is known, and (b) the relationship between outlays and progress is known. In this case it is optimal to increase effort over time as the project nears completion. The value of a research project is convex in its payoff on completion and in the difficulty of the project. Relaxing (a), we find in general a simple, positive relationship between the optimal expenditure rate at any point in time and the (expected) value at that time of the research program. We also show that, for a given level of expected difficulty, a riskier project is always preferred to a safe project. Relaxing (b), we find again that research outlays increase as further progress is made.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {1986},
pages = {581-593}
}
@article{fudenberg_ea_1983,
repec_id = {RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:22:y:1983:i:1:p:3-31},
author = {Fudenberg, Drew and Gilbert, Richard and Stiglitz, Joseph and Tirole, Jean},
title = {{Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races}},
journal = {European Economic Review},
year = 1983,
volume = {22},
number = {1},
pages = {3-31},
month = {June}
}
@article{reinganum_1981b,
repec_id = {RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:25:y:1981:i:1:p:21-41},
author = {Reinganum, Jennifer F.},
title = {{Dynamic games of innovation}},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = 1981,
volume = {25},
number = {1},
pages = {21-41},
month = {August}
}
@article{reinganum_1982,
repec_id = {RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:3:p:671-88},
author = {Reinganum, Jennifer F},
title = {{A Dynamic Game of R\&D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior}},
journal = {Econometrica},
year = 1982,
volume = {50},
number = {3},
pages = {671-88},
month = {May}
}
@article{lerner_1997,
number = {2},
title = {{An Empirical Exploration of a Technology Race}},
volume = {28},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199722\%2928\%3A2\%3C228\%3AAEEOAT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-\%23},
abstract = {An extensive theoretical literature examines technological competition, and in particular whether leaders maintain their standing. These models, however, have received little empirical support. I examine innovation in the disk drive industry, an environment particularly conducive to identifying racing behavior. Strategic variables prove significant in explaining the decision to innovate. The patterns are in accord with Reinganum's work: firms that trail the leader innovate more. I add controls for technological opportunity, financing constraints, and firm turnover. When firms manufacture drives for internal use or there are many entrants, and strategic interactions may be less important, the effects are less pronounced.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Josh Lerner},
year = {1997},
pages = {228-247}
}
@article{odonoghue_1998,
number = {4},
title = {{A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation}},
volume = {29},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199824\%2929\%3A4\%3C654\%3AAPRFSI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-B},
abstract = {I investigate patent protection for a long sequence of innovations where firms repeatedly supersede each other. Incentives for R\&D can be insufficient if successful firms earn market profit only until competitors achieve something better. To correct this problem, patents must provide protection against future innovators. I propose using a patentability requirement-a minimum innovation size required for patents. A patentability requirement can stimulate R\&D investment and increase dynamic efficiency. Intuitively, requiring firms to pursue larger innovations prolongs market incumbency because larger innovations are harder to achieve, and longer market incumbency implies an increased reward to innovation.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Ted O'Donoghue},
year = {1998},
pages = {654-679}
}
@article{harris_ea_1987,
number = {1},
title = {{Racing with Uncertainty}},
volume = {54},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28198701\%2954\%3A1\%3C1\%3ARWU\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-V},
abstract = {The paper presents two models of races in which there is both technological uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds. Most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features, but not the two combined. Our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them. In our principal model, which is of a one-dimensional race, it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower, and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases. Under certain conditions the same results hold in our second, related model, which is of a two-dimensional race.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Christopher Harris and John Vickers},
year = {1987},
pages = {1-21}
}
@article{beath_ea_1987,
number = {Supplement: Conference Papers},
title = {{Sequential Product Innovation and Industry Revolution}},
volume = {97},
issn = {00130133},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133\%281987\%2997\%3C32\%3ASPIAIR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-4},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
author = {John Beath and Yannis Katsoulacos and David Ulph},
year = {1987},
pages = {32-43},
rgrp-note = {Paper and proceedings I think. Look at products rather than processes and show that may get incumbency or may get leap-frogging.}
}
@article{dasgupta_ea_1980b,
number = {358},
title = {{Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity}},
volume = {90},
issn = {00130133},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133\%28198006\%2990\%3A358\%3C266\%3AISATNO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-N},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
author = {Partha Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz},
month = jun,
year = {1980},
pages = {266-293}
}
@article{dasgupta_1988,
number = {389},
title = {{Patents, Priority and Imitation or, the Economics of Races and Waiting Games}},
volume = {98},
issn = {00130133},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133\%28198803\%2998\%3A389\%3C66\%3APPAIOT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-R},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
author = {Partha Dasgupta},
month = mar,
year = {1988},
pages = {66-80}
}
@article{dasgupta_ea_1983,
number = {5},
title = {{Strategic Considerations in Invention and Innovation: The Case of Natural Resources}},
volume = {51},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198309\%2951\%3A5\%3C1439\%3ASCIIAI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
abstract = {Strategic considerations may induce a resource importing country to invent a substitute earlier than it intends to put it to use. There are also circumstances in which it would wish to delay an invention date even if it could obtain it at an earlier date at no extra cost. Similar paradoxical results obtain if resource cartels behave strategically. Setting prices high may be a way of deterring invention. If those engaged in R \& D are not resource users, and the cartel has access to similar R \& D technology, it will pre-empt rivals. This may not be the case if resource users can also engage in R \& D.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Partha Dasgupta and Richard Gilbert and Joseph Stiglitz},
month = sep,
year = {1983},
pages = {1439-1448}
}
@article{green_ea_1990,
number = {1},
title = {{Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law}},
volume = {21},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199021\%2921\%3A1\%3C131\%3ANADIPL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Q},
abstract = {The stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms. It also affects ex ante profitability of research. We compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency. We ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology. The possible rules are "first-to-invent," which applies in the U.S., and "first-to-file," which applies everywhere else.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry Green},
year = {1990},
pages = {131-146}
}
@article{matutes_ea_1996,
number = {1},
title = {{Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations}},
volume = {27},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199621\%2927\%3A1\%3C60\%3AOPDATD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
abstract = {Innovators who have made significant breakthroughs may be tempted to get a head start in developing the applications of a new discovery before commercializing any new product. We consider how this socially undesirable waiting period and the pattern of development of subsequent innovations are affected by two patent protection regimes which we call "length" and "scope" protection. Our main finding is that the scope of the patent, and not its length, is the dimension that should be used to induce early disclosure of fundamental innovations while still preserving firms' incentive to do R\&D. Furthermore, the optimal protection increases with rivalry in the markets for applications.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Carmen Matutes and Pierre Regibeau and Katharine Rockett},
year = {1996},
pages = {60-83}
}
@article{gilbert_ea_1990,
number = {1},
title = {{Optimal Patent Length and Breadth}},
volume = {21},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199021\%2921\%3A1\%3C106\%3AOPLAB\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
abstract = {In providing rewards to innovators, there is a tradeoff between patent length and breadth. This article provides conditions under which the optimal patent policy involves infinitely-lived patents, with patent breadth adjusting to provide the required reward for innovation.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro},
year = {1990},
pages = {106-112}
}
@article{tandon_1982,
number = {3},
title = {{Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing}},
volume = {90},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28198206\%2990\%3A3\%3C470\%3AOPWCL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
abstract = {This paper examines the use of compulsory lincensing as a policy to combat the monopoly problem associated with the patent system. It introduces the notion of an optimal patent--one where the patent life and the licensing royalty rate are both determined optimally. Under certain simplifying assumptions it is shown that the optimal patent will have an indefinite life, for both process and product innovations. Some preliminary calculations suggest that the use of compulsory licensing may lead to substantial welfare improvements, even if the patent life is left unchanged at 17 years.},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Pankaj Tandon},
month = jun,
year = {1982},
pages = {470-486}
}
@article{dijk_1996,
number = {2},
title = {{Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements}},
volume = {44},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199606\%2944\%3A2\%3C151\%3APHACIP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
abstract = {The stringency of novelty requirements that patent offices use in judging patentability defines the height of patent protection. We study patent height in a duopoly where firms compete in product improvements. A competitor who wants to invent around the other's patent is restricted by a minimum improvement level. We show that low patent protection does not affect market equilibrium without patent protection. A patent holder can lose with medium patent heights, but not if patents provide high protection. The non patent holder can gain with medium heights but is increasingly worse off with higher patent protection.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Theon van Dijk},
month = jun,
year = {1996},
pages = {151-167}
}
@article{gilbert_ea_1982,
number = {3},
title = {{Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly}},
volume = {72},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198206\%2972\%3A3\%3C514\%3APPATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-N},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Richard J Gilbert and David M. G Newbery},
month = jun,
year = {1982},
pages = {514-526}
}
@article{salant_1984,
number = {1},
title = {{Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment}},
volume = {74},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198403\%2974\%3A1\%3C247\%3APPATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-H},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Stephen W Salant},
month = mar,
year = {1984},
pages = {247-250},
rgrp-note = {interesting stuff on licensing. points out that once licensing is allowed result goes away (focuses on bad effects in form of monopolist's rent dissipation but point holds in general).}
}
@article{scotchmer_1991,
number = {1},
title = {{Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law}},
volume = {5},
issn = {08953309},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309\%28199124\%295\%3A1\%3C29\%3ASOTSOG\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-S},
journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
author = {Suzanne Scotchmer},
year = {1991},
pages = {29-41}
}
@article{reinganum_1983,
repec_id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:73:y:1983:i:4:p:741-48},
number = {4},
title = {{Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly}},
volume = {73},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198309\%2973\%3A4\%3C741\%3AUIATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-H},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Jennifer F Reinganum},
month = sep,
year = {1983},
pages = {741-748},
rgrp-note = {Response to Gilbert and Newbery showing for a radical innovation incumbent has less incentive than new-comer because it eats its own lunch}
}
@article{delbono_ea_1991,
number = {3},
title = {{Incentives to Innovate in a Cournot Oligopoly}},
volume = {106},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28199108\%29106\%3A3\%3C951\%3AITIIAC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-E},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Flavio Delbono and Vincenzo Denicolo},
month = aug,
year = {1991},
pages = {951-961}
}
@article{delbono_1989,
number = {1},
title = {{Market Leadership With a Sequence of History Dependent Patent Races}},
volume = {38},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28198909\%2938\%3A1\%3C95\%3AMLWASO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-X},
abstract = {This note extends the results of Vickers [1986] examining the consequences on the evolution of market structure of having payoffs--and thus profits and incentives--which depend on the technological history of the firms. In a simple duopoly model we determine the conditions under which the technological leadership of a firm is strengthened over time (Increasing Dominance) or is progressively eroded by the rival (Catching-Up). This reformulation of Vickers' model can also accommodate incremental innovations, i.e. technological changes which do not allow the innovator to overtake the rival.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Flavio Delbono},
month = sep,
year = {1989},
pages = {95-101}
}
@article{denicolo_1996,
number = {3},
title = {{Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length}},
volume = {44},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199609\%2944\%3A3\%3C249\%3APRAOPB\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-3},
abstract = {This paper reexamines the issue of optimal patent breadth in extending the earlier literature to the case where many firms race for a patent. It also discusses several examples that suggest the relevance of the nature of competition prevailing in the product market to explain the diverse results found in the literature. Loosely speaking, the less efficient is competition in the product market, the more likely it is that broad and short patents are socially optimal.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Vincenzo Denicolo},
month = sep,
year = {1996},
pages = {249-265}
}
@article{budd_ea_1993,
number = {3},
title = {{A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?}},
volume = {60},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28199307\%2960\%3A3\%3C543\%3AAMOTEO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-4},
abstract = {This paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms. The stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms. The question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard-does the `gap' between firms tend to increase or decrease? We show that several effects are at work. The state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater. Since joint payoffs are related to joint product-market profits less joint effort costs, there are two classes of effect: the joint-profit effect and various joint-cost effects. The latter result in part from the pattern of profits, and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts. Asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences. Moreover, we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint-cost effect. The pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure, and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts, in a mutually self-reinforcing manner. In particular, there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Christopher Budd and Christopher Harris and John Vickers},
month = jul,
year = {1993},
pages = {543-573}
}
@article{lippman_1987,
number = {2},
title = {{Dropout Behavior in R\&D Races with Learning}},
volume = {18},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198722\%2918\%3A2\%3C287\%3ADBIRRW\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-R},
abstract = {We examine a game-theoretic model of a two-firm R\&D race in which expenditures on R\&D and the concomitant increase in experience/learning enable the firms to increase their probability of discovering an invention. The learning process is stochastic. It generates a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for identical firms with the characteristic that the leader never drops out, but the follower drops out if the leader gains a significant lead. The leader can find it optimal to drop out if the firms value the invention differently or have different R\&D efficiencies. Thus, our analysis generates results between vigorous competition and natural monopoly.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Steven A Lippman and Kevin F McCardle},
year = {1987},
pages = {287-295}
}
@article{choi_1991,
number = {4},
title = {{Dynamic R\&D Competition under ``Hazard Rate'' Uncertainty}},
volume = {22},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199124\%2922\%3A4\%3C596\%3ADRCU\%22R\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Q},
abstract = {A model of dynamic R\&D behavior is presented in which participants in the race have imperfect information about the (true) "hazard rate" of the R\&D process. In this model, a firm will be ambivalent about a rival firm's success at an intermediate stage. On the one hand, the probability of winning is reduced, since a rival firm is ahead and the technological gap is larger. This effect is always negative. On the other hand, the discovery could be a signal that the project is not as hard after all ("If you can do that, why not me?"), which could shorten the expected time needed for the discovery. This is a positive effect or a rival firm's success, one that is not present in existing models and hence has been ignored up to now. According to the relative magnitude of these two opposing effects, a much richer description of real-world R\&D behavior is obtained. This article also provides a potential explanation of the strategic practice of innovation shelving.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Jay P Choi},
year = {1991},
pages = {596-610}
}
@article{malueg_ea_1997,
number = {4},
title = {{Dynamic R\&D Competition with Learning}},
volume = {28},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199724\%2928\%3A4\%3C751\%3ADRCWL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Y},
abstract = {To account for the possibility that firms are unsure about the ease of innovation, we formulate a differential game of R\&D competition with an unknown hazard rate. We show, as time passes without success, firms become more pessimistic about eventual innovation, reducing their R\&D investment and possibly exiting the race. An increase in the number of competing firms tends to increase firms' R\&D intensities, for given beliefs, but because beliefs evolve at different rates depending on the number of firms in the race, time paths of R\&D investment intensity are not unambiguously ordered with respect to the number of competing firms.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {David A Malueg and Shunichi O Tsutsui},
year = {1997},
pages = {751-772}
}
@article{chang_1995,
number = {1},
title = {{Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation}},
volume = {26},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199521\%2926\%3A1\%3C34\%3APSAPAC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-T},
abstract = {In this article, I present a model of cumulative innovation to investigate what factors should influence a court's decision when a patentee alleges that another inventor has infringed the patent with an improved version of the patented product. The model reveals how the optimal patent policy would extend broad protection to those inventions that have very little value (standing alone) relative to the improvements that others may subsequently invent. I also examine whether courts should allow a patentee and competing inventors with improved versions of the patented product to enter collusive agreements. The model indicates that such a policy could create incentives for inefficient entry by imitators who "invent around" the original patent.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Howard F Chang},
year = {1995},
pages = {34-57}
}
@article{scotchmer_1996,
number = {2},
title = {{Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products be Patentable?}},
volume = {27},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199622\%2927\%3A2\%3C322\%3APEISSP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-8},
abstract = {Incentives to develop basic technologies are greater if the patentholder profits from applications or other second-generation products. Assuming that such products infringe the basic patent and that there is not much delay between the innovations, I argue that (i) patents on second-generation products are not necessary to encourage their development and (ii) the patentholder of the basic technology collects a larger share of the profit if applications or other second-generation products are not patentable.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Suzanne Scotchmer},
year = {1996},
pages = {322-331}
}
@article{harris_ea_1985b,
number = {4, A Symposium on Oligopoly, Competition and Welfare},
title = {{Patent Races and the Persistence of Monopoly}},
volume = {33},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28198506\%2933\%3A4\%3C461\%3APRATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Christopher Harris and John Vickers},
month = jun,
year = {1985},
pages = {461-481}
}
@article{kamien_ea_1972b,
number = {2},
title = {{Market Structure, Rivals' Response, and the Firm's Rate of Product Improvement}},
volume = {20},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28197204\%2920\%3A2\%3C159\%3AMSRRAT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Morton I Kamien and Nancy L Schwartz},
month = apr,
year = {1972},
pages = {159-172}
}
@article{barzel_1968,
number = {3},
title = {{Optimal Timing of Innovations}},
volume = {50},
issn = {00346535},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6535\%28196808\%2950\%3A3\%3C348\%3AOTOI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Z},
journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
author = {Yoram Barzel},
month = aug,
year = {1968},
pages = {348-355}
}
@article{kamien_ea_1974,
number = {1},
title = {{Patent Life and R\&D Rivalry}},
volume = {64},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28197403\%2964\%3A1\%3C183\%3APLARAD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-6},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Morton I Kamien and Nancy L Schwartz},
month = mar,
year = {1974},
pages = {183-187}
}
@article{kamien_ea_1978,
number = {3},
title = {{Potential Rivalry, Monopoly Profits and the Pace of Inventive Activity}},
volume = {45},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28197810\%2945\%3A3\%3C547\%3APRMPAT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Morton I Kamien and Nancy L Schwartz},
month = oct,
year = {1978},
pages = {547-557}
}
@article{kamien_ea_1972,
number = {1},
title = {{Timing of Innovations Under Rivalry}},
volume = {40},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28197201\%2940\%3A1\%3C43\%3ATOIUR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-M},
abstract = {The choice of development period and consequent introduction time for a single innovation by an expected profit maximizing firm operating under conditions of rivalrous competition is studied. Factors taken into account by the firm are the increasing cost with compression of the development period, the reduction of profit opportunities with prolongation of the development period, and the probability of rival innovation and imitation which affect the potential rewards available to the firm. Comparisons is made with the timing that would be selected in the absence of rivalry. The effects of intense rivalry are also examined.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Morton I Kamien and Nancy L Schwartz},
year = {1972},
pages = {43-60}
}
@article{gallini_ea_1985,
number = {2},
title = {{Licensing in the Theory of Innovation}},
volume = {16},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198522\%2916\%3A2\%3C237\%3ALITTOI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-C},
abstract = {This article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative R\&D game. We ask two questions: What are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure? The gains from trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques (the ex post incentive) and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures (the ex ante incentive). In a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms' initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Nancy T Gallini and Ralph A Winter},
year = {1985},
pages = {237-252}
}
@techreport{farrell_ea_2002,
repec-id = {RePEc:cdl:econwp:1049},
author = {Joseph Farrell and Richard Gilbert and Michael Katz},
title = {{Market Structure, Organizational Structure, and R\&D Diversity}},
year = 2002,
month = oct,
institution = {Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley},
type = {Department of Economics, Working Paper Series},
number = {1049}
}
@article{harter_1993,
number = {1},
title = {{Differentiated Products with R\&D}},
volume = {41},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199303\%2941\%3A1\%3C19\%3ADPWR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-H},
abstract = {This paper looks to the literature on one-dimensional, location, models and adds to it a simple process of R\&D. Differentiated-products models have often included sequential entry in order to add realism, but the order of entry is known. Here, the order is not known a priori. Also, interim profits are not ignored, allowing the monopoly profits to affect the outcome. It is found that firms do not necessarily locate at the extrema, but often race for the optimal monopoly variety--the midpoint of the interval.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {John F. R Harter},
month = mar,
year = {1993},
pages = {19-28}
}
@article{sakakibara_ea_2001,
number = {1},
title = {{Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms}},
volume = {32},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200121\%2932\%3A1\%3C77\%3ADSPIMI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
abstract = {Does an expansion of patent scope induce more innovative effort by firms? We examine responses to the Japanese patent reforms of 1988. Interviews with practitioners and professional documents for patent agents suggest the reforms significantly expanded the scope of patent rights. However, econometric analysis using both Japanese and U.S. patent data on 307 Japanese firms finds no evidence of an increase in either R\&D spending or innovative output that could plausibly be attributed to patent reform.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Mariko Sakakibara and Lee Branstetter},
year = {2001},
pages = {77-100}
}
@article{flaherty_1980,
number = {5},
title = {{Industry Structure and Cost-Reducing Investment}},
volume = {48},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198007\%2948\%3A5\%3C1187\%3AISACI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-1},
abstract = {A dynamic noncooperative game in which firms choose output and cost-reducing investment sequences is developed. The sequences exhibit several properties of manufacturing industries. Several steady states exist. Under some reasonable conditions only industry structures in which firms have different market shares can be locally stable steady states. So the model presents one explanation of the source of differences among firms in homogeneous good oligopolies.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {M. Therese Flaherty},
month = jul,
year = {1980},
pages = {1187-1209}
}
@article{katz_ea_1985b,
number = {4},
title = {{On the Licensing of Innovations}},
volume = {16},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198524\%2916\%3A4\%3C504\%3AOTLOI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-3},
abstract = {We study a three-stage, asymmetric duopoly game of R\&D rivalry. The stages are: (1) development of an innovation; (2) fixed-fee licensing of the innovation; and (3) sale of the final product. We find that major innovations will not be licensed, but that equally efficient firms will tend to license minor innovations. For some innovations, licensing is both privately and socially undesirable. If at least one of the two producers would refuse to license (were it to acquire the innovation), then licensing will not occur; an excluding firm will obtain the innovation. The possibility of licensing may decrease the returns to innovation if the licensee appropriates most of the licensing gains to trade.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro},
year = {1985},
pages = {504-520}
}
@article{judd_1985,
number = {3},
title = {{On the Performance of Patents}},
volume = {53},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198505\%2953\%3A3\%3C567\%3AOTPOP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-0},
abstract = {A tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of continuous product innovation is developed. Patents, or any imitation lag, of infinite duration may achieve too much, too little, or the socially optimum level of innovation. Most surprising, finite-life patents may induce undamped oscillations in innovation.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Kenneth L Judd},
month = may,
year = {1985},
pages = {567-586}
}
@article{gallini_ea_1985b,
number = {207},
series = {2},
title = {{Optimal R\&D Processes and Competition}},
volume = {52},
issn = {00130427},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427\%28198508\%292\%3A52\%3A207\%3C321\%3AORADPA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-A},
journal = {Economica},
author = {Nancy T Gallini and Yehuda Kotowitz},
month = aug,
year = {1985},
pages = {321-334}
}
@article{reinganum_1984,
number = {2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association},
title = {{Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R\&D}},
volume = {74},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198405\%2974\%3A2\%3C61\%3APIOGTM\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-W},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Jennifer F Reinganum},
month = may,
year = {1984},
pages = {61-66}
}
@article{futia_1980,
number = {4},
title = {{Schumpeterian Competition}},
volume = {94},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28198006\%2994\%3A4\%3C675\%3ASC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-M},
abstract = {This paper describes a stochastic model of the process of competition via technological innovation as it might occur within a single industry. Individual firms undertake R\&D projects in the hope of acquiring a decisive competitive advantage over their rivals. But such advantages and the economic rents arising from this are only temporary; they eventually disappear in the face of imitation, entry, and innovation by other firms. At the industry's long-run equilibrium, concentration and the pace of technological innovation are jointly determined by the conditions of entry and the extent of innovative opportunity. The model implies relationships among these variables that have in fact been detected in the empirical R\&D literature.},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Carl A Futia},
month = jun,
year = {1980},
pages = {675-695}
}
@article{bhattacharya_ea_1986,
number = {4},
title = {{Portfolio Choice in Research and Development}},
volume = {17},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198624\%2917\%3A4\%3C\%3APCIRAD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
abstract = {We analyze the effects of a "winner-take-all" patent mechanism on the riskiness of the research strategies chosen by competing firms, as well as on the firms' incentives to duplicate research projects. Nash equilibrium choices are compared with the social optimum in a one-shot, simultaneous-move game in which competitors choose the riskiness or correlation of their research performances. We show that neither society nor firms have any preference for correlation per se, while the divergence between social and privately optimal levels of risk depends on skewness characteristics of the probability distribution over discovery dates and on levels of risk aversion.},
pages = {594-605},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Sudipto Bhattacharya and Dilip Mookherjee},
year = {1986}
}
@article{chatterjee_ea_2004,
number = {1},
title = {{Rivals' Search for Buried Treasure: Competition and Duplication in R\&D}},
volume = {35},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200421\%2935\%3A1\%3C160\%3ARSFBTC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
abstract = {We analyze an R\&D race in which, in each period, two firms each choose which of two research projects to invest in. Each observes the other's past choices and so strategic search is possible. Equilibrium is efficient if the projects differ only in their probability of being the "right" project. If they differ in other dimensions (e.g., cost), then there may be too much or too little duplication relative to the social optimum.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Kalyan Chatterjee and Robert Evans},
year = {2004},
pages = {160-183}
}
@article{katz_1986,
number = {4},
title = {{An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development}},
volume = {17},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198624\%2917\%3A4\%3C\%3AAAOCRA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
abstract = {I analyze the effects of cooperative research, whereby member firms agree to share the costs and fruits of a research project before they undertake it. In this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree of product market competition is low, when there are R\&D spillovers in the absence of cooperation, when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible, and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities. I show that a royalty-free cross-licensing agreement among any number of firms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of R\&D through sharing.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Michael L Katz},
year = {1986}
}
@article{gilbert_ea_1997,
title = {{Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No's Meet the Nineties}},
volume = {1997},
issn = {10578641},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1057-8641\%281997\%291997\%3C283\%3AAIITLO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-5},
journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics},
author = {Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro and Louis Kaplow and Robert Gertner},
year = {1997},
pages = {283-349}
}
@article{aghion_ea_2001,
number = {3},
title = {{Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation}},
volume = {68},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28200107\%2968\%3A3\%3C467\%3ACIAGWS\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
abstract = {Is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth? This question is addressed in the context of an endogenous growth model with "step-by-step" innovations, in which technological laggards must first catch up with the leading-edge technology before battling for technological leadership in the future. In contrast to earlier Schumpeterian models in which innovations are always made by outsider firms who earn no rents if they fail to innovate and become monopolies if they do innovate, here we find: first, that the usual Schumpeterian effect of more intense product market competition (PMC) is almost always outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate in order to escape competition, so that PMC has a positive effect on growth; second, that a little imitation is almost always growth-enhancing, as it promotes more frequent neck-and-neck competition, but too much imitation is unambiguously growth-reducing. The model thus points to complementary roles for competition (anti-trust) policy and patent policy.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Philippe Aghion and Christopher Harris and Peter Howitt and John Vickers},
month = jul,
year = {2001},
pages = {467-492}
}
@article{pepall_1997,
number = {254},
series = {2},
title = {{Imitative Competition and Product Innovation in a Duopoly Model}},
volume = {64},
issn = {00130427},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427\%28199705\%292\%3A64\%3A254\%3C265\%3AICAPII\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-F},
abstract = {This paper investigates imitative competition in a two-stage game of strategic product choice in a vertically differentiated market. The innovator chooses its product strategy anticipating the subsequent entry of a rival firm. The rival firm chooses the degree to which it is profitable to differentiate its product from the innovator. It has the second mover advantage that its costs are lower the more closely it copies the innovator's product. But against this advantage is the drawback that the more similar the two products are, the more intense is the price competition between the two firms. The trade-off between imitation and differentiation is affected by the degree of consumer heterogeneity in the market. Consumers differ by income. The relationship between the incentive to imitate and the distribution of income is important, particularly in evaluating the welfare effects of two different policy responses, patent policy and cooperative alliances.},
journal = {Economica},
author = {Lynne Pepall},
month = may,
year = {1997},
pages = {265-279}
}
@article{segerstrom_1991,
number = {4},
title = {{Innovation, Imitation, and Economic Growth}},
volume = {99},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28199108\%2999\%3A4\%3C807\%3AIIAEG\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-V},
abstract = {This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. The model has a steady-state equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to discovering qualitatively improved products and other firms devote resources to copying these products. Rates of both innovation and imitation are endogenously determined on the basis of the outcomes of \$R \& D\$ races between firms. Innovation subsidies are shown to unambiguously promote economic growth. Welfare is enhanced, however, only if the steady-state intensity of innovative effort exceeds a critical level.},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Paul S Segerstrom},
month = aug,
year = {1991},
pages = {807-827}
}
@article{horowitz_ea_1996,
number = {4},
title = {{Patent Length and the Rate of Innovation}},
volume = {37},
issn = {00206598},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598\%28199611\%2937\%3A4\%3C785\%3APLATRO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-E},
abstract = {This paper models the effect of patent length on the rate-of-innovation and consumer welfare. We find that the patent length that maximizes the rate-of-innovation exceeds that which maximizes consumer welfare. We show a countervailing effect of patent length upon the "size" and "frequency" of innovation. Longer patents increase the size, but decrease the frequency of innovation. The patent lengths that maximize the rate-of-innovation and welfare represent balance points between size and frequency. The divergence of the welfare maximizing and rate-of-innovation maximizing patent lengths has important policy implications that we briefly explore.},
journal = {International Economic Review},
author = {Andrew W Horowitz and Edwin L. -C Lai},
month = nov,
year = {1996},
pages = {785-801}
}
@article{eswaran_ea_1996,
number = {4},
title = {{Patent Policy and the Direction of Technological Change}},
volume = {27},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199624\%2927\%3A4\%3C722\%3APPATDO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-N},
abstract = {In this article we examine the interaction between firms' product and process innovation decisions, and the role patent policy can play in directing technological change toward a socially efficient mix of innovations. Product innovation is a variant on a pioneer's new product; process innovation improves upon the cost efficiency of production. In a model with heterogeneous consumers, we show that an entrant relaxes competition by trading off too much process innovation in favor of product innovation, relative to what the social planner would desire. This bias toward product innovation can be corrected through appropriate choice of patent breadths on product and process innovations.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Mukesh Eswaran and Nancy Gallini},
year = {1996},
pages = {722-746}
}
@article{chou_ea_1993,
number = {2},
title = {{The Crowding-Out Effects of Long Duration of Patents}},
volume = {24},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199322\%2924\%3A2\%3C304\%3ATCEOLD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-B},
abstract = {In this article we demonstrate how a long duration of patents affects investment in new product development. We construct an overlapping-generations model of saving, investment, and product innovation and show that a long duration of patents results in a high aggregate value of monopoly firms that compete for the younger generation's savings with investment in new product development. We analyze the crowding-out effects of long duration of patents and their implications for individuals' welfare under different patent regimes.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Chien-fu Chou and Oz Shy},
year = {1993},
pages = {304-312}
}
@article{aspremont_ea_1988,
number = {5},
title = {{Cooperative and Noncooperative R \& D in Duopoly with Spillovers}},
volume = {78},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198812\%2978\%3A5\%3C1133\%3ACANR\%26D\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Z},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Claude D'Aspremont and Alexis Jacquemin},
month = dec,
year = {1988},
pages = {1133-1137}
}
@article{pakes_ea_1986,
number = {384},
title = {{Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period}},
volume = {96},
issn = {00130133},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133\%28198612\%2996\%3A384\%3C1052\%3AEOTVOP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-K},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
author = {Mark Schankerman and Ariel Pakes},
month = dec,
year = {1986},
pages = {1052-1076}
}
@article{schankerman_1998,
number = {1},
title = {{How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field}},
volume = {29},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199821\%2929\%3A1\%3C77\%3AHVIPPE\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-9},
abstract = {I present evidence on the private value of patent rights in France for different technology fields and nationalities of ownership, using nonparametric techniques and a parametric model of patent renewal. The distribution of the value of patent rights is highly skewed, patent protection is a significant but not the major source of private returns to R\&D, and these characteristics vary across technology fields. I compute the R\&D cash subsidy that is equivalent to the value of patent rights, measure the variations in value over time, technology fields, and nationalities, and show that these differences are correlated with patent grant rates.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Mark Schankerman},
year = {1998},
pages = {77-107}
}
@article{scotchmer_1999,
number = {2},
title = {{On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System}},
volume = {30},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199922\%2930\%3A2\%3C181\%3AOTOOTP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-N},
abstract = {The patent system is mainly a renewal system: the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees. I ask whether such a system can be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research. In such a model I show that renewal mechanisms (possibly with subsidies) are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on, regardless of the objective function. Under plausible circumstances, patents should have a uniform life, rather than varying in length, as typically occurs under a renewal system.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Suzanne Scotchmer},
year = {1999},
pages = {181-196}
}
@article{lanjouw_1998,
number = {4},
title = {{Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value}},
volume = {65},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28199810\%2965\%3A4\%3C671\%3APPITSO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-0},
abstract = {Empirical estimates of the private value of patent protection are derived for four technology areas-computers, textiles, combustion engines, and pharmaceuticals-using new patent data for West Germany, 1953-1988. Patentees must pay renewal fees to keep their patents in force as well as legal expenses in order to enforce them. A dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of optimal renewal decisions is developed incorporating both learning and depreciation as well as the potential need to prosecute infringement. The evolution of the distribution of returns over the life of a group of patents is calculated for each technology using a minimum distance simulation estimator. Results indicate that the aggregate value of protection generated per year is on the order of 10\% of related R\&D expenditure.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Jean Olson Lanjouw},
month = oct,
year = {1998},
pages = {671-710}
}
@article{cornelli_ea_1999,
number = {2},
title = {{Patent Renewals and R\&D Incentives}},
volume = {30},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199922\%2930\%3A2\%3C197\%3APRARI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-6},
abstract = {In a model with moral hazard and asymmetric information, we show that it can be welfare improving to differentiate patent lives when firms have different R\&D productivities. A uniform patent life provides too much R\&D incentive to low-productivity firms and too little to high-productivity ones. The optimally differentiated patent scheme can be implemented through a menu of patent lives (or renewals) and associated fees. We characterize the optimal mechanism and use simulation analysis to compare it with existing patent renewal systems and to illustrate the potential welfare gains from the optimal policy.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Francesca Cornelli and Mark Schankerman},
year = {1999},
pages = {197-213}
}
@article{pakes_1986,
number = {4},
title = {{Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks}},
volume = {54},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198607\%2954\%3A4\%3C755\%3APAOSEO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-X},
abstract = {In many countries patentees must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force. This paper presents and then estimates a model which uses observations on the proportion of different cohorts of patents which are renewed at alternative ages, and the relevant renewal fee schedules, to estimate the distribution of the returns earned from holding patents, and the evolution of this distribution function over the lifespan of the patents. Since patents are often applied for at an early exploratory stage of the innovation process, the model allows patentees to be uncertain about the sequence of returns that will be earned if the patent is kept in force. The paper solves the implied optimal stopping problem for the micro units, derives the implications of these solutions on the aggregate proportion renewed, and then estimates the parameters of the model from the aggregate data. Separate estimates are obtained from data on post World War II cohorts of patents in each of France the United Kingdom, and Germany.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Ariel Pakes},
month = jul,
year = {1986},
pages = {755-784}
}
@article{hopenhayn_ea_2001,
number = {1},
title = {{Innovation Variety and Patent Breadth}},
volume = {32},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200121\%2932\%3A1\%3C152\%3AIVAPB\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-U},
abstract = {When innovations are heterogeneous, it may be advantageous to provide a variety of patents. By trading off patent breadth for length, it is possible that fees are not needed in the optimal policy. We present two examples. The first is a quality-ladder model, in which innovations benefit society directly as well as through their use as building blocks to future inventions, and the rate of arrival for the future innovation is unobserved. More fertile innovations get more breadth for a shorter time. Menus may also be useful in the case of horizontal product differentiation.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Hugo A Hopenhayn and Matthew F Mitchell},
year = {2001},
pages = {152-166}
}
@article{weinberg_1992,
number = {2},
title = {{Exclusionary Practices and Technological Competition}},
volume = {40},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199206\%2940\%3A2\%3C135\%3AEPATC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-6},
abstract = {This paper examines the effects of exclusionary practices on the process of technological change, modeled as a sequence of innovations. The winner of an early innovation may be able to take (possibly costly) actions that effectively exclude its rivals from competition for subsequent innovations. The possibility of exclusion can change the equilibrium time pattern of investments in research from that of the case of no exclusion. Conditions that make such a change most likely are also conditions under which such a change is most likely to reduce the efficiency of the allocation of resources to technological change.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {John A Weinberg},
month = jun,
year = {1992},
pages = {135-146}
}
@article{reinganum_1985,
number = {1},
title = {{Innovation and Industry Evolution}},
volume = {100},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28198502\%29100\%3A1\%3C81\%3AIAIE\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-7},
abstract = {The theoretical literature on innovation has been concerned with a single innovation produced by a number of identical agents. By contrast, we consider a market in which one firm is the current incumbent, while the remaining firms are challengers. Moreover, we consider a sequence of innovations, so that success does not imply that the successful firm reaps monopoly profits forever after, but only until the next, better innovation is developed. We begin with a fully optimizing behavioral model and derive the equivalent of the Schumpeterian "process of creative destruction." That is, a firm enjoys temporary monopoly power but is soon overthrown by a more inventive challenger. The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process...The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates [Schumpeter, 1942, pp. 82-83].},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Jennifer F Reinganum},
month = feb,
year = {1985},
pages = {81-99}
}
@article{anton_ea_2004,
number = {1},
title = {{Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property}},
volume = {35},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200421\%2935\%3A1\%3C1\%3ALPABSM\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-R},
abstract = {Exploitation of an innovation commonly requires some disclosure of enabling knowledge (e.g., to obtain a patent or induce complementary investment). When property rights offer only limited protection, the value of the disclosure is offset by the increased threat of imitation. Our model incorporates three features critical to this setting: innovation creates asymmetric information, innovation often has only limited legal protection, and disclosure facilitates imitation. Imitation depends on inferences the imitator makes about the innovator's advance. We find an equilibrium in which small inventions are not imitated, medium inventions involve a form of "implicit licensing," and large inventions are protected primarily through secrecy when property rights are weak.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {James J Anton and Dennis A Yao},
year = {2004},
pages = {1-22}
}
@article{reinganum_1981,
number = {3},
title = {{On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach}},
volume = {48},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28198107\%2948\%3A3\%3C395\%3AOTDONT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Z},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Jennifer F Reinganum},
month = jul,
year = {1981},
pages = {395-405}
}
@article{horstmann_ea_1985,
number = {5},
title = {{Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent}},
volume = {93},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28198510\%2993\%3A5\%3C837\%3APAITMT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-N},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Ignatius Horstmann and Glenn M MacDonald and Alan Slivinski},
month = oct,
year = {1985},
pages = {837-858}
}
@article{vickers_1986,
number = {1},
title = {{The Evolution of Market Structure when There is a Sequence of Innovations}},
volume = {35},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28198609\%2935\%3A1\%3C1\%3ATEOMSW\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-S},
abstract = {The paper explores the question of how market structure evolves when there is a sequence of opportunities to innovate. Does one firm extend its technological superiority to become increasingly dominant, or does technological leadership constantly change hands in a process of "action-reaction"? A simple duopoly model is proposed, in which the answer to this question depends upon the nature of product market behavior. In that model, highly competitive product market behavior leads to increasing dominance, whereas Cournot behavior may lead to action-reaction.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {John Vickers},
month = sep,
year = {1986},
pages = {1-12}
}
@article{kitch_1977,
number = {2},
title = {{The Nature and Function of the Patent System}},
volume = {20},
issn = {00222186},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2186\%28197710\%2920\%3A2\%3C265\%3ATNAFOT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-0},
journal = {Journal of Law and Economics},
author = {Edmund W Kitch},
month = oct,
year = {1977},
pages = {265-290}
}
@article{harter_1994,
number = {1},
title = {{The Propensity to Patent with Differentiated Products}},
volume = {61},
issn = {00384038},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-4038\%28199407\%2961\%3A1\%3C195\%3ATPTPWD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-F},
journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
author = {John F. R Harter},
month = jul,
year = {1994},
pages = {195-201}
}
@incollection{arrow_1993,
title = {{The Interaction of Corporate Market Allocation Processes and Entrepreneurial Activity}},
author = {Arrow, Kenneth},
year = 1993,
booktitle = {{The Markets for Innovation, Ownership and Control}},
editor = {Day, R. H. and Eliasson, G. and Wihlborg, C.},
publisher = {Amsterdam: North-Holland}
}
@article{aspremont_ea_2000,
number = {2},
title = {{Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge}},
volume = {67},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28200004\%2967\%3A2\%3C255\%3ABASIK\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-R},
abstract = {We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge between two participants in an R\&D race for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the "amount of knowledge disclosed", by the leading to the lagging agent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes and varying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In her sequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicit full disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type of the licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminating knowledge licensee.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Claude d'Aspremont and Sudipto Bhattacharya and Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet},
month = apr,
year = {2000},
pages = {255-271}
}
@article{spence_1984,
number = {1},
title = {{Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance}},
volume = {52},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198401\%2952\%3A1\%3C101\%3ACRCAIP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Y},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Michael Spence},
year = {1984},
pages = {101-122}
}
@article{gallini_1984,
number = {5},
title = {{Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing}},
volume = {74},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198412\%2974\%3A5\%3C931\%3ADBMSAS\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-S},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Nancy T Gallini},
month = dec,
year = {1984},
pages = {931-941}
}
@article{anton_ea_1994,
number = {1},
title = {{Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights}},
volume = {84},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28199403\%2984\%3A1\%3C190\%3AEAIARI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-G},
abstract = {We analyze the problem faced by a financially weak independent inventor when selling a valuable, but easily imitated, invention for which no property rights exist. The inventor can protect his or her intellectual property by negotiating a contingent contract (with a buyer) prior to revealing the invention or, alternatively, the inventor can reveal the invention and then negotiate with the newly informed buyer. Despite the risk of expropriation, we find that, in equilibrium, an inventor with little wealth can expect to appropriate a sizable share of the market value of the invention by adopting the latter approach.},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {James J Anton and Dennis A Yao},
month = mar,
year = {1994},
pages = {190-209}
}
@article{bhattacharya_ea_1983,
number = {2},
title = {{Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure}},
volume = {50},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28198304\%2950\%3A2\%3C331\%3AIACSWP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-A},
abstract = {This paper introduces a model of "feedback effect equilibrium", i.e. equilibria in which an asymmetrically informed agent is motivated to communicate its privately known attribute but can do so only through channels or signals which convey directly useful information to competing agents. This revelation to the competition serves to reduce the value of the private information held by the first agent. Models of this kind are of obvious relevance to realistic theories of product or financial market disclosure policies of firms, patenting, and a host of related behavioural and regulatory issues. This model is developed in the context of a set of firms engaged in research and development rivalry, in which the value of privately held and disclosed information arises from its implications for the likelihood and timing of productive innovation.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Sudipto Bhattacharya and Jay R Ritter},
month = apr,
year = {1983},
pages = {331-346},
rgrp-note = {Not very relevant to innovation/IP stuff.}
}
@article{blundell_ea_1999,
number = {3},
title = {{Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms}},
volume = {66},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28199907\%2966\%3A3\%3C529\%3AMSMVAI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-5},
abstract = {This paper examines the empirical relationship between technological innovations, market share and stock market value. New developments in the estimation of dynamic count data models are used to control for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity. We find a robust and positive effect of market share on observable headcounts of innovations and patents although increased product market competition in the industry tends to stimulate innovative activity. Furthermore, the impact of innovation on market value is larger for firms with higher market shares. We argue that our results are consistent with models where high market share firms have incentives to pre-emptively innovate.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Richard Blundell and Rachel Griffith and John Van Reenen},
month = jul,
year = {1999},
pages = {529-554}
}
@article{fishman_ea_2000,
number = {2},
title = {{Product Innovation by a Durable-Good Monopoly}},
volume = {31},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200022\%2931\%3A2\%3C237\%3APIBADM\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-J},
abstract = {We consider a durable-good monopolist that periodically introduces new models, each new model representing an improvement upon its predecessor. We show that if the monopolist is able neither to exercise planned obsolescence (i.e., artificially shorten the life of its products) nor to give discounts to repeat customers, the rate of product introductions is too slow-in comparison with the social optimum. On the other hand, if the monopolist is able to artificially shorten the durability of its products or to offer price discounts to repeat customers, it can raise its profit and, at the same time, implement the social optimum.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Arthur Fishman and Rafael Rob},
year = {2000},
pages = {237-252}
}
@article{gallini_ea_1990,
number = {1},
title = {{Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information}},
volume = {21},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199021\%2921\%3A1\%3C147\%3ATTUAI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
abstract = {Licensing contracts for newly patented innovations are observed to vary along several dimensions, including the form and size of the payment to the inventor (fixed fee versus some output-based royalty), the degree of exclusivity, and the division of rents. In this article, we show that the form of the contract can be explained by two problems in technology exchange: the superiority of a licensor's precontractual information about the economic value of the innovation and the fact that sharing this information with the licensee may facilitate imitation. We show that a licensor signals her technology type with an output-based payment (or royalty) and may leave some of the rents with the licensee. Conditions under which exclusive license contracts (linear and nonlinear) and nonexclusive linear contracts are used to transfer technology are identified.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Nancy T Gallini and Brian D Wright},
year = {1990},
pages = {147-160}
}
@article{anton_ea_2002,
number = {3},
title = {{The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting}},
volume = {69},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28200207\%2969\%3A3\%3C513\%3ATSOISD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-K},
abstract = {Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect the nonverifiability of key elements of an intellectual property sale. An expropriable partial disclosure can be used as a signal, allowing the seller to obtain payment based on the value of the remaining (undisclosed) know-how. We examine contracting after the disclosure and find that seller wealth is pivotal in supporting a partial disclosure equilibrium and in determining the payoff size.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {James J Anton and Dennis A Yao},
month = jul,
year = {2002},
pages = {513-531}
}
@article{gabszewicz_ea_1980,
title = {{Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated Industry}},
author = {Gabszewicz, J. J. and J.-F. Thisse},
year = 1980,
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
volume = {22},
pages = {327-338}
}
@article{shaked_ea_1987,
number = {2},
title = {{Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure}},
volume = {36},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28198712\%2936\%3A2\%3C131\%3APDAIS\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-G},
abstract = {Some recent literature on "vertical product differentiation" has developed the idea that if the nature of technology and tastes in some industry take a certain form, then the industry must necessarily be "concentrated"; and must remain so, no matter how large the economy becomes. The present paper develops this idea further, and looks at some of its implications. This approach offers a simple unified framework within which to re-explore many issues which arise in considering the relationship between advertising, R \& D, and market structure.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Avner Shaked and John Sutton},
month = dec,
year = {1987},
pages = {131-146}
}
@article{shaked_ea_1982,
number = {1},
title = {{Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation}},
volume = {49},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28198201\%2949\%3A1\%3C3\%3ARPCTPD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
abstract = {The notion of a Perfect Equilibrium in a multi-Stage game is used to characterize industry equilibrium under Monopolistic Competition, where products are differentiated by quality.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Avner Shaked and John Sutton},
year = {1982},
pages = {3-13}
}
@article{shaked_ea_1983,
number = {5},
title = {{Natural Oligopolies}},
volume = {51},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198309\%2951\%3A5\%3C1469\%3ANO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-3},
abstract = {In a market where firms offer products which differ in quality, an upper bound may exist to the number of firms which can coexist at a noncooperative price equilibrium. We fully characterize the conditions under which this possibility arises.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Avner Shaked and John Sutton},
month = sep,
year = {1983},
pages = {1469-1483}
}
@article{horowitz_1963,
number = {2},
title = {{Research Inclinations of a Cournot Oligopolist}},
volume = {30},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28196306\%2930\%3A2\%3C128\%3ARIOACO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-5},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Ira Horowitz},
month = jun,
year = {1963},
pages = {128-130}
}
@article{gompers_ea_2001,
number = {2},
title = {{The Venture Capital Revolution}},
volume = {15},
issn = {08953309},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309\%28200121\%2915\%3A2\%3C145\%3ATVCR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-3},
journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
author = {Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner},
year = {2001},
pages = {145-168}
}
@article{bernheim_ea_1998,
number = {1},
title = {{Exclusive Dealing}},
volume = {106},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28199802\%29106\%3A1\%3C64\%3AED\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-B},
abstract = {In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provisions may be irrelevant, anticompetitive, or efficiency-enhancing, depending on the setting. More specifically, we exhibit the potential for anticompetitive effects in noncoincident markets (i.e., markets other than the ones in which exclusive dealing is practiced), and we explore the potential for the enhancement of efficiency in a setting in which common representation gives rise to incentive conflicts. In each instance, we describe the manner in which equilibrium outcomes would be altered by a ban on exclusive dealing. We demonstrate that a ban may have surprisingly subtle and unintended effects.},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D Whinston},
month = feb,
year = {1998},
pages = {64-103},
rgrp-tags = {network}
}
@article{denicolo_ea_2003,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:4:p:365-380},
author = {Denicolo, Vincenzo and Franzoni, Luigi Alberto},
title = {{The Contract Theory of Patents}},
journal = {International Review of Law and Economics},
year = 2003,
volume = {23},
number = {4},
pages = {365-380},
month = {December}
}
@article{bessen_2005,
title = {{Patents and the Diffusion of Technical Information}},
author = {Bessen, James},
journal = {Economics Letters},
volume = {86},
number = {3},
year = {2005},
pages = {121-128},
abstract = {Abstract: Does the disclosure requirement of the patent system encourage the diffusion of inventions? This paper builds a simple model where firms choose between patents and trade secrecy to protect inventions. Diffusion is not more likely with a patent system nor is the "market for technology" necessarily greater.}
}
@article{aghion_ea_1992,
number = {2},
title = {{A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction}},
volume = {60},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28199203\%2960\%3A2\%3C323\%3AAMOGTC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-\%23},
abstract = {A model of endogenous growth is developed in which vertical innovations, generated by a competitive research sector, constitute the underlying source of growth. Equilibrium is determined by a forward-looking difference equation, according to which the amount of research in any period depends upon the expected amount of research next period. One source of this intertemporal relationship is creative destruction. That is, the prospect of more future research discourages current research by threatening to destroy the rents created by current research. The paper analyzes the positive and normative properties of stationary equilibria, in which research employment is constant and GNP follows a random walk with drift, although under some circumstances cyclical equilibria also exist. Both the average growth rate and the variance of the growth rate are increasing functions of the size of innovations, the size of the skilled labor force, and the productivity of research as measured by a parameter indicating the effect of research on the Poisson arrival rate of innovations; and decreasing functions of the rate of time preference of the representative individual. Under laissez faire the economy's growth rate may be more or less than optimal because, in addition to the appropriability and intertemporal spillover effects of other endogenous growth models, which tend to make growth slower than optimal, the model also has effects that work in the opposite direction. In particular, the fact that private research firms do not internalize the destruction of rents generated by their innovations introduces a business-stealing effect similar to that found in the partial-equilibrium patent race literature. When we endogenize the size of innovations we find that business stealing also makes innovations too small.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt},
month = mar,
year = {1992},
pages = {323-351}
}
@article{romer_1986,
number = {5},
title = {{Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth}},
volume = {94},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28198610\%2994\%3A5\%3C1002\%3AIRALG\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-C},
abstract = {This paper presents a fully specified model of long-run growth in which knowledge is assumed to be an input in production that has increasing marginal productivity. It is essentially a competitive equilibrium model with endogenous technological change. In contrast to models based on diminishing returns, growth rates can be increasing over time, the effects of small disturbances can be amplified by the actions of private agents, and large countries may always grow faster than small countries. Long-run evidence is offered in support of the empirical relevance of these possibilities.},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Paul M Romer},
month = oct,
year = {1986},
pages = {1002-1037}
}
@article{helpman_1993,
number = {6},
title = {{Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights}},
volume = {61},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28199311\%2961\%3A6\%3C1247\%3AIIAIPR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-C},
abstract = {The debate between the North and the South about the enforcement of intellectual property rights is examined within a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the North invents new products and the South imitates them. A welfare evaluation of a policy of tighter intellectual property rights is provided by decomposing the welfare change into four items: (a) terms of trade; (b) production composition; (c) available products; and (d) intertemporal allocation of consumption. The paper provides a theoretical evaluation of the effect of each one of these items and their relative size. The analysis proceeds in stages. It begins with an exogenous rate of innovation in order to focus on the first two elements. The following two components are added by endogenizing the rate of innovation. Finally, the paper considers the role of foreign direct investment.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Elhanan Helpman},
month = nov,
year = {1993},
pages = {1247-1280}
}
@article{grossman_ea_1991,
number = {1},
title = {{Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth}},
volume = {58},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28199101\%2958\%3A1\%3C43\%3AQLITTO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-V},
abstract = {We develop a model of repeated product improvements in a continuum of sectors. Each product follows a stochastic progression up a quality ladder. Progress is not uniform across sectors, so an equilibrium distribution of qualities evolves over time. But the rate of aggregate growth is constant. The growth rate responds to profit incentives in the R\&D sector. We explore the welfare properties of our model. Then we relate our approach to an alternative one that views product innovation as a process of generating an ever-expanding range of horizontally differentiated products. Finally, we apply the model to issues of resource accumulation and international trade.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Gene M Grossman and Elhanan Helpman},
year = {1991},
pages = {43-61}
}
@article{gallini_2002,
number = {2},
title = {{The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform}},
volume = {16},
issn = {08953309},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309\%28200221\%2916\%3A2\%3C131\%3ATEOPLF\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-M},
journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
author = {Nancy T Gallini},
year = {2002},
pages = {131-154}
}
@article{suzumura_1992,
number = {5},
title = {{Cooperative and Noncooperative R\&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers}},
volume = {82},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28199212\%2982\%3A5\%3C1307\%3ACANRIA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-B},
abstract = {This paper examines the positive and normative effects of cooperative R\&D--whereby member firms commit themselves to the joint profit-maximizing level of R\&D in a "precompetitive stage" but remain fierce competitors in the product market--vis-a-vis noncooperative R\&D, socially first-best R\&D, and socially second-best R\&D. In the presence of sufficiently large R\&D spillovers, neither noncooperative nor cooperative equilibria achieve even second-best R\&D levels. In the absence of spillover effects, however, while the cooperative R\&D level remains socially insufficient, the noncooperative level may overshoot first- and second-best levels of R\&D.},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Kotaro Suzumura},
month = dec,
year = {1992},
pages = {1307-1320}
}
@article{simpson_ea_1994,
number = {1},
title = {{Cournot Equilibrium with Imperfectly Appropriable R\&D}},
volume = {42},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199403\%2942\%3A1\%3C79\%3ACEWIAR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
abstract = {We investigate the effects of knowledge spillovers, numbers of incumbents, and demand characteristics on market equilibria involving either noncooperative firms or a research joint venture. Firms engage in cost-reducing R\&D before competing in outputs. Noncooperative R\&D expenditure is socially suboptimal with convex demand and likely to be so under general demand functions. A research joint venture involving all firms in the industry always invests too little relative to the social optimum. It may, however, lead to better market performance than is achieved under the noncooperative regime.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {R. David Simpson and Nicholas S Vonortas},
month = mar,
year = {1994},
pages = {79-92}
}
@article{duranton_2000,
number = {2},
title = {{Cumulative Investment and Spillovers in the Formation of Technological Landscapes}},
volume = {48},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28200006\%2948\%3A2\%3C205\%3ACIASIT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-M},
abstract = {In this paper, the evolution of product differentiation in industries is modeled as the result of a cumulative cost-reduction process subject to spillovers in a differentiated oligopoly. Our results suggest that the long-run outcome is dependent on the intensity of spillovers and the shape of their diffusion function. With weak spillovers, firms dig their niche over time, differentiation remains important and cost-reduction keeps going. By contrast, if spillovers are strong and have a concave diffusion function, firms gradually use more similar technologies. This standardization process involves less and less investment. For spillovers of intermediate strength, complex technological landscapes may arise.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Gilles Duranton},
month = jun,
year = {2000},
pages = {205-213}
}
@article{katsoulacos_ea_1998,
number = {3},
title = {{Endogenous Spillovers and the Performance of Research Joint Ventures}},
volume = {46},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199809\%2946\%3A3\%3C333\%3AESATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-V},
abstract = {We present a model of R\&D with endogenous spillovers and demonstrate that noncooperation can produce maximal spillovers. The only other noncooperative outcome is minimal spillovers. When noncooperation achieves maximal spillovers so does an RJV, whereas minimal noncooperative spillovers imply partial--but not necessarily maximal--spillovers by an RJV. Partial RJV spillovers are chosen for anti-competitive reasons and an RJV may also close a lab for anti-competitive reasons. The possibility of anti-competitive outcomes is precluded in the existing literature on RJVs which focuses on symmetric outcomes. Our model predicts when anti-competitive behaviour by an RJV arises.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Yannis Katsoulacos and David Ulph},
month = sep,
year = {1998},
pages = {333-357}
}
@article{harberger_1954,
number = {2, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association},
title = {{Monopoly and Resource Allocation}},
volume = {44},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28195405\%2944\%3A2\%3C77\%3AMARA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Arnold C Harberger},
month = may,
year = {1954},
pages = {77-87}
}
@article{leahy_ea_1997,
number = {4},
title = {{Public Policy Towards R\&D in Oligopolistic Industries}},
volume = {87},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28199709\%2987\%3A4\%3C642\%3APPTRIO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-C},
abstract = {We consider the free-market and socially optimal outcomes in a general oligopoly model with many firms which first engage in R\&D and then compete in either output or price. Strategic behavior by firms tends to reduce output, R\&D, and welfare and so justifies higher subsidies except when R\&D spillovers are low and firms' actions are strategic substitutes. It also reduces the benefits of R\&D cooperation. Moreover, policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition policy is high.},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Dermot Leahy and J. Peter Neary},
month = sep,
year = {1997},
pages = {642-662}
}
@article{katz_ea_1990,
title = {{R\&D Cooperation and Competition}},
volume = {1990},
issn = {10578641},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1057-8641\%281990\%291990\%3C137\%3ARADCAC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-7},
journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics},
author = {Michael L Katz and Janusz A Ordover},
year = {1990},
pages = {137-203},
rgrp-notes = {Commentary from Franklin Fisher and Richard Schmalensee, who both point out that in the end the paper seems to tell us: it depends on the models ....}
}
@article{goyal_ea_2001,
number = {4},
title = {{R\&D Networks}},
volume = {32},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200124\%2932\%3A4\%3C686\%3ARN\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
abstract = {We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R\&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing, and efficient. By contrast, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint. This suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Sanjeev Goyal and Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez},
year = {2001},
pages = {686-707}
}
@article{ziss_1994,
number = {4},
title = {{Strategic R \& D with Spillovers, Collusion and Welfare}},
volume = {42},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199412\%2942\%3A4\%3C375\%3ASR\%26DWS\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-7},
abstract = {We consider a two-stage R \& D then output or price duopoly game in which R \& D spills over, so reducing the marginal cost of both the investing firm and its rival. We compare the non-cooperative regime to three collusive regimes: joint venture (collusion on R \& D), price fixing (collusion at the price or output stage) and merger (collusion at both stages) and evaluate under what circumstances a collusive regime improves welfare. If spillovers are sufficiently large, all three regimes are beneficial, although mergers are more likely, and price-fixing less likely to produce specific benefits than are joint ventures.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Steffen Ziss},
month = dec,
year = {1994},
pages = {375-393}
}
@article{schwartzman_1960,
number = {6},
title = {{The Burden of Monopoly}},
volume = {68},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28196012\%2968\%3A6\%3C627\%3ATBOM\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-B},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {David Schwartzman},
month = dec,
year = {1960},
pages = {627-630}
}
@article{kamien_ea_1986,
number = {3},
title = {{Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent}},
volume = {101},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28198608\%29101\%3A3\%3C471\%3AFVRATP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-7},
abstract = {We compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost-reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product, by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty. Our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n + 1 players: the inventor and the n firms. In this game the inventor acts as a Stackelberg leader, and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers. Only a "drastic" innovation is licensed to a single producer.},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Morton I Kamien and Yair Tauman},
month = aug,
year = {1986},
pages = {471-492}
}
@article{katz_ea_1986,
number = {3},
title = {{How to License Intangible Property}},
volume = {101},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28198608\%29101\%3A3\%3C567\%3AHTLIP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-F},
abstract = {We examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors. We consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture. We show that (1) demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit-maximizing licensing strategy; (2) the seller's incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive; (3) the seller's incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low; (4) larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation, and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs; and (5) a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation.},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro},
month = aug,
year = {1986},
pages = {567-590}
}
@article{benoit_1985,
number = {1},
title = {{Innovation and Imitation in a Duopoly}},
volume = {52},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28198501\%2952\%3A1\%3C99\%3AIAIIAD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-5},
abstract = {In a duopoly where one firm has the idea for a non-patentable innovation, the expected profits from the innovation will not be a monotonic function of the cost of innovating. Furthermore, a costly innovation may be undertaken, where an inexpensive one would not have been, all other things being equal.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Jean-Pierre Benoit},
year = {1985},
pages = {99-106}
}
@article{eswaran_1994,
number = {3},
title = {{Licensees as Entry Barriers}},
volume = {27},
issn = {00084085},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085\%28199408\%2927\%3A3\%3C673\%3ALAEB\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-6},
abstract = {In a more general setting than has been considered hitherto, this paper examines how the incumbent in a market threatened by entry can exploit its first-mover advantage by licensing its technology not to a potential entrant but to firms that would have remained outside the industry. It is shown, among other things, that the incumbent may subsidize the variable costs of its licensees in order to deter entry. Even when entry is not deterred, it is demonstrated that the incumbent might opt to invite outsiders as licensees. /// Firmes a qui on accorde une licence en tant que barrieres a l'entree. Ce memoire examine, dans un cadre de reference plus general que d'habitude, comment la firme qui occupe un marche menace par la possibilite d'un nouvel arrivant peut prendre l'initiative en accordant une licence non pas a l'entrant potentiel mais a des firmes qui demeureraient hors de l'industrie. On montre que, entre autres choses, la firme en place peut subventionner les couts variables des firmes auxquelles elle accorde une licence afin de decourager l'entree. Meme quand on n'empeche pas l'entree de la nouvelle firme, on montre que l'entreprise en place peut choisir d'inviter les firmes externes a se prevaloir de l'acces a la licence.},
journal = {The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique},
author = {Mukesh Eswaran},
month = aug,
year = {1994},
pages = {673-688}
}
@article{katz_ea_1987,
number = {3},
title = {{R\&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation}},
volume = {77},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198706\%2977\%3A3\%3C402\%3ARADRWL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-K},
abstract = {We study the rivalry between two firms to develop an innovation in a dynamic setting that allows for postdevelopment dissemination of the innovation, such as licensing or imitation. This dissemination may cause the noninnovating firm to benefit from the discovery. When this occurs, conventional results in the economics of R \& D no longer need apply. We find that industry leaders will tend to develop minor innovations, but will develop major innovations only if imitation is difficult.},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro},
month = jun,
year = {1987},
pages = {402-420}
}
@article{rockett_1990,
number = {1},
title = {{Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing}},
volume = {21},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199021\%2921\%3A1\%3C161\%3ACTCAPL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-X},
abstract = {This article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patenteemonopolist will face in the period after the patent expires. The queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative "strengths" as competitors (for example, by size or level of marginal cost). By structuring the industry to be composed of "weak" competitors, the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires. Examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that "choosing the competition" was an important motivation of the licensor's behavior.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Katharine E Rockett},
year = {1990},
pages = {161-171}
}
@article{chaudhuri_ea_2006,
citeuliki-id = {citeulike:1034875},
author = {Chaudhuri, Shubham and Goldberg, Pinelopi K. and Jia, Panle},
citeulike-article-id = {1034875},
doi = {10.1257/000282806779396111},
issn = {0002-8282},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
month = {December},
number = {5},
pages = {1477--1514},
publisher = {American Economic Association},
title = {{Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India}},
url-src = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282806779396111},
volume = {96},
year = {2006}
}
@book{taylor_ea_1973,
author = {Taylor, C. T. and Silberston, Z. A.},
title = {{The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A Study of the British Experience}},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = 1973
}
@article{levin_1986,
number = {2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association},
title = {{A New Look at the Patent System}},
volume = {76},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198605\%2976\%3A2\%3C199\%3AANLATP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-9},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Richard C Levin},
month = may,
year = {1986},
pages = {199-202}
}
@article{pepall_ea_1994,
number = {3},
title = {{Innovation, Imitation, and Social Welfare}},
volume = {60},
issn = {00384038},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-4038\%28199401\%2960\%3A3\%3C673\%3AIIASW\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-S},
journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
author = {Lynne M Pepall and Daniel J Richards},
year = {1994},
pages = {673-684}
}
@article{choi_1998,
number = {5},
title = {{Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism}},
volume = {88},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28199812\%2988\%3A5\%3C1249\%3APLAAIM\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-U},
abstract = {Patent litigation reveals important information about the validity of the contested patent to other potential entrants. This paper explores the implications of such informational externalities for entry dynamics in the presence of multiple potential entrants. The nature of the entry game can be one of either waiting or pre-emption depending on the degree of patent protection. Therefore, the payoffs for the patentee and the initial imitator are discontinuous in the degree of patent protection. Furthermore, strengthening intellectual property rights is not necessarily desirable for the patentee. The analysis may also help explain the apparently puzzling practice of delaying patent suits.},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Jay Pil Choi},
month = dec,
year = {1998},
pages = {1249-1263}
}
@article{aghion_ea_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:120:y:2005:i:2:p:701-728},
author = {Philippe Aghion and Nick Bloom and Richard Blundell and Rachel Griffith and Peter Howitt},
title = {{Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 2005,
volume = {120},
number = {2},
pages = {701-728},
month = {May},
abstract = {This paper investigates the relationship between product market competition and innovation. We find strong evidence of an inverted-U relationship using panel data. We develop a model where competition discourages laggard firms from innovating but encourages neck-and-neck firms to innovate. Together with the effect of competition on the equilibrium industry structure, these generate an inverted-U. Two additional predictions of the model-that the average technological distance between leaders and followers increases with competition, and that the inverted-U is steeper when industries are more neck-and-neck-are both supported by the data.}
}
@incollection{shapiro_2001,
title = {{Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting}},
author = {Shapiro, Carl},
booktitle = {{Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol. 1}},
publisher = {MIT Press},
year = 2001,
pages = {119-50}
}
@article{jovanovic_ea_1994,
number = {1},
title = {{Competitive Diffusion}},
volume = {102},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28199402\%29102\%3A1\%3C24\%3ACD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-C},
abstract = {This paper studies the evolution of a competitive industry in which a fixed number of firms reduce costs by innovating and by imitating their rivals' technologies. As the firms' technologies gradually improve, industry output expands and price falls. Technological leaders tend to rely on innovations to reduce their costs, whereas the laggards rely more on imitation. Imitation causes technology to spread from the leaders to the followers and forces some convergence of technology among firms as the industry matures. This convergence is accompanied by faster growth of smaller firms and a consequent tightening of the distribution of output over firms. Since imitation is a kind of spillover of technology, equilibrium is likely to involve insufficient innovative and imitative effort relative to a social optimum.},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Boyan Jovanovic and Glenn M MacDonald},
month = feb,
year = {1994},
pages = {24-52}
}
@article{lerner_ea_2004,
number = {3},
title = {{Efficient Patent Pools}},
volume = {94},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28200406\%2994\%3A3\%3C691\%3AEPP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-\%23},
abstract = {The paper builds a tractable model of patent pools, agreements among patent owners to license sets of their patents. It provides a necessary and sufficient condition for patent pools to enhance welfare and shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing. The paper allows patents to differ in importance, asymmetric blocking patterns, and licensors to also be licensees. We undertake some initial exploration of the impact of pools on innovation. The analysis has broader applicability than pools, being relevant to a number of co-marketing arrangements.},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole},
month = jun,
year = {2004},
pages = {691-711}
}
@article{griliches_1957,
number = {4},
title = {{Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological Change}},
volume = {25},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28195710\%2925\%3A4\%3C501\%3AHCAEIT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-A},
abstract = {This is a study of factors responsible for the wide cross-sectional differences in the past and current rates of use of hybrid seed corn in the United States. Logistic growth functions are fitted to the data by states and crop reporting districts, reducing differences among areas to differences in estimates of the three parameters of the logistic: origins, slopes, and ceilings. The lag in the development of adaptable hybrids for particular areas and the lag in the entry of seed producers into these areas (differences in origins) are explained on the basis of varying profitability of entry, "profitability" being a function of market density, and innovation and marketing cost. Differences in the long-run equilibrium use of hybrid corn (ceilings) and in the rates of approach to that equilibrium (slopes) are explained, at least in part, by differences in the profitability of the shift from open pollinated to hybrid varieties in different parts of the country. The results are summarized and the conclusion is drawn that the process of innovation, the process of adapting and distributing a particular invention to different markets and the rate at which it is accepted by entrepreneurs are amenable to economic analysis.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Zvi Griliches},
month = oct,
year = {1957},
pages = {501-522}
}
@article{davidson_ea_1998,
number = {3},
title = {{R\&D Subsidies and Economic Growth}},
volume = {29},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199823\%2929\%3A3\%3C548\%3ARSAEG\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-G},
abstract = {We present an endogenous growth model in which some firms devote resources to developing higher-quality products (innovative R\&D) and other firms devote resources to copying these products (imitative R\&D). Although consumers benefit from the knowledge created by both types of R\&D activities, only innovative R\&D subsidies lead to faster economic growth; imitative R\&D subsidies actually lead to slower economic growth. A key assumption driving these conclusions is that R\&D activities are subject to decreasing returns. When R\&D activities are subject to constant returns, as is commonly assumed, the only equilibrium with both innovation and imitation is unstable.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Carl Davidson and Paul Segerstrom},
year = {1998},
pages = {548-577}
}
@article{griliches_1958,
number = {5},
title = {{Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related Innovations}},
volume = {66},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28195810\%2966\%3A5\%3C419\%3ARCASRH\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-S},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Zvi Griliches},
month = oct,
year = {1958},
pages = {419-431}
}
@article{jovanovic_1982,
number = {3},
title = {{Selection and the Evolution of Industry}},
volume = {50},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198205\%2950\%3A3\%3C649\%3ASATEOI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
abstract = {Recent evidence shows that within an industry, smaller firms grow faster and are more likely to fail than large firms. This paper provides a theory of selection with incomplete information that is consistent with these and other findings. Firms learn about their efficiency as they operate in the industry. The efficient grow and survive; the inefficient decline and fail. A perfect foresight equilibrium is proved by means of showing that it is a unique maximum to discounted net surplus. The maximization problem is not standard, and some mathematical results might be of independent interest.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Boyan Jovanovic},
month = may,
year = {1982},
pages = {649-670}
}
@article{mansfield_1961,
number = {4},
title = {{Technical Change and the Rate of Imitation}},
volume = {29},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28196110\%2929\%3A4\%3C741\%3ATCATRO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-W},
abstract = {This paper investigates the factors determining how rapidly the use of a new technique spreads from one firm to another. A simple model is presented to help explain differences among innovations in the rate of imitation. Deterministic and stochastic versions of this model are tested against data showing how rapidly firms in four industries came to use twelve important innovations. The empirical results seem quite consistent with both versions of the model.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Edwin Mansfield},
month = oct,
year = {1961},
pages = {741-766}
}
@article{johnston_1966,
number = {2},
series = {2},
title = {{Technical Progress and Innovation}},
volume = {18},
issn = {00307653},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653\%28196607\%292\%3A18\%3A2\%3C158\%3ATPAI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-V},
journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
author = {Robert E Johnston},
month = jul,
year = {1966},
pages = {158-176}
}
@article{baldwin_ea_1969,
number = {1},
title = {{The Fast Second and Rivalry in Research and Development}},
volume = {36},
issn = {00384038},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-4038\%28196907\%2936\%3A1\%3C18\%3ATFSARI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
author = {William L Baldwin and Gerald L Childs},
month = jul,
year = {1969},
pages = {18-24}
}
@article{krugman_1979,
number = {2},
title = {{A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer, and the World Distribution of Income}},
volume = {87},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28197904\%2987\%3A2\%3C253\%3AAMOITT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-6},
abstract = {This paper develops a simple general-equilibrium model of product cycle trade. There are two countries, innovating North and noninnovating South. Innovation consists of the development of new products. These can be produced at first only in North, but eventually the technology of production becomes available to South. This technological lag gives rise to trade, with North exporting new products and importing old products. Higher Northern per capita income depends on the quasi rents from the Northern monopoly of new products, so that North must continually innovate not only to maintain its relative position but even to maintain its real income in absolute terms.},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Paul Krugman},
month = apr,
year = {1979},
pages = {253-266}
}
@article{grossman_ea_1991b,
number = {2},
title = {{Quality Ladders and Product Cycles}},
volume = {106},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28199105\%29106\%3A2\%3C557\%3AQLAPC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-\%23},
abstract = {We develop a two-country model of endogenous innovation and imitation in order to study the interactions between these two processes. Firms in the North race to bring out the next generation of a set of technology-intensive products. Each product potentially can be improved a countably infinite number of times, but quality improvements require the investment of resources and entail uncertain prospects of success. In the South entrepreneurs invest resources in order to learn the production processes that have been developed in the North. All R\&D investment decisions are made by forward-looking, profit-maximizing entrepreneurs. The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by constant aggregate rates of innovation and imitation. We study how these rates respond to changes in the sizes of the two regions and to policies in each region to promote learning.},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Gene M Grossman and Elhanan Helpman},
month = may,
year = {1991},
pages = {557-586}
}
@misc{gilbert_ea_2007,
title = {{Efficient Division of Profit for Complex Technologies}},
author = {Richard Gilbert and Michael Katz},
year = {2007},
note = {Unpublished working paper.}
}
@article{lerner_ea_2002,
repec-id = {RePEc:bla:jindec:v:50:y:2002:i:2:p:197-234},
author = {Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean},
title = {{Some Simple Economics of Open}},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = 2002,
volume = {50},
number = {2},
pages = {197-234},
month = {June}
}
@article{lerner_ea_2005b,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:jecper:v:19:y:2005:i:2:p:99-120},
author = {Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole},
title = {{The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond}},
journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
year = 2005,
volume = {19},
number = {2},
pages = {99-120},
month = {Spring}
}
@techreport{maurer_ea_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12148},
author = {Stephen M. Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer},
title = {{Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm}},
year = 2006,
month = apr,
institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc},
type = {NBER Working Papers},
number = {12148}
}
@article{hunt_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:87-91},
author = {Robert M. Hunt},
title = {{When Do More Patents Reduce R\&D?}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2006,
volume = {96},
number = {2},
pages = {87-91},
month = {May}
}
@book{jefferson_1905,
author = {Jefferson, Thomas},
title = {{The Writings of Thomas Jefferson}},
editor = {Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh},
publisher = {Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association},
year = 1905
}
@article{delaat_1996,
title = {{Patents or Prizes: Monopolistic R\&D and Asymmetric Information}},
author = {De Laat, E. A.},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
volume = {15},
number = {3},
pages = {369-390},
year = 1996
}
@article{teece_1986,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:respol:v:15:y:1986:i:6:p:285-305},
author = {Teece, David J.},
title = {{Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy}},
journal = {Research Policy},
year = 1986,
volume = {15},
number = {6},
pages = {285-305},
month = {December}
}
@article{shavell_ea_2001,
repec-id = {RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:44:y:2001:i:2:p:525-47},
author = {Shavell, Steven and van Ypersele, Tanguy},
title = {{Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights}},
journal = {Journal of Law \& Economics},
year = 2001,
volume = {44},
number = {2},
pages = {525-47},
month = {October}
}
@article{kremer_1998,
number = {4},
title = {{Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation}},
volume = {113},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28199811\%29113\%3A4\%3C1137\%3APBAMFE\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
abstract = {In 1839 the French government purchased the Daguerreotype patent and placed it in the public domain. Such patent buyouts could potentially eliminate the monopoly price distortions and incentives for rent-stealing duplicative research created by patents, while increasing incentives for original research. Governments could offer to purchase patents at their estimated private value, as determined in an auction, times a markup equal to the typical ratio of inventions' social and private value. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but to induce bidders to reveal their valuations, a few would be sold to the highest bidder.},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Michael Kremer},
month = nov,
year = {1998},
pages = {1137-1167}
}
@article{wright_1983,
number = {4},
title = {{The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts}},
volume = {73},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198309\%2973\%3A4\%3C691\%3ATEOIIP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Brian D Wright},
month = sep,
year = {1983},
pages = {691-707}
}
@article{bessen_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:16:y:2007:i:1:p:157-189},
author = {James Bessen and Robert M. Hunt},
title = {{An Empirical Look at Software Patents}},
journal = {Journal of Economics \& Management Strategy},
year = 2007,
volume = {16},
number = {1},
pages = {157-189},
month = {03}
}
@misc{pollock_2006,
author = {Rufus Pollock},
title = {{The Value of the Public Domain}},
year = 2006,
month = jul,
note = {Published by the Institute for Public Policy Research as part of a series on IP and the Public Sphere},
url = {http://www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=482}
}
@techreport{pollock_2006b,
repec-id = {RePEc:aal:abbswp:06-29},
author = {Rufus Pollock},
title = {{Cumulative Innovation, Sampling and the Hold-up Problem}},
year = 2006,
institution = {DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies},
type = {DRUID Working Papers},
number = {06-29}
}
@incollection{bessen_2006,
title = {{Open Source Software: Free Provision of Complex Public Goods}},
author = {James Bessen},
editor = {Jargen Bitzer and Philipp J. H. Schraeder},
booktitle = {{The Economics of Open Source Software Development}},
publisher = {Elsevier B. V.},
year = 2006,
abstract = {Open source software, developed by volunteers, appears counter to the conventional wisdom that private provision of public goods is socially more efficient. But complexity makes a difference. Under standard models, development contracts for specialized software may be difficult to write and ownership rights do not necessarily elicit socially optimal effort. I consider three mechanisms that improve the likelihood that firms can obtain the software they need: pre-packaged software, Application Program Interfaces (APIs) and Free/Open Source software (FOSS). I show that with complex software, some firms will choose to participate in FOSS over both "make" or "buy" and this increases social welfare. In general, FOSS complements proprietary provision, rather than replacing it. Pre-packaged software can coexist in the marketplace with FOSS: pre-packaged software addresses common uses with limited feature sets, while firms with specialized, more complex needs use FOSS.}
}
@article{bonaccorsi_ea_2004,
author = {Bonaccorsi, A. and C. Rossi},
year = 2004,
title = {{Altruistic individuals, selfish firms? The structure of motivation in Open Source software}},
journal = {First Monday},
volume = {9},
number = {1},
url-src = {http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue9\_1/bonaccorsi/index.html},
rgrp-notes = {A summary of their working paper available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=433620.}
}
@techreport{rossi_2004,
repec-id = {RePEc:usi:wpaper:424},
author = {Maria Alessandra Rossi},
title = {{Decoding the "Free/Open Source(F/OSS) Software Puzzle" a survey of theoretical and empirical contributions}},
year = 2004,
month = apr,
institution = {Department of Economics, University of Siena},
type = {Department of Economics University of Siena},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/usi/wpaper/424.html},
number = {424}
}
@article{benkler_2002,
author = {Yochai Benkler},
title = {{Coase's Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm}},
journal = {Yale Law Journal},
volume = {112},
number = {3},
pages = {369-446},
year = 2002
}
@techreport{gaudeul_2004,
repec-id = {RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0409008},
author = {Alexandre Gaudeul},
title = {{Open Source Software Development Patterns and License Terms}},
year = 2004,
month = sep
}
@article{lakhani_ea_2003,
author = {Karim R. Lakhani and Eric von Hippel},
title = {{How open source software works: "free" user-to-user assistance}},
journal = {Research Policy},
year = 2003,
volume = 32,
number = 6,
pages = {923-943}
}
@article{hippel_2002,
type = {Working Paper Series},
title = {{Open Source Projects as Horizontal Innovation Networks - By and For Users}},
author = {Von Hippel, Eric},
journal = {SSRN eLibrary},
year = {2002},
publisher = {SSRN},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.328900},
keywords = {Innovation Networks, User Innovation, Open Source Software},
location = {http://ssrn.com/paper=328900},
language = {English}
}
@book{schumpeter_1947,
author = {Schumpeter, J.},
title = {{Captialism, Socialism and Democracy (2nd ed.)}},
publisher = {London Allen and Unwin},
year = 1947
}
@techreport{noel_ea_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5701},
author = {Noel, Michael D. and Schankerman, Mark},
title = {{Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation}},
year = 2006,
month = may,
institution = {C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers},
type = {CEPR Discussion Papers},
number = {5701}
}
@techreport{mortimer_ea_2005,
author = {Julie Mortimer and Alan Sorenson},
title = {{Supply Responses to Digital Distribution: Recorded Music and Live Performances}},
note = {Presented as preliminary version at the 2006 AEA conference},
url-src = {http://www.aeaweb.org/annual\_mtg\_papers/2006/0107_0800_0702.pdf},
year = 2005
}
@techreport{connolly_ea_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:pri:indrel:499},
author = {Marie Connolly and Alan Krueger},
title = {{Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music}},
year = 2005,
month = apr,
institution = {Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.},
type = {Working Papers},
number = {499}
}
@techreport{casadesus_ea_2003,
repec-id = {RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0519},
author = {Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon and Ghemawat, Pankaj},
title = {{Dynamic mixed duopoly: A model motivated by Linux vs. Windows}},
year = 2003,
month = sep,
institution = {IESE Business School},
type = {IESE Research Papers},
number = {D/519},
note = {Forthcoming in Management Science}
}
@book{lucas_ea_1989,
title = {{Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics}},
isbn = {0674750969},
publisher = {Harvard University Press},
author = {Nancy L. Stokey and Robert E., Jr. Lucas and Edward C. Prescott},
month = oct,
year = {1989},
pages = {616}
}
@techreport{rappaport_1998,
author = {Rappaport, E.},
title = {{Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values}},
institution = {Congressional Research Service},
month = may,
year = 1998,
url-src = {http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/1998/meta-crs-727.tkl}
}
@inbook{rappaport2002cte,
author = {Rappaport, E.},
year = 2002,
title = {{Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values}},
booktitle = {Copyright: Current Issues and Laws},
publisher = {Nova Science Publishers, Inc., New York}
}
@techreport{armstrong_ea_2005,
author = {Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright},
title = {{Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts}},
year = 2005,
note = {Forthcoming in Economic Theory}
}
@article{armstrong_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:2:p:353-380},
author = {Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright},
title = {{Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts}},
journal = {Economic Theory},
year = 2007,
volume = {32},
number = {2},
pages = {353-380},
month = {August}
}
@techreport{armstrong_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0505009},
author = {Mark Armstrong},
title = {{Competition in Two-Sided Markets}},
year = 2005,
note = {Forthcoming in the Rand Journal of Economics (December 2006)}
}
@article{armstrong_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:668-691},
author = {Mark Armstrong},
title = {{Competition in Two-Sided Markets}},
journal = {RAND Journal of Economics},
year = 2006,
volume = {37},
number = {3},
pages = {668-691},
month = {Autumn},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/rje/randje/v37y20063p668-691.html}
}
@techreport{choi_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:net:wpaper:0604},
author = {Jay Pil Choi},
title = {{Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing}},
year = 2006,
month = sep,
institution = {NET Institute},
type = {Working Papers},
number = {06-04}
}
@article{choi_2004,
repec-id = {RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:114:y:2004:i:492:p:83-101},
author = {Jay Pil Choi},
title = {{Tying and innovation: A dynamic analysis of tying arrangements}},
journal = {Economic Journal},
year = 2004,
volume = {114},
number = {492},
pages = {83-101},
month = {01}
}
@techreport{cabral_2007,
author = {Luis Cabral},
title = {{Dynamic Price Competition with Network Effects}},
year = 2007,
note = {Unpublished}
}
@article{hurt_ea_1966,
author = {Hurt, R. and Schuchman, R.},
title = {{The Economic Rationale for Copyright}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {56},
number = {1},
pages = {421-432},
year = 1966
}
@techreport{cabral_ea_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:ste:nystbu:07-6},
author = {Luis Cabral and Ben Polak},
title = {{Dominant Firms, Imitation, and Incentives to Innovate}},
year = 2007,
institution = {New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics},
type = {Working Papers},
number = {07-6}
}
@book{fisher_2004,
title = {{Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment}},
isbn = {0804750130},
publisher = {Stanford University Press},
author = {William W. Fisher},
month = aug,
year = {2004},
pages = {352}
}
@article{cabral_1994,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:indorg:v:12:y:1994:i:4:p:533-547},
author = {Cabral, Luis},
title = {{Bias in market R\&D portfolios}},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
year = 1994,
volume = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {533-547},
month = {December}
}
@article{harun_ea_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:91:y:2006:i:1:p:131-137},
author = {Bulut, Harun and Moschini, GianCarlo},
title = {{Patents, trade secrets and the correlation among R\&D projects}},
journal = {Economics Letters},
year = 2006,
volume = {91},
number = {1},
pages = {131-137},
month = {April}
}
@incollection{dasgupta_1989,
author = {Dasgupta, Partha},
title = {{The Economics of Parallel Research}},
editor = {Hahn, Frank},
booktitle = {{The Economic Theory of Information, Games, and Missing Markets}},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = 1989
}
@article{cardon_ea_1998,
title = {{Preemptive Search and R\&D Clustering}},
volume = {29},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199822\%2929\%3A2\%3C324\%3APSARC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-8},
abstract = {While many preceding studies discuss the equilibrium intensity of R\&D, this article focuses on its equilibrium direction. There can be a pure-strategy equilibrium in which multiple firms "cluster," i.e., attempt to develop the same technology even if (i) potential technologies are ex ante equally promising, (ii) each technology can be patented by no more than one firm, and (iii) there are no informational spillovers among firms. Economic applications of this clustering result are not confined to R\&D. Any situation where agents are racing in search of exclusive economic opportunities can be an example of this model.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {James H Cardon and Dan Sasaki},
year = {1998},
pages = {324-338}
}
@article{landes_ea_2003,
author = {Landes, William and Posner, Richard},
title = {{Indefinitely Renewable Copyright}},
journal = {University of Chicago Law Review},
volume = {70},
number = {2},
pages = {471-518},
year = 2003
}
@misc{brooks_2005,
author = {Brooks, Tim},
title = {{Survey of Reissues of US Recordings}},
year = 2005,
note = {Copublished by the Council on Library and Information Resources and the Library of Congress},
url-src = {http://www.clir.org/pubs/abstract/pub133abst.html}
}
@techreport{png_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000478},
author = {Ivan Png and Qiu-hong Wang},
title = {{Copyright Duration and the Supply of Creative Work}},
year = 2007,
month = jan,
institution = {UCLA Department of Economics},
type = {Levine's Working Paper Archive},
number = {321307000000000478},
url-src = {http://www.dklevine.com/archive/png-duration.pdf}
}
@article{hui_ea_2002,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:2:p:217-220},
author = {Kai-Lung Hui and I. P. L. Png},
title = {{On the Supply of Creative Work: Evidence from the Movies}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2002,
volume = {92},
number = {2},
pages = {217-220},
month = {May}
}
@article{sen_1977,
title = {{Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory}},
volume = {6},
issn = {00483915},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0048-3915\%28197722\%296\%3A4\%3C317\%3ARFACOT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Z},
journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs},
author = {Amartya K Sen},
year = {1977},
pages = {317-344}
}
@misc{hmt_2000,
title = {{Cross Cutting Review of the Knowledge Economy}},
author = {HM Treasury},
year = 2000,
url-src = {http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending\_review/spending\_review\_2000/associated\_documents/spend\_sr00\_ad\_ccrcontents.cfm}
}
@misc{hmt_2001,
title = {{Charges for Information: When and How}},
author = {HM Treasury},
year = 2001,
url-src = {http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/7/C/charging\_for\_info.pdf}
}
@misc{oft_2006,
title = {{The Commercial Use of Public Information}},
author = {{Office of Fair Trading}},
year = 2006,
url-src = {http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice\_and\_resources/resource\_base/market-studies/public-information}
}
@misc{mayo_ea_2007,
title = {{The Power of Information}},
author = {Ed Mayo and Tom Steinberg},
year = 2007,
url-src = {http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/downloads/work\_areas/power\_information/power\_information.pdf}
}
@techreport{oecd_2006,
author = {{OECD, Working Party on the Information Economy (Directorate for Science Technology and Industry)}},
title = {{Digital Broadband Content: Public Sector Information and Content}},
year = 2006,
url-src = {http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/22/36481524.pdf}
}
@techreport{pira_2000,
author = {{PIRA}},
title = {{Commercial Exploitation of Europe's Public Sector Information. Final Report for the European Commission, Directorate General for the Information Society}},
url-src = {http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/3538/5662},
year = 2000
}
@article{willig_1976,
title = {{Consumer's Surplus Without Apology}},
volume = {66},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28197609\%2966\%3A4\%3C589\%3ACSWA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-0},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Robert D Willig},
month = sep,
year = {1976},
pages = {589-597}
}
@article{ballard_ea_1992,
title = {{Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods}},
volume = {6},
issn = {08953309},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309\%28199222\%296\%3A3\%3C117\%3ADTATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-X},
journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
author = {Charles L Ballard and Don Fullerton},
year = {1992},
pages = {117-131}
}
@article{slesnick_1998,
title = {{Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare}},
volume = {36},
issn = {00220515},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0515\%28199812\%2936\%3A4\%3C2108\%3AEATTMO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-4},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
author = {Daniel T Slesnick},
month = dec,
year = {1998},
pages = {2108-2165}
}
@article{hausman_1981,
title = {{Exact Consumer's Surplus and Deadweight Loss}},
volume = {71},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198109\%2971\%3A4\%3C662\%3AECSADL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Jerry A Hausman},
month = sep,
year = {1981},
pages = {662-676}
}
@article{ruggieri_1999,
repec-id = {RePEc:ifs:fistud:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:41-60},
author = {Giuseppe Ruggieri},
title = {{The marginal cost of public funds in closed and small open economies}},
journal = {Fiscal Studies},
year = 1999,
volume = {20},
number = {1},
pages = {41-60},
month = {March}
}
@article{parry_2003,
repec-id = {RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:10:y:2003:i:3:p:281-304},
author = {Parry, Ian W H},
title = {{On the Costs of Excise Taxes and Income Taxes in the UK}},
journal = {International Tax and Public Finance},
year = 2003,
volume = {10},
number = {3},
pages = {281-304},
month = {May}
}
@article{feldstein_1999,
repec-id = {RePEc:tpr:restat:v:81:y:1999:i:4:p:674-680},
author = {Martin Feldstein},
title = {{Tax Avoidance And The Deadweight Loss Of The Income Tax}},
journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = 1999,
volume = {81},
number = {4},
pages = {674-680},
month = {November}
}
@article{browning_1987,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:77:y:1987:i:1:p:11-23},
author = {Browning, Edgar K},
title = {{On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 1987,
volume = {77},
number = {1},
pages = {11-23},
month = {March}
}
@article{thirsk_ea_1991,
author = {Thirsk, W. and Moore, J.},
year = 1991,
title = {{The social cost of Canadian labour taxes}},
journal = {Canadian Tax Journal},
volume = {39},
pages = {554–66}
}
@incollection{dahlby_1994,
author = {Dahlby, B.},
year = 1994,
editor = {W. Robson and W. Scarth},
title = {{The distortionary effect of rising taxes}},
booktitle = {{Deficit Reduction: What Pain, What Gain}},
publisher = {Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute}
}
@article{stuart_1984,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:74:y:1984:i:3:p:352-62},
author = {Stuart, Charles E},
title = {{Welfare Costs per Dollar of Additional Tax Revenue in the United States}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 1984,
volume = {74},
number = {3},
pages = {352-62},
month = {June}
}
@article{parry_2002,
repec-id = {RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:9:y:2002:i:5:p:531-552},
author = {Ian Parry},
title = {{Tax Deductions and the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation}},
journal = {International Tax and Public Finance},
year = 2002,
volume = {9},
number = {5},
pages = {531-552},
month = {September}
}
@article{fullerton_ea_1989,
repec-id = {RePEc:tpr:restat:v:71:y:1989:i:3:p:435-42},
author = {Fullerton, Don and Henderson, Yolanda Kodrzycki},
title = {{The Marginal Excess Burden of Different Capital Tax Instruments}},
journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = 1989,
volume = {71},
number = {3},
pages = {435-42},
month = {August}
}
@article{ballard_ea_1985,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:75:y:1985:i:1:p:128-38},
author = {Ballard, Charles L and Shoven, John B and Whalley, John},
title = {{General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 1985,
volume = {75},
number = {1},
pages = {128-38},
month = {March}
}
@article{allgood_ea_2006,
repec_id = {RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:44:y:2006:i:3:p:451-464},
author = {Sam Allgood and Arthur Snow},
title = {{Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxation with Human and Physical Capital}},
journal = {Economic Inquiry},
year = 2006,
volume = {44},
number = {3},
pages = {451-464},
month = {July}
}
@article{hausman_ea_1997,
author = {Jerry A. Hausman and Ariel Pakes and Gregory L. Rosston},
title = {{Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications}},
journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics},
year = 1997,
volume = {1997},
pages = {1-54}
}
@article{blundell_1992,
repec-id = {RePEc:ifs:fistud:v:13:y:1992:i:3:p:15-40},
author = {Richard Blundell},
title = {{Labour supply and taxation: a survey}},
journal = {Fiscal Studies},
year = 1992,
volume = {13},
number = {3},
pages = {15-40},
month = {January},
note = {available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/ifs/fistud/v13y1992i3p15-40.html}
}
@book{aicholzer_ea_2004,
editor = {Aicholzer, G. and Burkert H.},
title = {{Public Sector Information in the Digital Age: Between Markets, Public Management and Citizens' Rights}},
publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing},
year = 2004
}
@incollection{weiss_2004,
author = {Peter Weiss},
title = {{Borders in Cyberspace: Conflicting Government Information Policies and their Economic Impact}},
editor = {Aicholzer, G. and Burkert H.},
booktitle = {{Public Sector Information in the Digital Age: Between Markets, Public Management and Citizens' Rights}},
year = 2004
}
@misc{oft_g_2006,
author = {OFT},
title = {{Commercial Use of Public Information; Annexe G: Economic value and detriment analysis}},
year = 2006,
month = {December}
}
@incollection{lazo_ea_2002,
author = {Jeffrey K. Lazo and Lauraine G. Chestnut},
year = 2002,
title = {{Economic Value of Current and Improved Weather Forecasts in the US Household Sector}},
booktitle = {{Report prepared for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration by Stratus Consulting Inc. Boulder, Colorado}}
}
@techreport{davies_ea_2005,
repec-id = {uwo:epuwoc:20051},
author = {James B. Davies and Al Slivinski},
title = {{The Public Role in Provision of Scientific Information: An Economic Approach}},
year = 2005,
institution = {University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute},
type = {University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers},
rgrp-note = {available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/uwo/epuwoc/20051.html},
number = {20051}
}
@article{longhorn_ea_2004,
author = {Roger Longhorn and Michael Blakemore},
title = {{Re-visiting the Valuing and Pricing of Digital Geographic Information}},
journal = {Journal of Digital Information},
year = 2004,
volume = {4},
number = {2}
}
@article{rhind_1992,
author = {David Rhind},
title = {{Data access, charging and copyright and their implications for GIS}},
journal = {International Journal of Geographical Information Science},
year = 1992,
volume = {6},
number = {1},
pages = {13-30}
}
@misc{ravi_2000,
author = {Ravi Bedrijvenplatform},
title = {{Economische effecten van laagdrempelige beschikbaarstelling van overheidsinformatie}},
year = 2000,
note = {Private sector members of the Dutch Geographic Data Committee}
}
@incollection{kridel_ea_2002,
author = {Kridel, Donald and Paul Rappoport and Lester Taylor},
year = 2002,
title = {{The Demand for High-Speed Access to the Internet: The Case of Cable Modems}},
booktitle = {{Forecasting the Internet: Understanding the Explosive Growth of Data Communications}},
editor = {D.G. Loomis and L.D. Taylor, Kluwer},
publisher = {Academic Publishers, Dordrecht}
}
@article{goolsbee_2006,
repec-id = {bep:eapcon:v:5:y:2006:i:1:p:1505-1505},
author = {Austan Goolsbee},
title = {{The Value of Broadband and the Deadweight Loss of Taxing New Technology}},
journal = {Contributions to Economic Analysis \& Policy},
year = 2006,
volume = {5},
number = {1},
pages = {1505-1505},
month = {}
}
@article{goolsbee_ea_2006,
repec-id = {:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:108-113},
author = {Austan Goolsbee and Peter J. Klenow},
title = {{Valuing Consumer Products by the Time Spent Using Them: An Application to the Internet}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2006,
volume = {96},
number = {2},
pages = {108-113},
month = {May}
}
@article{hackl_ea_1996,
repec-id = {:eee:econom:v:70:y:1996:i:1:p:243-260},
author = {Hackl, Peter and Westlund, Anders H.},
title = {{Demand for international telecommunication time-varying price elasticity}},
journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
year = 1996,
volume = {70},
number = {1},
pages = {243-260},
month = {January}
}
@misc{appsi_2007,
author = {APPSI Review Board},
title = {{Report in relation to requests by Intelligent Addressing Limited and Ordnance Survey to review certain recommendations made in the Report of the Office of Public Sector Information of 13 July 2006 relating to a complaint by Intelligent Addressing Limited (SO 42/8/4)}},
url-src = {http://www.appsi.gov.uk/review-board/review-SO-42-8-4.pdf},
year = 2007
}
@misc{ons_2005,
author = {Office for National Statistics},
title = {{Family Spending: A Report on the 2003-04 Expenditure and Food Survey}},
year = 2005
}
@article{mirlees_1971,
author = {Mirrlees, James A.},
year = 1971,
title = {{An Exploration of the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation}},
journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
volume = {38},
pages = {175-208}
}
@misc{green_book_2003,
author = {{HM Treasury}},
title = {{The Green Book}},
year = 2003
}
@book{ben-ner_ea_1998,
title = {{Economics, Values and Organization}},
booktitle = {{Economics, Values and Organization}},
editor = {Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = 1999
}
@incollection{lane_1998,
title = {{The Joyless Market Economy}},
author = {Robert E. Lane},
pages = {119-50},
crossref = {ben-ner_ea_1998}
}
@book{battelle_2005,
title = {{The Search: How Google and Its Rivals Rewrote the Rules of Business and Transformed Our Culture}},
isbn = {1591840880},
publisher = {Portfolio},
author = {John Battelle},
month = sep,
year = {2005},
pages = {320}
}
@techreport{oswald_ea_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2208},
author = {Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee},
title = {{Does Happiness Adapt? A Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges}},
year = 2006,
month = jul,
institution = {Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
number = {2208}
}
@techreport{oswald_ea_2007b,
repec-id = {RePEc:wrk:warwec:793},
author = {Oswald, Andrew J and Powdthavee, Nattavudh},
title = {{Obesity, Unhappiness, and The Challenge of Affluence : Theory and Evidence}},
year = 2007,
institution = {University of Warwick, Department of Economics},
type = {The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)},
number = {793}
}
@article{oswald_2007,
author = {Andrew J. Oswald},
title = {{An Examination of the Reliability of Prestigious Scholarly Journals: Evidence and Implications for Decision-makers}},
journal = {Economica},
year = 2007,
volume = {74},
pages = {21-31}
}
@article{ditella_ea_2003,
repec-id = {RePEc:tpr:restat:v:85:y:2003:i:4:p:809-827},
author = {Rafael Di Tella and Robert J. MacCulloch and Andrew J. Oswald},
title = {{The Macroeconomics of Happiness}},
journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = 2003,
volume = {85},
number = {4},
pages = {809-827},
month = {09}
}
@article{palacios-huerta_ea_2004,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:88:y:2004:i:3-4:p:601-627},
author = {Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio and Santos, Tano J.},
title = {{A theory of markets, institutions, and endogenous preferences}},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
year = 2004,
volume = {88},
number = {3-4},
pages = {601-627},
month = {March}
}
@techreport{blanchflower_ea_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2138},
author = {David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald},
title = {{The Wage Curve: An Entry Written for the New Palgrave, 2nd Edition}},
year = 2006,
month = may,
institution = {Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
number = {2138}
}
@techreport{cowell_ea_1999,
author = {Cowell, F A and Gardiner, K},
year = 1999,
month = {August},
title = {{Welfare Weights}},
institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics},
type = {Economics Research Paper},
number = {20}
}
@techreport{pos_growth_2001,
author = {{Spatial Information Industry Action Agenda}},
year = 2001,
title = {{Positioning for Growth}},
url-src = {http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/SIAA_Positioning__20050606100443.pdf}
}
@article{rogers_ea_2005,
author = {Rodgers, S. and Q. Chen},
year = 2005,
title = {{Internet Community Group Participation: Psychosocial Benefits for Women with Breast Cancer}},
journal = {Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication},
number = {4},
volume = 10
}
@article{ziebland_2004,
author = {Ziebland, S.},
year = 2004,
title = {{The Importance of Being Expert: the Quest for Cancer Information on the Internet}},
journal = {Social Science and Medicine},
number = {59},
volume = {9},
pages = {1783-1793}
}
@techreport{hellinger_2002,
author = {Hellinger, F. J.},
year = 2002,
title = {{Focus on Research: HIV Disease}},
institution = {Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, United States Department of Health and Human Services},
url-src = {www.ahrq.gov/news/focus/fochiv.pdf}
}
@incollection{hampton_2007,
author = {Hampton, K. N.},
year = 2007,
title = {{Neighborhoods in the Network Society: the e-Neighbors Study}},
booktitle = {{Information, Communication and Society}}
}
@misc{lomax_2005,
author = {Dr Grace Lomax},
title = {{Presentation to Patient Compliance, Adherence and Persistence Conference}},
year = 2005
}
@article{acs_ea_1992,
author = {Acs, Z. and Audretsch, D. and Feldman, M.},
year = 1992,
title = {{Real Effects of Academic Research: Comment}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
number = {82},
pages = {363-367}
}
@article{diamond_ea_1971,
title = {{Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I}},
author = {James Mirless and Peter Diamond},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 1971,
volume = {61},
pages = {8-27}
}
@techreport{currarini_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:ven:wpaper:20_07},
author = {Sergio Currarini and Paolo Pin and Matthew O. Jackson},
title = {{An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation}},
year = 2007,
institution = {University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics},
type = {Working Papers},
number = {20_07},
tags = {networks}
}
@article{gilbert_ea_2007b,
repec-id = {RePEc:bla:jindec:v:55:y:2007:i:1:p:113-139},
author = {Richard J. Gilbert and Michael H. Riordan},
title = {{Product Improvement and Technological Tying in a Winner-Take-All Market}},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = 2007,
volume = {55},
number = {1},
pages = {113-139},
month = {03},
tags = {microsoft tying}
}
@techreport{rubinstein_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000539},
author = {Ariel Rubinstein},
title = {Discussion of 'BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS'},
year = 2005,
month = nov,
institution = {UCLA Department of Economics},
type = {Levine's Bibliography},
number = {784828000000000539},
tags = {behavioural}
}
@techreport{shaked_2005,
title = {{The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion}},
author = {Avner Shaked},
url-src = {http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/shaked/rhetoric/Rhetoric.pdf},
year = 2005,
tags = {behavioural}
}
@article{polanski_2007,
title = {{Is the General Public Licence a Rational Choice?}},
author = {Polanski, Arnold},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {55},
number = {4},
pages = {691-714},
month = {Dec},
year = 2007
}
@article{gandal_2001,
author = {Gandal, Neil},
title = {{The Dynamics of Competition in the Internet Search Engine Market}},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
year = 2001,
volume = {19},
number = {7},
pages = {1103-1117},
month = {July},
tags = {search-engines}
}
@article{swann_2002,
author = {Swann, G. M. Peter},
title = {{The Functional Form of Network Effects}},
journal = {Information Economics and Policy},
year = 2002,
volume = {14},
number = {3},
pages = {417-429},
month = {September},
abstract = {Metcalfe's Law states that aggregate network value is proportional to the square of network size, and that implies the individual user's utility is a linear function of network size. This paper explores the functional form of network effects in a simple model of a telephone network, and finds that it can be linear, but only under strong conditions. The paper establishes weaker conditions under which a representative subscriber's utility is a linear function of network size. When these linearity conditions are not satisfied, we show that under some assumptions, the value to a typical subscriber will be an s-shaped function of network size.},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{bradlow_ea_2000,
title = {{The Little Engines That Could: Modeling the Performance of World Wide Web Search Engines}},
volume = {19},
issn = {07322399},
abstract = {This research examines the ability of six popular Web search engines, individually and collectively, to locate Web pages containing common marketing/management phrases. We propose and validate a model for search engine performance that is able to represent key patterns of coverage and overlap among the engines. The model enables us to estimate the typical additional benefit of using multiple search engines, depending on the particular set of engines being considered. It also provides an estimate of the number of relevant Web pages not found by any of the engines. For a typical marketing/management phrase we estimate that the "best" search engine locates about 50\% of the pages, and all six engines together find about 90\% of the total. The model is also used to examine how properties of a Web page and characteristics of a phrase affect the probability that a given search engine will find a given page. For example, we find that the number of Web page links increases the prospect that each of the six search engines will find it. Finally, we summarize the relationship between major structural characteristics of a search engine and its performance in locating relevant Web pages.},
journal = {Marketing Science},
author = {Eric T Bradlow and David C Schmittlein},
year = {2000},
pages = {43-62},
tags = {search-engines}
}
@misc{blanes-i-vidal_ea_2007,
title = {{Behaviour in Networks of Collaborators: Theory and Evidence from the English Judiciary}},
author = {Blanes i Vidal, Jordi and Leaver, Clare},
year = 2007,
note = {University of Oxford, Department of Economics, Economics Series Working Papers: 354, 2007},
abstract = {This paper uses data on judicial citations to explore whether the diffusion and/or application of knowledge within an organisation is affected by worker connectivity. Developing a simple model of discretionary citations, we distinguish between two hypotheses: knowledge diffusion whereby connected judges are more likely to be aware of each others' cases than unconnected judges, and socialisation whereby judges are more likely to be positively disposed to judges to whom they are more connected. Our empirical strategy exploits three important institutional features: (a) the random allocation of judges to case committees in the English Court of Appeal, (b) the existence of both positive and neutral citations and (c) the fact that connections occur over time. We are able to reject the knowledge diffusion hypothesis in its simplest form. We are unable to reject the socialisation hypothesis, and find strong evidence to support it. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications for other knowledge-based organisations.}
}
@article{silverberg_ea_2007,
title = {{The Size Distribution of Innovations Revisited: An Application of Extreme Value Statistics to Citation and Value Measures of Patent Significance}},
author = {Silverberg, Gerald and Verspagen, Bart},
journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
number = { 139(2)},
year = 2007,
abstract = {This paper focuses on the analysis of size distributions of innovations, which are known to be highly skewed. We use patent citations as one indicator of innovation significance, constructing two large datasets from the European and US Patent Offices at a high level of aggregation, ... Statistical methods are applied to analyse the properties of the empirical size distributions, where we put special emphasis on testing for the existence of 'heavy tails', i.e., whether or not the probability of very large innovations declines more slowly than exponentially. While overall the distributions appear to resemble a lognormal, we argue that the tails are indeed fat. ... We find significantly and consistently lower tail estimates for the returns data than the citation data (around 0.6-1 vs. 3-5). ... The heaviness of the tails, particularly as measured by value indicators, we argue, has significant implications for technology policy and growth theory, since the second and possibly even the first moments of these distributions may not exist.}
}
@article{dewatripont_ea_2007,
title = {{Pricing of Scientific Journals and Market Power}},
author = {Dewatripont, Mathias and Legros, Patrick and Ginsburgh, victor and Walckiers, Alexis},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
number = { 5(2-3)},
year = 2007,
abstract = {We analyze the empirical relationship between journal prices, their quality measured by their citation counts, their age, as well as conduct of publishers. The database covers 22 scientific fields and more than 2,600 of among the most highly reputed and cited journals in 2003. We show that (a) for-profit journals charge roughly 3 times more than journals run by scientific societies; (b) the number of citations has a positive impact on prices; (c) there are large differences in prices across fields that vary by a factor between 1 and 6; these are highly (and positively) correlated with the degree of concentration in the industry.}
}
@article{alcacer_ea_2006,
title = {{Patent Citations as a Measure of Knowledge Flows: The Influence of Examiner Citations}},
author = {Alcacer, Juan and Gittelman, Michelle},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
number = {88(4)},
year = 2006,
abstract = {Analysis of patent citations is a core methodology in the study of knowledge diffusion. However, citations made by patent examiners have not been separately reported, adding unknown noise to the data. We leverage a recent change in the reporting of patent data showing citations added by examiners. The magnitude is high: two-thirds of citations on the average patent are inserted by examiners. Furthermore, 40% of all patents have all citations added by examiners. We analyze the distribution of examiner and inventor citations with respect to self-citation, distance, technology overlap, and vintage. Results indicate that inferences about inventor knowledge using pooled citations may suffer from bias or overinflated significance levels.}
}
@article{thompson_ea_2005,
title = {{Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge Spillovers: A Reassessment}},
author = {Thompson, Peter and Fox-Kean, Melanie},
journal = {American Economic Review},
number = {95(1)},
year = 2005
}
@techreport{dekel_ea_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1423},
author = {Eddie Dekel and Barton Lipman and Aldo Rustichini},
title = {Temptation-Driven Preferences},
year = 2006,
month = apr,
institution = {Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
type = {Discussion Papers},
number = {1423},
tags = {happiness behavioural}
}
@techreport{gul_ea_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000121},
author = {Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer},
title = {A Simple Theory of Temptation and Self-Control},
year = 2005,
month = jun,
institution = {UCLA Department of Economics},
type = {Levine's Bibliography},
number = {784828000000000121},
tags = {happiness behavioural}
}
@article{ameriks_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:3:p:966-972},
author = {John Ameriks and Andrew Caplin and John Leahy and Tom Tyler},
title = {Measuring Self-Control Problems},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2007,
volume = {97},
number = {3},
pages = {966-972},
month = {June}
}
@article{gneezy_ea_2003,
repec-id = {RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:118:y:2003:i:3:p:1049-1074},
author = {Uri Gneezy and Muriel Niederle and Aldo Rustichini},
title = {Performance In Competitive Environments: Gender Differences},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 2003,
volume = {118},
number = {3},
pages = {1049-1074},
month = {August},
tags = {happiness gender behavioural}
}
@article{brenner_ea_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:61:y:2006:i:4:p:617-631},
author = {Brenner, Thomas and Vriend, Nicolaas J.},
title = {On the behavior of proposers in ultimatum games},
journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
year = 2006,
volume = {61},
number = {4},
pages = {617-631},
month = {December},
tags = {behavioural learning}
}
@article{isaac_ea_1994,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:54:y:1994:i:1:p:1-36},
author = {Isaac, R. Mark and Walker, James M. and Williams, Arlington W.},
title = {{Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups}},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
year = 1994,
volume = {54},
number = {1},
pages = {1-36},
month = {May},
tags = {behavioural public-goods happiness},
abstract = {New experimental evidence extending the investigation of free-riding behavior in public goods provision is presented. Procedures are developed to deal with the logistical problems inherent in experiments involving many subjects. Data from Voluntary Contribution Mechanism experiments are reported utilizing group sizes of 4, 10, 40 and 100. THese experiments provide replicable results that contradict the widely held view that a group's ability to provide the optimal level of a pure public good is inversely related to group size. On the contrary, groups of size 40 and 100 provided the public good more efficiently than groups of size 4 and 10. Several possible alternative explanations are discussed.}
}
@article{loewenstein_ea_1995,
title = {{A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes}},
volume = {105},
issn = {00130133},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133\%28199507\%29105\%3A431\%3C929\%3AABITPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-3},
abstract = {Recent research has documented an `endowment effect' whereby people become more attached to objects they receive than would be predicted from their prior desire to possess the object. In two experiments, we test whether people are aware of the effect--whether they realise that they will become attached to an object once they receive it. In both experiments, subjects without an object underestimated how much they would value the object when they received it.},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
author = {George Loewenstein and Daniel Adler},
month = jul,
year = {1995},
pages = {929-937}
}
@article{milgrom_ea_1991,
title = {{Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games}},
volume = {3},
url-src = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4CYGSTV-32/2/f4f5ed6e8354c1f82a3c869b3fdbd131},
doi = {10.1016/0899-8256(91)90006-Z},
abstract = {In a class of games including some Cournot and Bertrand games, a sequence of plays converges to the unique Nash equilibrium if and only if the sequence is "consistent with adaptive learning" according to the new definition we propose. In the Arrow-Debreu model with gross substitutes, a sequence of prices converges to the competitive equilibrium if and only if the sequence is consistent with adaptive learning by price-setting market makers for the individual goods. Similar results are obtained for "sophisticated" learning. All the familiar learning algorithms generate play that is consistent with adaptive learning. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026, 021.},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
author = {Paul Milgrom and John Roberts},
month = feb,
year = {1991},
pages = {82-100}
}
@article{becker_ea_1988,
title = {{A Theory of Rational Addiction}},
volume = {96},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28198808\%2996\%3A4\%3C675\%3AATORA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-H},
abstract = {We develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time. Strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption. Such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable. They are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention. Our theory also implies that "cold turkey" is used to end strong addictions, that addicts often go on binges, that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods, and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction.},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Gary S Becker and Kevin M Murphy},
month = aug,
year = {1988},
pages = {675-700}
}
@article{mischel_ea_1989,
series = {3},
title = {{Delay of Gratification in Children}},
volume = {244},
issn = {00368075},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-8075\%2819890526\%293\%3A244\%3A4907\%3C933\%3ADOGIC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-G},
abstract = {To function effectively, individuals must voluntarily postpone immediate gratification and persist in goal-directed behavior for the sake of later outcomes. The present research program analyzed the nature of this type of future-oriented self-control and the psychological processes that underlie it. Enduring individual differences in self-control were found as early as the preschool years. Those 4-year-old children who delayed gratification longer in certain laboratory situations developed into more cognitively and socially competent adolescents, achieving higher scholastic performance and coping better with frustration and stress. Experiments in the same research program also identified specific cognitive and attentional processes that allow effective self-regulation early in the course of development. The experimental results, in turn, specified the particular types of preschool delay situations diagnostic for predicting aspects of cognitive and social competence later in life.},
journal = {Science},
author = {Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda and Monica L Rodriguez},
month = may,
year = {1989},
pages = {933-938}
}
@article{burlando_ea_1997,
title = {{Do Anglo-Saxons free-ride more?}},
volume = {64},
url-src = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-3SWXNBB-3/2/7162a048d8e1c2562cba8a46bc865efd},
doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01609-X},
abstract = {We report on experiments replicating the Partners and Strangers design and we find some evidence that may help to accommodate previous diverging partners/strangers results. This finding comes out of a preliminary investigation into whether nationality makes a difference as far as free-riding is concerned. We seem to have identified a strong effect on behaviour resulting from national differences (which, in turn, presumably reflect cultural and sociological differences between subject groups), both on average contribution and, possibly, on the attitude toward playing in stranger or partner sessions. This seems to point out the existence (and relevance) of different social norms in different social and cultural contexts. We have also explored the influence of a change to Public Bads and we have further investigated the Restart Effect. Our results both in the final rounds and especially in the restart indicate that learning requires much more time and trials than expected and does not seem to provide a full explanation of the observed behaviour.},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
author = {Roberto Burlando and John D. Hey},
month = apr,
year = {1997},
keywords = {Nationality,Partners,Public goods/bads,Social norms,Strangers,Voluntary giving},
pages = {41-60}
}
@article{odonoghue_ea_1999,
title = {{Doing It Now or Later}},
volume = {89},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28199903\%2989\%3A1\%3C103\%3ADINOL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-E},
abstract = {We examine self-control problems--modeled as time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences--in a model where a person must do an activity exactly once. We emphasize two distinctions: Do activities involve immediate costs or immediate rewards, and are people sophisticated or naive about future self-control problems? Naive people procrastinate immediate-cost activities and preproperate--do too soon--immediate-reward activities. Sophistication mitigates procrastination, but exacerbates preproperation. Moreover, with immediate costs, a small present bias can severely harm only naive people, whereas with immediate rewards it can severely harm only sophisticated people. Lessons for savings, addiction, and elsewhere are discussed.},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin},
month = mar,
year = {1999},
pages = {103-124}
}
@article{gneezy_ea_2004,
title = {{Gender and Competition at a Young Age}},
volume = {94},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28200405\%2994\%3A2\%3C377\%3AGACAAY\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-B},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini},
month = may,
year = {2004},
pages = {377-381}
}
@article{carlsson_ea_1993,
title = {{Global Games and Equilibrium Selection}},
volume = {61},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28199309\%2961\%3A5\%3C989\%3AGGAES\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-K},
abstract = {A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game. For \$2 {\textbackslash}times 2\$ games, it is shown that, when the noise vanishes, iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game forces the players to conform to Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme},
month = sep,
year = {1993},
pages = {989-1018}
}
@article{laibson_1997,
title = {{Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting}},
volume = {112},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28199705\%29112\%3A2\%3C443\%3AGEAHD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
abstract = {Hyperbolic discount functions induce dynamically inconsistent preferences, implying a motive for consumers to constrain their own future choices. This paper analyzes the decisions of a hyperbolic consumer who has access to an imperfect commitment technology: an illiquid asset whose sale must be initiated one period before the sale proceeds are received. The model predicts that consumption tracks income, and the model explains why consumers have asset-specific marginal propensities to consume. The model suggests that financial innovation may have caused the ongoing decline in U. S. savings rates, since financial innovation increases liquidity, eliminating commitment opportunities. Finally, the model implies that financial market innovation may reduce welfare by providing "too much" liquidity.},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {David Laibson},
month = may,
year = {1997},
pages = {443-477}
}
@article{boldrin_ea_1994,
title = {{Growth and Indeterminancy in Dynamic Models with Externalities}},
volume = {62},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28199403\%2962\%3A2\%3C323\%3AGAIIDM\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-7},
abstract = {We study the indeterminacy of equilibria in infinite horizon capital accumulation models with technological externalities. Our investigation encompasses models with bounded and unbounded accumulation paths, and models with one and two sectors of production. Under reasonable assumptions we find that equilibria are locally unique in one-sector economies. In economies with two sectors of production it is instead easy to construct examples where a positive external effect induces a two-dimensional manifold of equilibria converging to the same steady state (in the bounded case) or to the same constant growth rate (in the unbounded case). For the latter we point out that the dynamic behavior of these equilibria is quite complicated and that persistent fluctuations in their growth rates are possible.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Michele Boldrin and Aldo Rustichini},
month = mar,
year = {1994},
pages = {323-342}
}
@article{mischel_ea_1974,
title = {{Instrumental Ideation in Delay of Gratification}},
volume = {45},
issn = {00093920},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-3920\%28197412\%2945\%3A4\%3C1083\%3AIIIDOG\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-F},
abstract = {While waiting in a delay-of-gratification paradigm, preschool children were shown objects that were either the rewards in the delay-of-reward situation or irrelevant to the delay contingency. All children were encouraged to ideate about the objects while waiting. They either were led to believe that ideating about the objects would help terminate the delay period (instrumental ideation) or were not led to think that their ideation would affect the delay time (noninstrumental ideation). As expected, children were able to wait longer in the instrumental ideation condition than in the noninstrumental ideation condition. Most important, this increased waiting occurred only when the reward objects in the delay contingency were the focus of ideation and not when the ideated objects were irrelevant to the delay contingency. Finally, a significant effect was found for sex (girls waited longer) but not for age. The findings were discussed in light of prior experimental and theoretical work on the specific relationship between cognitive activity and delay of gratification.},
journal = {Child Development},
author = {Walter Mischel and Bill Underwood},
month = dec,
year = {1974},
pages = {1083-1088}
}
@article{gruber_ea_2001,
title = {{Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence}},
volume = {116},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28200111\%29116\%3A4\%3C1261\%3AIA\%22TAE\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
abstract = {This paper makes two contributions to the modeling of addiction. First, we provide new and convincing evidence that smokers are forward-looking in their smoking decisions, using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet effective, and monthly data on consumption. Second, we recognize the strong evidence that preferences with respect to smoking are time inconsistent, with individuals both not recognizing the true difficulty of quitting and searching for self-control devices to help them quit. We develop a new model of addictive behavior that takes as its starting point the standard "rational addiction" model, but incorporates time-inconsistent preferences. This model also exhibits forward-looking behavior, but it has strikingly different normative implications; in this case optimal government policy should depend not only on the externalities that smokers impose on others but also on the "internalities" imposed by smokers on themselves. We estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should be at least one dollar higher under our formulation than in the rational addiction case.},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Jonathan Gruber and Botond Koszegi},
month = nov,
year = {2001},
pages = {1261-1303}
}
@article{ryder_ea_1973,
title = {{Optimal Growth with Intertemporally Dependent Preferences}},
volume = {40},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28197301\%2940\%3A1\%3C1\%3AOGWIDP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-4},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Harl E. Ryder and Geoffrey M Heal},
year = {1973},
pages = {1-31}
}
@article{wan_1970,
title = {{Optimal Saving Programs under Intertemporally Dependent Preferences}},
volume = {11},
issn = {00206598},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598\%28197010\%2911\%3A3\%3C521\%3AOSPUID\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-4},
journal = {International Economic Review},
author = {Henry Y Wan},
month = oct,
year = {1970},
pages = {521-547}
}
@article{croson_1996,
title = {{Partners and strangers revisited}},
volume = {53},
url-src = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-3VWC6V5-4/2/26678acd41b4afe05a2cc53dea0fe274},
doi = {10.1016/S0165-1765(97)82136-2},
abstract = {This study replicates Andreoni's (Journal of Public Economics, 1988, 37, 291-304) public goods experiments. The results are not consistent with simple learning, but are compatible with strategies, unlike Andreoni's original experiment. An investigation of the variance of contributions provides an organizing explanation of previous results.},
journal = {Economics Letters},
author = {Rachel T. A. Croson},
month = oct,
year = {1996},
keywords = {Experiments,Partners,Public goods,Strangers},
pages = {25-32}
}
@article{gneezy_ea_2000,
title = {{Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All}},
volume = {115},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28200008\%29115\%3A3\%3C791\%3APEODPA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-0},
abstract = {Economists usually assume that monetary incentives improve performance, and psychologists claim that the opposite may happen. We present and discuss a set of experiments designed to test these contrasting claims. We found that the effect of monetary compensation on performance was not monotonic. In the treatments in which money was offered, a larger amount yielded a higher performance. However, offering money did not always produce an improvement: subjects who were offered monetary incentives performed more poorly than those who were offered no compensation. Several possible interpretations of the results are discussed.},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini},
month = aug,
year = {2000},
pages = {791-810}
}
@article{thompson_ea_1976,
title = {{Relative Deprivation in Buganda: The Relation of Wealth, Security, and Opportunity to the Perception of Economic Satisfaction}},
volume = {4},
issn = {00912131},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0091-2131\%28197622\%294\%3A2\%3C155\%3ARDIBTR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
journal = {Ethos},
author = {Richard W Thompson and Roy E Roper},
year = {1976},
pages = {155-187}
}
@article{gul_self-control_2004,
title = {{Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption}},
volume = {72},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28200401\%2972\%3A1\%3C119\%3ASATTOC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-8},
abstract = {To study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon consumption problems under uncertainty, we define and characterize dynamic self-control (DSC) preferences. DSC preferences are recursive and separable. In economies with DSC agents, equilibria exist but may be inefficient; in such equilibria, steady state consumption is independent of initial endowments and increases in self-control. Increasing the preference for commitment while keeping self-control constant increases the equity premium. Removing nonbinding constraints changes equilibrium allocations and prices. Debt contracts can be sustained even if the only feasible punishment for default is the termination of the contract.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer},
year = {2004},
pages = {119-158}
}
@article{wedell_ea_1989,
title = {{Student Perceptions of Fair Grading: A Range-Frequency Analysis}},
volume = {102},
issn = {00029556},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9556\%28198922\%29102\%3A2\%3C233\%3ASPOFGA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-P},
abstract = {University students were instructed to assign grades as fairly as possible to different hypothetical distributions of exam scores (bell, U, positively skewed, and negatively skewed). Experiment 1 demonstrated significant distribution effects that were quantitatively consistent with Parducci's (1965) range-frequency theory: Grading reflected a roughly equal compromise between a tendency to assign grades to equal subranges of exam scores (e.g., A's to the top fifth of the range) and a tendency to assign an equal number of scores to each grade (e.g., A's to the top 20\% of scores). Individual differences in the relative weighting of these two tendencies were fairly reliable, \$r\_{tt{\textasciicircum}{{\textbackslash}prime}}\$. Although most students followed a roughly equal compromise, a few favored "grading on a straight scale" (equal subranges) and a few "grading on a curve" (equal frequencies). The results of Experiment 2 supported a range-frequency model in which different grades tend to be used with equal frequency over a modified model in which different grades tend to be used with fixed but unequal frequencies.},
journal = {The American Journal of Psychology},
author = {Douglas H Wedell and Allen Parducci and Diana Roman},
year = {1989},
pages = {233-248}
}
@article{brunk_2003,
title = {{Swarming of innovations, fractal patterns, and the historical time series of US patents}},
volume = {56},
url-src = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1021998523825},
doi = {10.1023/A:1021998523825},
abstract = {Abstract While most of us who study intellectual and technical advancement believe that innovations tend to swarm, the details of this process are not well understood. The aggregate-level behavior of US patents is examined as a way to better infer the process that generates innovation. The amount of swarming decreases as the observational period increases, which indicates that the process of innovation is not perfectly self-similar. Instead, the effects of innovations are mostly contained within specialized areas, and do not often trigger further advances in other fields.},
journal = {Scientometrics},
author = {Brunk},
year = {2003},
pages = {61-80}
}
@article{gul_ea_2001,
title = {{Temptation and Self-Control}},
volume = {69},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28200111\%2969\%3A6\%3C1403\%3ATAS\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-C},
abstract = {We study a two-period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision-maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking, temptation ranking, and cost of self-control. An agent has a preference for commitment if she strictly prefers a subset of alternatives to the set itself. An agent has self-control if she resists temptation and chooses an option with higher ex ante utility. We introduce comparative measures of preference for commitment and self-control and relate them to our representations.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer},
month = nov,
year = {2001},
pages = {1403-1435}
}
@article{dickhaut_ea_2003,
title = {{The Impact of the Certainty Context on the Process of Choice}},
volume = {100},
issn = {00278424},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424\%2820030318\%29100\%3A6\%3C3536\%3ATIOTCC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Y},
abstract = {In this study we examine how the introduction of a reference lottery with nonrandom outcomes alters the way in which choices among pairs of lotteries are made, even if it does not alter the choices. We use different domains (some of the lotteries produce gains, other losses) and different contexts (one member of the pair, the reference lottery, may be either risky or certain). In our experiment, the change from gain to loss domain affects choices: subjects are risk averse in the gain domain, but not in the loss domain. On the contrary, the context effect of the certain lottery does not affect choices. However, the introduction of the certainty reference lottery affects two behavioral variables, response time and brain activation, in a dramatic way. This result suggests that the certainty lottery promotes a different process through which preferences are revealed, even if the differences among lotteries may not be large enough to induce different choices.},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America},
author = {John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe and Jennifer C Nagode and Aldo Rustichini and Kip Smith and Jose V Pardo},
month = mar,
year = {2003},
pages = {3536-3541}
}
@article{andreoni_1988,
title = {{Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments}},
volume = {37},
url-src = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-458X3XV-67/2/93253d52db84d35d910f73e5c12384b3},
doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(88)90043-6},
abstract = {Laboratory experiments on free riding have produced mixed results. Free riding is seldom observed with single-shot games; however, it is often approximated in finitely repeated games. There are two prevailing hypothesis for why this is so: strategies and learning. This paper discusses these hypotheses and presents an experiment that examines both.},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
author = {James Andreoni},
month = dec,
year = {1988},
pages = {291-304}
}
@book{berners-lee_1999,
title = {{Weaving the Web: Origins and Future of the World Wide Web}},
publisher = {Orion Business},
author = {Tim Berners-Lee},
year = {1999},
pages = {244}
}
@article{binmore_ea_1985,
title = {{Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study}},
volume = {75},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198512\%2975\%3A5\%3C1178\%3ATNBTAP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-7},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {K. Binmore and A. Shaked and J. Sutton},
month = dec,
year = {1985},
pages = {1178-1180}
}
@article{kreps_ea_1982,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:27:y:1982:i:2:p:245-252},
author = {Kreps, David M. and Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John and Wilson, Robert},
title = {{Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma}},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = 1982,
volume = {27},
number = {2},
pages = {245-252},
month = {August}
}
@book{sutton_1991,
title = {{Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising, and the}},
isbn = {0262193051},
publisher = {MIT Press},
author = {John Sutton},
year = {1991},
pages = {577}
}
@book{sutton_1998,
title = {{Technology and Market Structure: Theory and History}},
isbn = {0585077533},
publisher = {The MIT Press},
author = {John Sutton},
year = {1998}
}
@article{edelman_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:1:p:242-259},
author = {Benjamin Edelman and Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz},
title = {{Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2007,
volume = {97},
number = {1},
pages = {242-259},
month = {March},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v97y2007i1p242-259.html},
tags = {search-engines}
}
@inproceedings{edelman_2007,
title = {{Assessing and Improving the Safety of Internet Search Engines}},
author = {Edelman, Ben},
booktitle = {{The Rising Power of Search Engines on the Internet}},
year = 2007,
pages = {259-277},
tags = {search-engines}
}
@misc{edelman_2006,
title = {{Adverse Selection in Online "Trust" Certifications}},
author = {Edelman, Ben},
year = 2006
}
@techreport{pollock_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:cam:camdae:0754},
author = {Pollock, Rufus},
title = {{The Control of Porting in Two-Sided Markets}},
year = 2007,
month = nov,
institution = {Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge},
type = {Cambridge Working Papers in Economics},
number = {0754},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@article{pollock_2007b,
title = {{Optimal Copyright Over Time: Technological Change and the Stock of Works}},
author = {Pollock, Rufus},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
volume = {4},
number = {2},
year = 2007,
month = {December},
pages = {51-64},
tags = {ip copyright}
}
@misc{athey_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001633},
author = {Susan Athey and Glenn Ellison},
title = {{Position Auctions with Consumer Search}},
year = 2007,
month = oct,
institution = {UCLA Department of Economics},
type = {Levine's Bibliography},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levrem/122247000000001633.html},
number = {122247000000001633}
}
@misc{jansen_ea_2007,
author = {Jansen, Bernard and Zhang, Mimi and Zhang Ying},
title = {{The Effect of Brand Awareness on the Evaluation of Search Engine Results}},
year = 2007,
note = {CHI 2007, April 28-May 3, 2007, San Jose, California, USA.},
url-src = {http://ist.psu.edu/faculty_pages/jjansen/academic/pres/chi2007/jansen_branding_of_search_engines.pdf},
tags = {search-engines}
}
@article{varian_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:indorg:v:25:y:2007:i:6:p:1163-1178},
author = {Varian, Hal R.},
title = {{Position Auctions}},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
year = 2007,
volume = {25},
number = {6},
pages = {1163-1178},
month = {December},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/indorg/v25y2007i6p1163-1178.html}
}
@phdthesis{pollock_2008,
author = {Pollock, Rufus},
title = {{Should We Give Every Cow its Calf? Monopoly, Competition and Transaction Costs in the Promotion of Innovation and Creativity}},
school = {University of Cambridge},
year = 2008,
month = {February}
}
@misc{pollock_ea_2008b,
author = {Pollock, Rufus and Newbery, David and Bently, Lionel},
title = {{Models of Public Sector Information Provision via Trading Funds}},
year = 2008,
month = {March},
url-src = {http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file45136.pdf},
note = {Published by BERR (commissioned by HM Treasury and BERR)}
}
@misc{pollock_2008c,
author = {Pollock, Rufus},
title = {{Forever Minus a Day? Theory and Empirics of Optimal Copyright Term}},
year = 2008,
month = {March}
}
@misc{pollock_2008d,
author = {Pollock, Rufus},
title = {{Is Google the Next Microsoft? Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Internet Search}},
year = 2008,
month = {June}
}
@techreport{pollock_2008f,
author = {Pollock, Rufus},
title = {Cumulative Innovation, Experimentation and the Hold-Up Problem},
year = 2008,
month = apr,
institution = {Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge},
type = {Cambridge Working Papers in Economics},
number = {0817}
}
@techreport{pollock_2006c,
repec-id = {RePEc:pra:mprapa:5025},
author = {Pollock, Rufus},
title = {{Innovation and Imitation with and without Intellectual Property Rights}},
year = 2006,
month = sep,
institution = {University Library of Munich, Germany},
type = {MPRA Paper},
number = {5025}
}
@article{carlton_ea_2002,
repec-id = {RePEc:rje:randje:v:33:y:2002:i:summer:p:194-220},
author = {Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman},
title = {{The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries}},
journal = {RAND Journal of Economics},
year = 2002,
volume = {33},
number = {2},
pages = {194-220},
month = {Summer},
tags = {tying io}
}
@article{nocke_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:5:y:2007:i:6:p:1130-1160},
author = {Volker Nocke and Martin Peitz and Konrad Stahl},
title = {{Platform Ownership}},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = 2007,
volume = {5},
number = {6},
pages = {1130-1160},
month = {December},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/jeurec/v5y2007i6p1130-1160.html},
tags = {network-effects platforms}
}
@article{benartzi_ea_2002,
author = {Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler},
title = {{How Much Is Investor Autonomy Worth?}},
journal = {Journal of Finance},
year = 2002,
volume = {57},
number = {4},
pages = {1593-1616},
month = {08},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfinan/v57y2002i4p1593-1616.html}
}
@article{cronqvist_ea_2004,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:2:p:424-428},
author = {Henrik Cronqvist and Richard H. Thaler},
title = {{Design Choices in Privatized Social-Security Systems: Learning from the Swedish Experience}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2004,
volume = {94},
number = {2},
pages = {424-428},
month = {May},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v94y2004i2p424-428.html}
}
@article{thaler_ea_2003,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:175-179},
author = {Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein},
title = {{Libertarian Paternalism}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2003,
volume = {93},
number = {2},
pages = {175-179},
month = {May},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v93y2003i2p175-179.html}
}
@techreport{cronqvist_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:crp:wpaper:44},
author = {Henrik Cronqvist},
title = {{Advertising and Portfolio Choice}},
year = 2005,
month = nov,
institution = {Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, Turin (Italy)},
type = {CeRP Working Papers},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/crp/wpaper/44.html},
number = {44}
}
@article{vanrooij_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:91:y:2007:i:3-4:p:701-722},
author = {van Rooij, Maarten C.J. and Kool, Clemens J.M. and Prast, Henriette M.},
title = {{Risk-return preferences in the pension domain: Are people able to choose?}},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
year = 2007,
volume = {91},
number = {3-4},
pages = {701-722},
month = {April}
}
@techreport{hedesstrom_2006,
title = {{The psychology of diversification: Novice investors' ability to spread risks}},
author = {Hedesstrom, T. M.},
year = 2006,
institution = {Department of Psychology, Goteborg University, Sweden}
}
@article{benartzi_ea_2007,
title = {{Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behaviour}},
author = {Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler},
year = 2007,
journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume = {21},
number = {3},
pages = {81-104}
}
@techreport{nao_2005,
title = {{Directory Enquiries - From 192 to 118}},
author = {{National Audit Office}},
year = 2005,
month = {March}
}
@techreport{gallini_ea_2003,
author = {Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer},
title = {{Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?}},
year = 2003,
month = oct,
institution = {UCLA Department of Economics},
type = {Levine's Working Paper Archive},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/618897000000000532.html},
number = {618897000000000532}
}
@techreport{newell_ea_2005,
author = {Newell, Richard and Wilson, Nathan},
title = {{Technology Prizes for Climate Change Mitigation}},
year = 2005,
month = jun,
institution = {Resources For the Future},
type = {Discussion Papers},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/rff/dpaper/dp-05-33.html},
number = {dp-05-33}
}
@techreport{scotchmer_2000,
author = {Suzanne Scotchmer},
title = {{Delegating Investment in a Common-Value Project}},
year = 2000,
month = feb,
institution = {EconWPA},
type = {Industrial Organization},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpio/9912001.html},
number = {9912001}
}
@techreport{maurer_ea_2003,
author = {Stephen M. Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer},
title = {{Procuring Knowledge}},
year = 2003,
month = aug,
institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc},
type = {NBER Working Papers},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/9903.html},
number = {9903}
}
@article{hopenhayn_ea_2006,
author = {Hugo Hopenhayn and Gerard Llobet and Matthew Mitchell},
title = {{Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents, and Buyouts}},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
year = 2006,
volume = {114},
number = {6},
pages = {1041-1068},
month = {December}
}
@article{moldovanu_ea_2001,
author = {Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela},
title = {{The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2001,
volume = {91},
number = {3},
pages = {542-558},
month = {June},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v91y2001i3p542-558.html}
}
@techreport{gilbert_ea_2003,
author = {Richard J. Gilbert and Michael L. Katz},
title = {{SHOULD GOOD PATENTS COME IN SMALL PACKAGES? A Welfare Analysis of Intellectual Property Bundling}},
year = 2003,
month = nov,
url-src = {http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/gilbert/wp/Package%20Licensing.pdf}
}
@book{dimitri_ea_2006,
author = {Nicola Dimitri and Gustavo Piga and Giancarlo Spagnolo},
title = {{Handbook of Procurement}},
year = 2006,
publisher = {Cambridge University Press}
}
@article{polanvyi_1944,
author = {Michael Polanvyi},
title = {{Patent Reform}},
year = 1944,
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
pages = {61-76},
volume = {11},
number = {3}
}
@book{sobel_1998,
author = {Dava Sobel},
title = {{Longitude}},
year = 1998,
publisher = {Fourth Estate}
}
@article{abramowicz_2003,
author = {Michael Abramowicz},
title = {{Perfecting Patent Prizes}},
year = 2003,
journal = {Vanderbilt Law Review},
number = 20,
pages = {114-236}
}
@techreport{davis_ea_2004,
author = {Lee Davis and Jerome Davis},
year = 2004,
title = {{How effective are prizes as incentives to innovation? Evidence from three 20th century contests}},
type = {Industrial Dynamics, Innovation and Development. DRUID Summer Conference}
}
@article{philipson_ea_2006,
author = {Tomas Philipson and Anupam Jena},
title = {{Who Benefits from New Medical Technologies? Estimates of Consumer and Producer Surpluses for HIV/AIDS Drugs}},
journal = {Forum for Health Economics \& Policy},
year = 2006,
volume = {0},
number = {1},
pages = {1005-1005},
month = {},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bep/fhecpo/vbiomedical_researchy2006i1p1005-1005.html}
}
@article{thaler_ea_1981,
repecid = {RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:89:y:1981:i:2:p:392-406},
author = {Thaler, Richard H and Shefrin, H M},
title = {{An Economic Theory of Self-Control}},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
year = 1981,
volume = {89},
number = {2},
pages = {392-406},
month = {April},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v89y1981i2p392-406.html}
}
@article{berns_ea_2007,
title = {{Intertemporal choice - toward an integrative framework}},
author = {Gregory S. Berns and David Laibson and and George Loewenstein},
journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
volume = {11},
number = {11},
pages = {482-8},
year = 2007,
tags = {discounting happiness}
}
@article{mcclure_ea_2007,
author = {Sam McClure and Keith Ericson and David Laibson and George Loewenstein and Jonathan Cohen},
title = {{Time Discounting for Primary Rewards}},
journal = {Journal of Neuroscience},
volume = {27},
pages = {5796-5804},
year = 2007,
tags = {discounting neuroscience}
}
@article{frederick_ea_2002,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:351-401},
author = {Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein and Ted O'Donoghue},
title = {{Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review}},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
year = 2002,
volume = {40},
number = {2},
pages = {351-401},
month = {June},
tags = {discounting review}
}
@inbook{chabris_ea_2008,
author = {Christopher Chabris and David Laibson and Jonathan Schuldt},
title = {{Intertemporal Choice}},
booktitle = {{Palgrave Dictionary of Economics}},
publisher = {Palgrave},
year = 2008
}
@misc{harris_ea_2004,
author = {Christopher Harris and David Laibson},
title = {{Instantaneous Gratification}},
year = 2004
}
@book{parducci_1995,
title = {{Happiness, Pleasure, and Judgment: The Contextual Theory and Its Applications}},
author = {Allen Parducci},
publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum Associates},
year = 1995,
tags = {happiness range-frequency}
}
@book{paris_ea_1983,
title = {{Learning and Motivation in the Classroom}},
author = {Paris, S.G. and Sarris, V. and Olson, G.M. and Parducci, A. and Lienert, G.A. and Stevenson, H.W.},
year = {1983},
publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum Associates},
tags = {happiness range-frequency}
}
@article{niedrich_ea_2001,
repec-id = {RePEc:ucp:jconrs:v:28:y:2001:i:3:p:339-54},
author = {Niedrich, Ronald W and Sharma, Subhash and Wedell, Douglas H},
title = {{Reference Price and Price Perceptions: A Comparison of Alternative Models}},
journal = {Journal of Consumer Research: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly},
year = 2001,
volume = {28},
number = {3},
pages = {339-54},
month = {December},
tags = {happiness range-frequency}
}
@article{brown_ea_2008,
author = {Brown, G. and Gardner, Jonathan and Oswald, Andrew and Qian, Jing},
title = {{Does Wage Rank Affect Employees Well-being?}},
journal = {Industrial Relations},
volume = {47},
year = 2008,
abstract = {How do workers make wage comparisons? Both an experimental study and an analysis of 16,000 British employees are reported. Satisfaction and well-being levels are shown to depend on more than simple relative pay. They depend upon the ordinal rank of an individual's wage within a comparison group. Rank itself thus seems to matter to human beings. Moreover, consistent with psychological theory, quits in a workplace are correlated with pay distribution skewness.},
pages = {355-389},
doi = {doi:10.1111/j.1468-232X.2008.00525.x},
tags = {happiness empirical range-frequency}
}
@article{clark_ea_1996,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:61:y:1996:i:3:p:359-381},
author = {Clark, Andrew E. and Oswald, Andrew J.},
title = {{Satisfaction and Comparison Income}},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
year = 1996,
volume = {61},
number = {3},
pages = {359-381},
month = {September}
}
@article{clark_ea_1998,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:70:y:1998:i:1:p:133-155},
author = {Clark, Andrew E. and Oswald, Andrew J.},
title = {{Comparison-concave utility and following behaviour in social and economic settings}},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
year = 1998,
volume = {70},
number = {1},
pages = {133-155},
month = {October}
}
@article{hopkins_ea_2004,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:4:p:1085-1107},
author = {Ed Hopkins and Tatiana Kornienko},
title = {{Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2004,
volume = {94},
number = {4},
pages = {1085-1107},
month = {September}
}
@techreport{hopkins_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001442},
author = {Ed Hopkins and Tatiana Kornienko},
title = {{Status, Affluence, and Inequality: Rank-Based Comparisons in Games of Status}},
year = 2007,
month = aug,
institution = {UCLA Department of Economics},
type = {Levine's Bibliography},
number = {122247000000001442}
}
@article{parducci_1965,
author = {Parducci, Allen},
title = {{Category Judgment: A Range-frequency Theory}},
journal = {Psychological Review},
volume = {72},
year = 1965,
month = {November},
pages = {407-418},
tags = {happiness range-frequency}
}
@article{parducci1971category,
title = {{Category Rating Scales: Effects of Relative Spacing and Frequency of Stimulus Values}},
author = {Parducci, A. and Perrett, L.},
journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology},
volume = {89},
number = {2},
pages = {427-452},
year = {1971}
}
@article{sobel_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:43:y:2005:i:2:p:392-436},
author = {Joel Sobel},
title = {{Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity}},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
year = 2005,
volume = {43},
number = {2},
pages = {392-436},
month = {June}
}
@misc{maillart_ea_2008,
author = {T. Maillart and D. Sornette and S. Spaeth and G. {Von Krogh}},
title = {{Empirical Tests of Zipf's law Mechanism In Open Source Linux Distribution}},
url-src = {http://www.citebase.org/abstract?id=oai:arXiv.org:0807.0014},
year = {2008}
}
@article{clark_ea_2008,
title = {{Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles}},
author = {Andrew E. Clark and Paul Frijters and Michael A. Shields},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
year = 2008,
volume = {46},
number = {1},
pages = {95-144},
doi = {10.1257/jel.46.1.95},
tags = {happiness contextual type-review}
}
@book{offer_2006,
title = {{The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and Britain Since 1950}},
isbn = {0198208537},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
author = {Avner Offer},
month = mar,
year = {2006},
pages = {472}
}
@book{layard_2006,
title = {{Happiness: Lessons from a New Science}},
isbn = {0141016906},
publisher = {Penguin Books Ltd},
author = {Richard Layard},
month = apr,
year = {2006},
pages = {320}
}
@article{frank_1985,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:75:y:1985:i:1:p:101-16},
author = {Frank, Robert H},
title = {{The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 1985,
volume = {75},
number = {1},
pages = {101-16},
month = {March}
}
@article{frank_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:137-141},
author = {Robert H. Frank},
title = {{Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2005,
volume = {95},
number = {2},
pages = {137-141},
month = {May},
url-src = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v95y2005i2p137-141.html},
tags = {toread}
}
@book{tsuru_1996,
edition = {{Canto}},
title = {{Japan's Capitalism: Creative Defeat and Beyond (Canto Original): Creative Defeat and Beyond}},
isbn = {0521576210},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
author = {Shigeto Tsuru},
month = jul,
year = {1996},
pages = {289},
notes = {First issued 1993}
}
@book{putnam_2001,
title = {{Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community}},
isbn = {0743203046},
publisher = {Simon \& Schuster Ltd},
author = {Robert Putnam},
month = oct,
year = {2001},
pages = {544}
}
@article{caillaud_ea_2003,
repec-id = {RePEc:rje:randje:v:34:y:2003:i:2:p:309-28},
author = { Caillaud, Bernard and Jullien, Bruno},
title = {{ Chicken \& Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers}},
journal = {RAND Journal of Economics},
year = 2003,
volume = {34},
number = {2},
pages = {309-28},
month = {Summer}
}
@article{radner_1993,
repec-id = {RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:5:p:1109-46},
author = {Radner, Roy},
title = {{The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing}},
journal = {Econometrica},
year = 1993,
volume = {61},
number = {5},
pages = {1109-46},
month = {September},
abstract = {In a decision-theoretic model of a firm, the author represents managers as information processors of limited capacity; efficiency is measured in terms of (1) the number of processors and (2) the delay between the receipt of information by the organization and the implementation of the decision. The author characterizes efficient networks for both one-shot and repeated regimes, as well as the corresponding 'production function' relating the number of items processed to the number of processors and the delay. He sketches some applications to common decision paradigms, and implications for decentralization and organizational returns to scale.}
}
@article{koch_2008,
author = {Stefan Koch},
title = {{Effort Modeling and Programmer Participation in Open Source Software Projects}},
journal = {Information Economics and Policy},
year = 2008,
notes = {forthcoming},
tags = {opensource}
}
@article{plassmann_ea_2008,
author = {Plassmann, Hilke and O'Doherty, John and Shiv, Baba and Rangel, Antonio},
title = {{Marketing Actions Can Modulate Neural Representations of Experienced Pleasantness}},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {105},
number = {3},
pages = {1050-1054},
tags = {happiness neuroscience}
}
@article{kubler_2004,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:mateco:v:40:y:2004:i:1-2:p:177-189},
author = {Kubler, Felix},
title = {{Is intertemporal choice theory testable?}},
journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics},
year = 2004,
volume = {40},
number = {1-2},
pages = {177-189},
month = {February}
}
@article{luttmer_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:120:y:2005:i:3:p:963-1002},
author = {Erzo F. P. Luttmer},
title = {{Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 2005,
volume = {120},
number = {3},
pages = {963-1002},
month = {August}
}
@article{redelmeier_ea_1996,
author = {Redelmeier, D. and Kahneman, D.},
year = 1996,
title = {{Patients' memories of painful medical treatments: Real-time and retrospective evaluations of two minimally invasive procedures}},
journal = {Pain},
volume = {66},
pages = {3-8}
}
@article{redelmeier_ea_2003,
author = {Redelmeier, D. and Katz, J. and Kahneman, D.},
title = {{Memories of colonoscopy: a randomized trial}},
journal = {Pain},
year = 2003,
number = {104},
pages = {187-194}
}
@misc{clark_ea_2004,
author = {Clark, Andrew and Yannis Georgellis},
title = {{Kahneman meets the Quitters: Peak-End Behaviour in the Labour Market}},
year = 2004,
month = february,
tags = {happiness}
}
@techreport{chen_ea_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:net:wpaper:0602},
author = {Yongmin Chen and Chuan He},
title = {{Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet}},
year = 2006,
month = sep,
institution = {NET Institute},
type = {Working Papers},
number = {06-02},
tags = {search-engine}
}
@techreport{goldfarb_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:net:wpaper:0723},
author = {Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker},
title = {{Search Engine Advertising: Pricing Ads to Context}},
year = 2007,
month = sep,
institution = {NET Institute},
type = {Working Papers},
number = {07-23}
}
@misc{white_2008,
author = {Alex White},
title = {{Search Engines: Left Side Quality versus Right Side Profits}},
year = 2008
}
@article{baye_ea_2001,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:3:p:454-474},
author = {Michael R. Baye and John Morgan},
title = {{Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2001,
volume = {91},
number = {3},
pages = {454-474},
month = {June}
}
@article{telang_ea_2004,
title = {{Market Structure for Internet Search Engines}},
author = {Telang, Rahul and Mukhopadhyay, Tridas and Rajan, Uday},
journal = {Journal of Management Information Systems},
volume = {21},
number = {2},
pages = {137-160},
year = 2004
}
@techreport{ellison_ea_2004,
repec-id = {RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10570},
author = {Glenn Ellison and Sara Fisher Ellison},
title = {{Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet}},
year = 2004,
month = jun,
institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc},
type = {NBER Working Papers},
number = {10570}
}
@techreport{ghose_ea_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:net:wpaper:0735},
author = {Anindya Ghose and Sha Yang},
title = {{An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine Advertising: Sponsored Search and Cross-Selling in Electronic Markets}},
year = 2007,
month = sep,
institution = {NET Institute},
type = {Working Papers},
number = {07-35}
}
@article{bowles_1998,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:36:y:1998:i:1:p:75-111},
author = {Samuel Bowles},
title = {{Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions}},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
year = 1998,
volume = {36},
number = {1},
pages = {75-111},
month = {March},
tags = {behavioural happiness}
}
@techreport{stevenson_ea_2008,
repec-id = {RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3654},
author = {Stevenson, Betsey and Wolfers, Justin},
title = {{Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox}},
year = 2008,
month = aug,
institution = {Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
number = {3654},
tags = {happiness}
}
@techreport{deaton_2007,
repec-id = {RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13317},
author = {Angus Deaton},
title = {{Income, Aging, Health and Wellbeing Around the World: Evidence from the Gallup World Poll}},
year = 2007,
month = aug,
institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc},
type = {NBER Working Papers},
number = {13317},
tags = {happiness}
}
@article{blanchflower_ea_2004,
repec-id = {RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:88:y:2004:i:7-8:p:1359-1386},
author = {Blanchflower, David G. and Oswald, Andrew J.},
title = {{Well-being over time in Britain and the USA}},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
year = 2004,
volume = {88},
number = {7-8},
pages = {1359-1386},
month = {July},
tags = {happiness}
}
@article{becker_ea_1977,
repec-id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:67:y:1977:i:2:p:76-90},
author = {Becker, Gary S and Stigler, George J},
title = {{De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 1977,
volume = {67},
number = {2},
pages = {76-90},
month = {March},
tags = {happiness preferences}
}
@misc{pollock_2008e,
author = {Rufus Pollock},
title = {{Innovation, Imitation and Open Source}},
year = 2008,
note = {To appear in International Journal of Open Source Software and Processes},
tags = {ip innovation open}
}
@article{newbery_ea_1997,
repec-id = {RePEc:bla:jindec:v:45:y:1997:i:3:p:269-303},
author = {Newbery, David M and Pollitt, Michael G},
title = {The Restructuring and Privatization of Britain's CEGB--Was It Worth It?},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = 1997,
volume = {45},
number = {3},
pages = {269-303},
month = {September},
tags = {192},
tags = {competition dq}
}
@techreport{oftel_ea_2003,
author = {{Oftel and ICSTIS}},
title = {{Evaluation of Directory Enquiry Services}},
year = 2003,
month = nov,
tags = {competition dq}
}
@techreport{ofcom_ea_2004,
author = {{OfCom and ICSTIS}},
title = {{Evaluation of Directory Enquiry Services}},
year = 2004,
month = nov,
tags = {competition dq}
}
@techreport{ofcom_ea_2005,
author = {{OfCom and ICSTIS}},
title = {{Evaluation of Directory Enquiry Services}},
year = 2005,
month = mar,
tags = {competition dq}
}
@techreport{ofcom_ea_2006,
author = {{OfCom and ICSTIS}},
title = {{Evaluation of Directory Enquiry Services}},
year = 2006,
month = mar,
tags = {competition dq}
}
@article{schelling1978mam,
title = {{Micromotives and Macrobehavior}},
author = {Schelling, T.C.},
year = {1978},
publisher = {WW Norton},
url-src = {http://hsd.soc.cornell.edu/curricular/schelling_chapter_on_segregation.pdf},
tags = {networks sociophysics}
}
@article{dosi1982tpa,
title = {{Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories: A Suggested Interpretation of the Determinants and Directions of Technical Change}},
author = {Dosi, G.},
journal = {Research Policy},
volume = {11},
number = {3},
pages = {147--162},
year = {1982}
}
@misc{hall2001npc,
title = {{The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools}},
author = {Hall, B.H. and Jaffe, A.B. and Trajtenberg, M.},
year = 2001,
publisher = {NBER},
notes = {Working Paper 8498},
tags = {ip innovation}
}
@misc{griliches1988vpi,
title = {{The Value of Patents as Indicators of Inventive Activity}},
author = {Griliches, Z. and Pakes, A. and Bronwyn, H. and National Bureau of Economic Research},
year = {1988},
publisher = {NBER},
tags = {ip innovation}
}
@article{bergstrom2002esb,
title = {{Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection}},
author = {Bergstrom, T.C.},
journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume = {16},
number = {2},
pages = {67--88},
year = {2002},
publisher = {American Economic Association Publications}
}
@article{giulietti2005ccc,
repec-id = {RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:115:y:2005:i:506:p:949-968},
author = {Monica Giulietti and Catherine Waddams Price and Michael Waterson},
title = {Consumer Choice and Competition Policy: a Study of UK Energy Markets},
journal = {Economic Journal},
year = 2005,
volume = {115},
number = {506},
pages = {949-968},
month = {October}
}
@techreport{pollock2009gne,
repec-id = {RePEc:cam:camdae:0915},
author = {Pollock, R.},
title = {General Network Effects and Welfare},
year = 2009,
month = apr,
institution = {Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge},
type = {Cambridge Working Papers in Economics},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/cam/camdae/0915.html},
number = {0915}
}
@techreport{harhoff2008igp,
repec-id = {RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6900},
author = {Harhoff, Dietmar and von Graevenitz, Georg and Wagner, Stefan},
title = {{Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets - The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity}},
year = 2008,
month = jul,
institution = {C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers},
type = {CEPR Discussion Papers},
number = {6900}
}
@article{david2008rab,
title = {{Restricting Access to Books on the Internet: Some Unanticipated Effects of US Copyright Legislation}},
author = {Paul A. David and Jared Rubin},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
year = 2008,
vol = {5},
number = {1},
pages = {23-53},
tags = {copyright}
}
@book{stclair2004rnr,
author = {St. Clair, William},
year = 2004,
title = {{The Reading Nation in the Romantic Period}},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK}
}
@misc{torremans2008pd,
title = {The `Public Domain'},
author = {{Paul Torremans}},
year = 2008,
note = {Produced as part of the Public Domain in Europe project}
}
@misc{pollock2009vpd,
title = {The Value of the Public Domain},
author = {{The EUPD Project Team}},
year = 2009
}
@misc{liebowitz2008icm,
author = {Stan J. Liebowitz},
title = {{Is the Copyright Monopoly a Best-Selling Fiction?}},
year = 2008,
url = {http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266486},
tags = {copyright}
}
@misc{heald2006coe,
author = {Heald, Paul},
title = {{Copyright Ownership and Efficient Exploitation: An Empirical Study of American Works Before and After They Enter the Public Domain}},
year = 2006
}
@article{audley2007cvm,
title = {{The `Competitive' Value of Music to Commercial Radio Stations}},
author = {Audley, Paul and Boyer, Marcel},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
volume = {4},
number = {2},
pages = {29-50},
year = {2007},
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