econ.bib
@MISC{akerlof_ea_2002,
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author = {George A. Akerlof and Kenneth J. Arrow and Timothy Bresnahan and James M. Buchanan and Ronald Coase and Linda R. Cohen and Milton Friedman and Jerry R. Green and Robert W. Hahn and Thomas W. Hazlett and C. Scott Hemphill and Robert E. Litan and Roger G. Noll and Richard L. Schmalensee and Steven Shavell and Hal R. Varian and Richard J. Zeckhauser},
year = {2002},
month = {5},
url-src = {http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=16},
notes = {Brief 02-1}
}
@BOOK{aghion_ea_1998,
title = {{Endogenous Growth Theory}},
author = {Aghion, Phillipe and Howitt, Peter},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {1998}
}
@ARTICLE{allison_ea_1974,
title = {{Productivity Differences Among Scientists: Evidence for Accumulative Advantage}},
author = {Allison, Paul and Stewart, John},
journal = {American Sociological Review},
volume = {39},
number = {4},
year = {1974},
month = {8},
pages = {596-606}
}
@ARTICLE{ansari_ea_1994,
author = {Ansari, Asim and Economides, Nicholas and Ghosh, Avijit},
title = {{Competitive Positioning in Markets with Nonuniform Preferences}},
journal = {Marketing Science},
year = 1994,
volume = {13},
number = {3},
pages = {248-273},
month = {}
}
@INPROCEEDINGS{arrow_1962,
title = {{Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention}},
author = {Arrow, Kenneth},
booktitle = {{The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors}},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {1962},
pages = {619-625}
}
@ARTICLE{arundel_ea_1998,
title = {{What Percentage of Innovations are Patented? Empirical Estimates for European Firms}},
author = {Arundel, A. and Kabla, I.},
journal = {Research Policy},
volume = {27},
year = {1998},
pages = {127-141}
}
@ARTICLE{arundel_2001,
title = {{Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy}},
author = {Arundel, A.},
journal = {Beleidstudies Technology Economie},
volume = {37},
pages = {67-88},
year = {2001}
}
@ARTICLE{bessen_2004,
title = {{Hold-up and Patent Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private Information}},
author = {Bessen, James},
journal = {Economics Letters},
volume = {82},
number = {3},
year = {2004},
pages = {321-326}
}
@MISC{bessen_ea_1999,
title = {{Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation}},
author = {Bessen, James and Maskin, Eric},
year = {2000},
note = {Working paper (MIT Econ WP 00-01)}
}
@MISC{bessen_ea_2004,
title = {{An Empirical Look at Software Patents}},
author = {Bessen, James and Hunt, Robert},
year = {2004},
month = {4},
url-src = {http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf},
note = {WORKING PAPER NO. 03-17/R (though new version of 2004). Original version August 2003.}
}
@MISC{blackburn_2004,
title = {{Online Piracy and Recorded Music Sales}},
author = {Blackburn, David},
year = {2004},
month = {12},
url-src = {http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~dblackbu/papers/blackburn\_fs.pdf},
note = {Job Market Paper (Harvard PhD Programme)}
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@MISC{boldrin_ea_2003,
title = {{Perfectly Competitive Innovation}},
author = {Boldrin, Michele and Levine, David},
year = {2003},
month = {1},
note = {Unpublished working paper. First version 1997-10-03}
}
@TECHREPORT{boldrin_ea_2005,
author = {Boldrin, Michele and Levine, David},
title = {{IP} and Market Size},
year = 2005,
month = JUL,
institution = {UCLA Department of Economics},
type = {Levine's Working Paper Archive},
number = {618897000000000836}
}
@ARTICLE{breyer_1970,
title = {{The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs}},
author = {Breyer, Stephen},
journal = {Harvard Law Review},
volume = {84},
number = {2},
year = {1970},
pages = {281-351}
}
@ARTICLE{brynjolfsson_ea_2000,
title = {{Frictionless Commerce? A comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers}},
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}
@ARTICLE{brynjolfsson_ea_2003,
title = {{Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers}},
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volume = {49},
number = {11},
year = {2003}
}
@MISC{chaudhuri_ea_2003,
title = {{Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India}},
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title = {{Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R\&D}},
author = {Dasgupta, Partha and Stiglitz, Joseph},
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volume = {11},
number = {1},
year = {1980},
pages = {1-28},
abstract = {This paper studies the nature and consequences of competition in R\&D and the relationship between this form of competition and competition in the product market, by focusing on comparisons of speed of research, number of independent research laboratories, and level of risk undertaken. Among the results: competition in the current product market reduces the level of innovation (relative to monopoly); competition in R\&D increases the level of innovation, possibly beyond the socially optimal level. Under certain conditions, it pays a monopolist to preempt potential competitors, thereby enabling the monopoly to persist. Market equilibrium may entail excessively fast research with insufficient risk-taking.}
}
@ARTICLE{dasgupta_ea_1987,
title = {{The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios}},
author = {Dasgupta, Partha and Maskin, Eric},
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number = {387},
year = {1987},
pages = {581-595}
}
@ARTICLE{dasgupta_ea_1994,
title = {{Towards a New Economics of Science}},
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volume = {23},
number = {5},
year = {1994},
pages = {487-521}
}
@ARTICLE{denicolo_2000,
title = {{Two-Stage Patent Races and Patent Policy}},
author = {Denicolo, Victor},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {31},
year = {2000},
pages = {488-501}
}
@ARTICLE{dixit_1988,
title = {{A General Model of R\&D Competition and Policy}},
author = {Dixit, Avinish},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume = {19},
number = {3},
year = {1988},
pages = {317-326}
}
@ARTICLE{dosi_1988,
title = {{Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation}},
author = {Dosi, Giovanni},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
year = {1988},
pages = {1120-1171}
}
@BOOK{dosi_ea_1988,
title = {{Technical Change and Economic Theory}},
editor = {Dosi, G. and Freeman, R. and Nelson, R. and Silverberg, G. and Soete, L.},
publisher = {Pinter Publishers (London)},
year = {1988}
}
@BOOK{dosi_ea_1998,
title = {{Technology, Organization, and Competitiveness}},
editor = {Dosi, Giovanni and Teece, David and Chytry, Josef},
publisher = {OUP},
year = {1998}
}
@BOOK{dutton_1984,
title = {{The Patent System and Inventive Activity during the Industrial Revolution 1750-1852}},
author = {Dutton, Henry},
publisher = {Manchester},
year = {1984}
}
@ARTICLE{eisenberg_ea_1998,
title = {{Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research}},
author = {Eisenberg, R. and Heller, M.},
journal = {Science},
volume = {280},
number = {5364},
year = {1998},
month = {5},
pages = {690-701}
}
@ARTICLE{ethier_1982,
title = {{National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade}},
author = {Ethier, William},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {72},
number = {3},
year = {1982},
month = {6},
pages = {389-405}
}
@BOOK{foray_2004,
title = {{The Economics of Knowledge}},
author = {Foray, Dominique},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {2004}
}
@ARTICLE{gallini_1992,
title = {{Patent Policy and Costly Imitation}},
author = {Gallini, Nancy},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {23},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {52-63}
}
@ARTICLE{geist_2005,
title = {{Piercing the peer-to-peer myths: An Examination of the Canadian Experience}},
author = {Geist, Michael},
journal = {First Monday},
volume = {10},
number = {4},
year = {2005},
month = {4},
url-src = {http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10\_4/geist/}
}
@MISC{ghose_ea_2004,
title = {{Internet Exchanges for Used Books: An Empirical Analysis of Product Cannibalization and Welfare Impact}},
author = {Ghose, A. and Smith, M.D. and Telang, R.},
year = {2004},
url-src = {http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=584401}
}
@ARTICLE{gilbert_ea_1987,
title = {{Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development}},
author = {Gilbert, Richard and Griliches, Zvi and Klevorick, Alvin and Levin, Richard and Nelson, Richard and Winter, Sidney},
journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity},
volume = {1987},
number = {3},
year = {1987},
pages = {783-831}
}
@ARTICLE{gordon_1982,
title = {{Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors}},
author = {Gordon, Wendy},
journal = {Columbia Law Review},
volume = {82},
number = {8},
year = {1982},
pages = {1600-1657}
}
@ARTICLE{gort_ea_1983,
title = {{Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product Innovations}},
author = {Gort, Michael and Klepper, Steven},
journal = {Economic Journal},
volume = {92},
number = {367},
year = {1982},
pages = {630-653}
}
@ARTICLE{green_ea_1995,
title = {{On the Division of Profit between Sequential Innovators}},
author = {Green, Jerry and Scotchmer, Suzanne},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {26},
number = {1},
year = {1995},
pages = {20-33}
}
@ARTICLE{griffiths_ea_1991,
title = {{Political Components of the Industrial Revolution: Parliament and the English Cotton Textile Industry, 1660-1774}},
author = {Griffiths, T. and Hunt, P. and O'Brien, P.},
journal = {Economic History Review},
year = {1991},
pages = {395-423}
}
@ARTICLE{griffiths_ea_1992,
title = {{Inventive Activity in the British Textile Industry, 1700-1800}},
author = {Griffiths, T. and Hunt, P. and O'Brien, P.},
journal = {Journal of Economic History},
year = {1992},
pages = {881-906}
}
@ARTICLE{griffiths_ea_1995,
title = {{There is Nothing Outside the Text, and There is No Safety in Numbers: A Reply to Sullivan}},
author = {Griffiths, T. and Hunt, P. and O'Brien, P.},
journal = {Journal of Economic History},
year = {1995},
pages = {671-672}
}
@ARTICLE{griliches_1990,
title = {{Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey}},
author = {Zvi Griliches},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
year = {1990},
pages = {1661-1707}
}
@INCOLLECTION{griliches_1995,
title = {{R\&D and productivity: Econometric Results and measurement issues}},
author = {Griliches, Zvi},
booktitle = {{Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change}},
editor = {P. Stoneman},
publisher = {Blackwell},
year = {1995}
}
@ARTICLE{hadfield_1992,
title = {{The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective}},
author = {Gillian K. Hadfield},
journal = {Copyright Law Symposium},
volume = {38},
pages = {1-46},
year = 1992
}
@MISC{hahn_ea_2003,
title = {{A Review of Bessen and Hunt's Analysis of Software Patents}},
author = {Hahn, Robert and Wallsten, Scott},
year = {2003},
month = {11},
url-src = {http://www.researchineurope.org/policy/hahn\_wallsten.pdf},
note = {AEI-Brookings Joint Center. From the acknowledgements: 'The authors gratefully acknowledge the support' of Microsoft.}
}
@MISC{hall_2003,
title = {{Business Method Patents, Innovation and Policy}},
author = {Hall, Bronwyn},
year = {2003},
month = {5},
url-src = {http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/papers/BHH\%20on\%20BMP\%20May03WP.pdf}
}
@MISC{hong_2004,
title = {{The Effect of Napster on Recorded Music Sales: Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey}},
author = {Hong, Seung-Hyun},
year = {2004},
month = {1},
url-src = {http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/03-18.pdf},
note = {SIEPR Policy paper No. 03-018}
}
@ARTICLE{jaffe_1989,
title = {{Real Effects of Academic Research}},
author = {Jaffe, Adam},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {79},
year = {1989},
pages = {957-970}
}
@ARTICLE{johnson_1985,
title = {{The Economics of Copying}},
author = {Johnson, William},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {93},
number = {1},
year = {1985},
pages = {158-174}
}
@BOOK{kamien_ea_1982,
title = {{Market Structure and Innovation}},
author = {Kamien, M. and Schwartz, N.},
publisher = {CUP},
year = {1982}
}
@ARTICLE{klein_ea_2002,
title = {{The Economics of Copyright Fair Use in a Networked World}},
author = {Klein, Benjamin and Lerner, Andres and Murphy, Kevin},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {92},
number = {2},
year = {2002},
month = {5},
pages = {205-208}
}
@ARTICLE{klemperer_1990,
title = {{How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?}},
author = {Paul Klemperer},
journal = {RAND Journal of Economics},
volume = {21},
number = {1},
year = {1990},
pages = {113-130}
}
@ARTICLE{klepper_ea_2000,
title = {{The Making of an Oligopoly: Firm Survival and Technological Change in the Evolution of the U.S. Tire Industry}},
author = {Klepper, Steven and Simons, K.},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {108},
number = {4},
year = {2000},
pages = {728-760}
}
@ARTICLE{kretschmer_2005,
title = {{Artists' earnings and copyright: A review of British and German music industry data}},
author = {Kretschmer, Martin},
journal = {First Monday},
volume = {10},
number = {1},
year = {2005},
month = {1},
url-src = {http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10\_1/kretschmer/index.html}
}
@ARTICLE{landes_ea_1989,
title = {{An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law}},
author = {Landes, William and Posner, Richard},
journal = {Journal of Legal Studies},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
year = {1989},
pages = {325-363}
}
@BOOK{levin_ea_1984,
title = {{Survey Research on R \& D appropriability and technological opportunity. Part 1: Appropriability.}},
author = {Levin, Richard},
publisher = {New Haven, CT: Yale U. Press},
year = {1984}
}
@ARTICLE{levin_ea_1985,
title = {{R \& D Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New Evidence on some Schumpeterian Hypotheses}},
author = {Cohen, Wesley and Levin, Richard and Mowery, David},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {1985},
pages = {20-24}
}
@ARTICLE{levin_ea_1987,
author = {Levin, Richard and Klevorick, A. and Nelson, R. and Winter, S. and Gilbert, R. and Griliches, Z.},
title = {{Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development}},
journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity},
year = {1987},
volume = {3},
pages = {783-831}
}
@ARTICLE{liebowitz_1985,
title = {{Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals}},
author = {Liebowitz, Stan},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {93},
number = {5},
year = {1985},
pages = {945-957}
}
@ARTICLE{liebowitz_ea_2005,
title = {{Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, \& Network Effects}},
author = {Liebowitz, Stan and Margolis, Stephen},
journal = {Harvard Journal of Law and Technology},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
year = {2005}
}
@BOOK{macleod_1988,
title = {{Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System, 1660-1800}},
author = {Macleod, C.},
publisher = {Cambridge},
year = {1988}
}
@ARTICLE{macleod_1991,
title = {{The Paradoxes Of Patenting: Invention And Its Diffusion In 18th And 19th Century Britain, France And North America.}},
author = {Macleod, C.},
journal = {Technology and Culture},
volume = {32},
year = {1991},
pages = {885-910}
}
@ARTICLE{mansfield_1985,
title = {{How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out?}},
author = {Edwin Mansfield},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {34},
number = {2},
year = {1985},
pages = {217-223}
}
@ARTICLE{mansfield_1995,
title = {{Academic Research Underlying Industrial Innovations: Sources, Characteristics and Financing}},
author = {Mansfield, E.},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
volume = {77},
year = {1995},
pages = {55-65}
}
@ARTICLE{matutues_ea_1996,
title = {{Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations}},
author = {Matutues, Carmen and Regibeau, Pierre and Rockett, Katharine},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {27},
number = {1},
year = {1996},
pages = {60-83}
}
@MISC{menell_ea_2005,
title = {{Intellectual Property}},
author = {Menell, Peter and Scotchmer, Suzanne},
year = {2005},
month = {6},
url-src = {http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~scotch/ms\_06\_10\_2005.pdf},
note = {forthcoming, Handbook of Law and Economics. Mitch Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier.}
}
@ARTICLE{merges_1999,
title = {{As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights For Business Concepts and Patent System Reform}},
author = {Merges, Robert},
journal = {Berkeley Technology Law Journal},
volume = {14},
year = {1999},
pages = {577-615}
}
@ARTICLE{merges_ea_1990,
title = {{On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope}},
author = {Merges, Robert and Nelson, Richard},
journal = {Columbia Law Review},
volume = {90},
year = {1990},
month = {5},
pages = {839-916},
url-src = {http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/IPCoop/90merg2.html}
}
@BOOK{mokyr_1990,
title = {{The Lever of Riches}},
author = {Mokyr, Joel},
publisher = {OUP},
year = {1990}
}
@INCOLLECTION{mokyr_1994,
title = {{Technological Change, 1700-1830}},
author = {Mokyr, Joel},
booktitle = {{The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, 2nd ed., vol. 1, 1700-1860}},
editor = {R. Floud and D. McCloskey},
year = {1994},
pages = {12-43},
publisher = {CUP}
}
@BOOK{nber_1962,
title = {{The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors}},
author = {National Bureau of Economic Research},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {1962},
note = {A report of the NBER being papers given at a conference}
}
@BOOK{nelson_ea_1982,
title = {{An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change}},
author = {Nelson, Richard and Winter, Sidney},
publisher = {Harvard University Press},
year = {1982}
}
@BOOK{nordhaus_1969,
title = {{Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change}},
author = {Nordhaus, William},
publisher = {M.I.T. Press},
year = {1969}
}
@ARTICLE{nordhaus_1972,
title = {{The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply}},
author = {Nordhaus, William},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {62},
number = {3},
year = {1972},
pages = {428-431}
}
@ARTICLE{novos_ea_1984,
title = {{The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach}},
author = {Novos, Ian and Waldman, Michael},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {92},
number = {2},
year = {1984},
pages = {236-246}
}
@MISC{oberholzer_ea_2004,
title = {{The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis}},
author = {Oberholzer, Felix and Strumpf, Koleman},
year = {2004},
url-src = {http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing\_March2004.pdf}
}
@ARTICLE{oberholzer_ea_2007,
title = {{The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis}},
author = {Oberholzer, Felix and Strumpf, Koleman},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {115},
number = {1},
year = {2007},
pages = {1-42}
}
@ARTICLE{odonoghue_ea_1998,
title = {{Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Improvement}},
author = {O'Donoghue, Ted and Scotchmer, Suzanne and Thisse, Jacques},
journal = {Journal of Economics and Management Strategy},
volume = {7},
year = {1998},
pages = {1-32}
}
@ARTICLE{peitz_ea_2004,
title = {{The Effect of Internet Piracy on Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence}},
author = {Peitz, Martin and Waelbroeck, Patrick},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
volume = {1},
number = {2},
year = {2004},
pages = {71-79},
url-src = {http://www.serci.org/docs\_1\_2/waelbroeck.pdf}
}
@ARTICLE{plant_1934,
title = {{The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions}},
author = {Plant, Arnold},
journal = {Economica},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
year = {1934},
month = {2},
pages = {30-51}
}
@ARTICLE{plant_1934b,
title = {{The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books}},
author = {Plant, Arnold},
journal = {Economica},
volume = {1},
number = {2},
year = {1934},
month = {5},
pages = {167-195}
}
@MISC{quah_2002,
title = {{Almost Efficient Innovation By Pricing Ideas}},
author = {Quah, Daniel},
year = {2002},
month = JUN,
note = {Unpublished LSE working paper}
}
@MISC{rob_ea_2004,
title = {{Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students}},
author = {Rob, Rafael and Waldfogel, Joel},
year = {2004},
url-src = {http://www.law.upenn.edu/polk/dropbox/waldfogel.pdf}
}
@ARTICLE{romer_1990b,
title = {{Endogenous Technological Change}},
author = {Romer, Paul},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {98},
number = {5(2)},
year = {1990},
month = {10},
pages = {S71-S102},
note = {The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 5, Part 2: The Problem of Development: A Conference of the Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Systems. (Oct., 1990), pp. S71-S102.}
}
@ARTICLE{romer_1994,
title = {{The Origins of Endogenous Growth}},
author = {Romer, Paul},
journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume = {8},
number = {1},
year = {1994},
pages = {3-22}
}
@ARTICLE{romer_1994b,
title = {{New Goods, Old Theory, and the Welfare Costs of Trade Restrictions}},
author = {Romer, Paul},
journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
volume = {43},
number = {1},
year = {1994},
pages = {5-38}
}
@ARTICLE{sah_ea_1987,
title = {{The Invariance of Market Innovation to the Number of Firms}},
author = {Sah, Raaj and Stiglitz, Joseph},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume = {18},
number = {1},
year = {1987},
pages = {98-108}
}
@ARTICLE{scherer_1972,
title = {{Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation}},
author = {Scherer, Frederic},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {62},
number = {3},
year = {1972},
pages = {422-427}
}
@BOOK{scherer_1984,
title = {{Innovation and Growth: Schumpeterian Perspectives}},
author = {Scherer, Frederic},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {1984}
}
@BOOK{scotchmer_2004,
title = {{Innovation and Incentives}},
author = {Scotchmer, Suzanne},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {2004}
}
@ARTICLE{sullivan_1985,
title = {{The Timing and Pattern of Technological Development in English Agriculture, 1611-1850}},
author = {Sullivan, Richard},
journal = {Journal of Economic History},
year = {1985},
pages = {305-314}
}
@ARTICLE{sullivan_1989,
title = {{England's 'Age Of Invention': The Acceleration Of Patents And Patentable Invention During The Industrial Revolution}},
author = {Sullivan, Richard},
journal = {Explorations in Economic History},
volume = {26},
year = {1989},
pages = {424-52}
}
@ARTICLE{sullivan_1990,
title = {{The Revolution of Ideas: Widespread Patenting and Invention During the English Industrial Revolution}},
author = {Sullivan, Richard},
journal = {Journal of Economic History},
year = {1990},
pages = {349-362}
}
@ARTICLE{tabuchi_ea_1995,
author = {Tabuchi, Takatoshi and Thisse, Jacques-Francois},
title = {{Asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition}},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
year = 1995,
volume = {13},
number = {2},
pages = {213-227},
month = {},
note = {available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/indorg/v13y1995i2p213-227.html}
}
@ARTICLE{takeyama_1994,
title = {{The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities}},
author = {Takeyama, L.},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {42},
number = {2},
year = {1994},
pages = {155-166}
}
@MISC{zentner_2004,
title = {{Measuring the Effect of Music Downloads on Music Purchases}},
author = {Zentner, Alejandro},
year = {2004},
url-src = {http://home.uchicago.edu/~alezentn/musicindustrynew.pdf}
}
@ARTICLE{RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:44:y:2001:i:2:p:525-47,
author = {Shavell, Steven and van Ypersele, Tanguy},
title = {{Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights}},
journal = {Journal of Law \& Economics},
year = {2001},
volume = {44},
number = {2},
pages = {525-47},
month = {October}
}
@ARTICLE{RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:113:y:1998:i:4:p:1137-1167,
author = {Michael Kremer},
title = {{Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism For Encouraging Innovation}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 1998,
volume = {113},
number = {4},
pages = {1137-1167},
month = {November}
}
@MISC{cohen_ea_2000,
author = {Cohen, W. and Nelson, R. and Walsh, P.},
title = {{Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)}},
year = {2000},
notes = {NBER Working Paper No. W7552}
}
@ARTICLE{mansfield_ea_1981,
author = {Mansfield, Edwin and Schwartz, Mark and Wagner, Samuel},
title = {{Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study}},
journal = {Economic Journal},
year = {1981},
volume = {91},
number = {364},
pages = {907-918}
}
@ARTICLE{mansfield_1986,
author = {Mansfield, E.},
title = {{Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study}},
journal = {Management Science},
year = {1986},
volume = {32},
number = {2},
pages = {173-181}
}
@ARTICLE{RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:4:p:705-729,
author = {Amil Petrin},
title = {{Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan}},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
year = 2002,
volume = {110},
number = {4},
pages = {705-729},
month = {August}
}
@BOOK{cornish_ea_2003,
author = {Cornish, William and Llewelyn, David},
title = {{Patents, Copyrights, Trade Marks and Allied Rights}},
edition = {5th},
publisher = {Sweet and Maxwell, London},
year = {2003}
}
@ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:indorg:v:24:y:2006:i:5:p:907-913,
author = {Peitz, Martin and Waelbroeck, Patrick},
title = {{Why the music industry may gain from free downloading -- The role of sampling}},
journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
year = 2006,
volume = {24},
number = {5},
pages = {907-913},
month = {September}
}
@BOOK{watt_2000,
author = {Watt, Richard},
title = {{Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends or Foes?}},
year = {2000},
publisher = {Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK}
}
@ARTICLE{watt_2004,
author = {Watt, Richard},
title = {{The Past and the Future of the Economics of Copyright}},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
year = {2004},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
pages = {151--171}
}
@ARTICLE{bharat_ea_2000,
repec-id = {RePEc:bla:jindec:v:48:y:2000:i:1:p:103-35},
author = {Anand, Bharat N and Khanna, Tarun},
title = {{The Structure of Licensing Contracts}},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = 2000,
volume = {48},
number = {1},
pages = {103-35},
month = {March}
}
@TECHREPORT{bessen_ea_2006,
repec-id = {RePEc:cla:najeco:321307000000000021},
author = {James Bessen and Eric Maskin},
title = {{Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Innovation}},
year = 2006,
month = MAY,
institution = {www.najecon.org},
type = {NajEcon Working Paper Reviews},
number = {321307000000000021}
}
@MISC{cockburn_2005,
author = {Cockburn, Iain},
title = {{Blurred Boundaries: Tensions Between Open Scientific Resources and Commercial Exploitation of Knowledge in Biomedical Research}},
year = {2005},
notes = {mimeo}
}
@ARTICLE{hall_ea_2001,
author = {Hall, Bronwyn and Ziedonis, Rosemarie},
title = {{The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry, 1979-1995}},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
year = {2001},
volume = {32},
number = {1},
pages = {101-128}
}
@ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:respol:v:29:y:2000:i:4-5:p:531-557,
author = {Jaffe, Adam B.},
title = {{The U.S. patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation process}},
journal = {Research Policy},
year = {2000},
volume = {29},
number = {4-5},
pages = {531-557},
month = {April}
}
@ARTICLE{waterson_1990,
author = {Waterson, Michael},
title = {{The Economics of Product Patents}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 1990,
volume = {80},
number = {4},
pages = {860-69},
month = {September}
}
@ARTICLE{RePEc:bla:jindec:v:39:y:1990:i:2:p:113-30,
author = {Waterson, Michael},
title = {{Product Differentiation and Profitability: An Asymmetric Model}},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = 1990,
volume = {39},
number = {2},
pages = {113-30},
month = {December}
}
@ARTICLE{RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:93:y:1985:i:5:p:837-58,
author = {Horstmann, Ignatius and MacDonald, Glenn M and Slivinski, Alan},
title = {{Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent}},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
year = 1985,
volume = {93},
number = {5},
pages = {837-58},
month = {October}
}
@TECHREPORT{RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0511002,
author = {Alex Gaudeul},
title = {{Public provision of a private good: What is the point of the BSD license?}},
year = 2005,
month = NOV,
institution = {EconWPA},
type = {Industrial Organization},
note = {available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpio/0511002.html},
number = {0511002}
}
@ARTICLE{rochet_ea_2003,
repec-id = {RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:1:y:2003:i:4:p:990-1029},
author = {Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole},
title = {{Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets}},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = 2003,
volume = {1},
number = {4},
pages = {990-1029},
month = {06}
}
@TECHREPORT{rochet_ea_2005,
repec-id = {RePEc:ide:wpaper:2145},
author = {Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean},
title = {{Two-Sided Markets : A Progress Report}},
year = 2005,
month = NOV,
institution = {Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse},
type = {IDEI Working Papers},
note = {Forthcoming in the RAND Journal of Economics},
number = {275}
}
@ARTICLE{RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:3:p:691-711,
author = {Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean},
title = {{Efficient Patent Pools}},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = 2004,
volume = {94},
number = {3},
pages = {691-711},
month = {June}
}
@MISC{aoki_ea_1999,
title = {{The Economics of Number Portability: SCs and Two Part Tariffs}},
author = {Aoki, R. and Small, J.},
year = {2001},
note = {Working Paper, University of Auckland.}
}
@ARTICLE{arthur_1989,
title = {{Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events}},
author = {Arthur, Brian},
journal = {Economic Journal},
volume = {99},
year = {1989},
pages = {106-131}
}
@ARTICLE{baker_2003,
title = {{The Case for Antitrust Enforcement}},
author = {Baker, J.},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {17},
number = {4},
year = {2003},
pages = {3-26}
}
@MISC{bresnahan_2001,
title = {{The Economics of The Microsoft Case}},
author = {Bresnahan, T.},
year = {2001},
note = {Unpublished discussion paper}
}
@ARTICLE{chakravorti_2003,
title = {{Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature}},
author = {Chakravorti, Sujit},
journal = {Review of Network Economics},
volume = {2},
number = {2},
year = {2003},
pages = {50-68}
}
@ARTICLE{choi_1997,
title = {{The Provision of (Two-Way) Converters in the Transition Process to a New Incompatible Technology}},
author = {Choi, Jay-Pil},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {45},
number = {2},
year = {1997},
pages = {139-153}
}
@ARTICLE{church_ea_1992,
title = {{Network Effects, Software Provision and Standardization}},
author = {Church, Jeffrey and Gandal, Neil},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {85-103}
}
@MISC{church_ea_2003,
title = {{Indirect Network Effects and Adoption Externalities}},
author = {Church, Jeffrey and Gandal, Neil and Krause, David},
year = {2003},
note = {mimeo}
}
@ARTICLE{crandall_ea_2003,
title = {{Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence}},
author = {Crandall, R. and Winston, C.},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {17},
number = {4},
year = {2003},
pages = {3-26}
}
@ARTICLE{davis_ea_2000,
title = {{A Competitive Perspective on Internet Explorer}},
author = {Davis, Stephen and Murphy, Kevin},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
volume = {90},
number = {2},
year = {2000},
pages = {184-187}
}
@MISC{doj_1994,
title = {{COMPLAINT (For Violations of Sections 1 \& 2 of the Sherman Act)}},
author = {Department of Justice Antitrust Division.},
year = {1994},
month = {07},
note = {US DOJ complaint in the Microsoft OEM licensing case}
}
@ARTICLE{economides_1989,
title = {{Symmetric Equilibrium Existence and Optimality in Differentiated Products Markets}},
author = {Economides, Nicholas},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
volume = {47},
number = {1},
pages = {178-194},
year = {1989},
tags = {io-theory}
}
@ARTICLE{economides_ea_1992,
title = {{Competition and Integration Among Complements, and Network Market Structure}},
author = {Economides, Nicholas and Salop, Steven},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {105-123},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{farrell_2003,
title = {{Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
year = {2003},
pages = {420-424},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@MISC{farrell_2004,
title = {{A Simple Price-Theory Model of Anticompetitive Exclusive Dealing}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph},
year = {2004},
note = {mimeo}
}
@ARTICLE{farrell_ea_1985,
title = {{Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Saloner, G.},
journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
volume = {16},
year = {1985},
pages = {70-83},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{farrell_ea_1986,
title = {{Installed Base And Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, And Predation}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Saloner, G.},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {76},
year = {1986},
pages = {940-955},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{farrell_ea_1992,
title = {{Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Saloner, G.},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {9-35},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{farrell_ea_2000,
title = {{Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Katz, Michael},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {48},
number = {4},
year = {2000},
pages = {413-432},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@MISC{farrell_ea_2001,
title = {{Competition and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects}},
author = {Farrell, Joseph and Klemperer, Paul},
year = {2001},
note = {mimeo. Dated 2001 but latest version is 2003. Preliminary draft chapter for Handbook of Industrial Organization. Also available from Farrell's web page (but in a different pagination).},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{fisher_2000,
title = {{The IBM and Microsoft Cases: What's the Difference}},
author = {Fisher, Franklin},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
volume = {90},
number = {2},
year = {2000},
month = {5},
pages = {180-183},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@ARTICLE{fudenberg_ea_2000,
title = {{Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry}},
author = {Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J.},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {48},
number = {4},
year = {2000},
pages = {373-90},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{gilbert_1992,
title = {{Symposium on Compatibility: Incentives and Market Structure}},
author = {Gilbert, R.},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
year = {1992},
pages = {1-8},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{gilbert_ea_2001,
title = {{An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft}},
author = {Gilbert, R. and Katz, Michael},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
year = {2001},
pages = {25-44},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@ARTICLE{hall_ea_2000,
title = {{Toward a Quantification of the Effects of Microsoft's Conduct}},
author = {Hall, C. and Hall, R.},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
volume = {90},
number = {2},
year = {2000},
month = {5},
pages = {188-191},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@MISC{jackson_1999,
title = {{Findings of Fact in the case of United States vs. Microsoft}},
author = {Jackson, R.},
year = {1999},
month = {11},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@ARTICLE{katz_ea_1985,
title = {{Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility}},
author = {Katz, Michael and Shapiro, Carl},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {75},
year = {1985},
pages = {424-440},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{klein_2001,
title = {{The Microsoft Case: What Can a Dominant Firm Do to Defend Its Market Position?}},
author = {Klein, Benjamin},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
year = {2001},
pages = {45-62},
tags = {microsoft}
}
@BOOK{laffont_ea_2000,
title = {{Competition in Telecommunications}},
author = {Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tirole, Jean},
publisher = {MIT},
year = {2000}
}
@BOOK{liebowitz_ea_1999,
title = {{Winner, Losers and Microsoft: Competition And Antitrust in High Technology}},
author = {Liebowitz, S. and Margolis, S.},
publisher = {Independent Institute},
year = {1999},
tags = {network-effects microsoft}
}
@MISC{pollock_2005,
title = {{Network Effect Models: A Summary}},
author = {Pollock, R.},
year = {2005},
note = {Working Paper},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{saloner_ea_1995,
title = {{Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines}},
author = {Saloner, G. and Shepard, S.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume = {26},
number = {3},
year = {1995},
pages = {479-501},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@ARTICLE{schmalensee_2000,
title = {{Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries}},
author = {Schmalensee, Richard},
journal = {AER Papers and Proceedings},
volume = {90},
number = {2},
year = {2000-05},
pages = {192-196},
tags = {antitrust microsoft}
}
@ARTICLE{whinston_1990,
title = {{Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion}},
author = {Whinston, M.},
journal = {American Economic Review},
volume = {80},
number = {4},
year = {1990},
pages = {837-859},
tags = {tying}
}
@ARTICLE{whinston_2001,
title = {{Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know}},
author = {Whinston, M.},
journal = {JEP},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
year = {2001},
pages = {63-80},
tags = {microsoft tying}
}
@MISC{cipil_2006,
title = {{Review of the Economic Evidence Relating to an Extension of the Term of Copyright in Sound Recordings}},
author = {CIPIL},
year = 2006,
month = 12,
note = {Prepared for the Gowers Review on Intellectual Property}
}
@MISC{odlyzko_ea_2005,
title = {{A refutation of Metcalf's Law and a better estimate for the value of networks and network interconnections}},
author = {Odlyzko, Andrew and Tilly, Benjamin},
year = {2005},
url-src = {http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/metcalfe.pdf},
tags = {network-effects}
}
@MISC{citeulike:71459,
title = {{The Dynamics of Book Sales: Endogenous versus Exogenous Shocks in Complex Networks}},
author = {Deschatres, F. and Sornette, D.},
citeulike-article-id = {71459},
eprint = {physics/0412171},
month = {December},
priority = {2},
url-src = {http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0412171},
year = {2004},
tags = {books copyright}
}
@MISC{RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9085,
author = {Goolsbee, Austan and Chevalier, Judith},
title = {{Measuring Prices and Price Competition Online: Amazon and Barnes and Noble}},
year = 2002,
month = JUL,
institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc},
note = {NBER Working Papers},
number = {9085}
}
@MISC{leguel_ea_2005,
title = {{P2P Music-Sharing Networks: Why Legal Fight Against Copiers May be Inefficient?}},
author = {Le Guel, Fabrice and Rochelandet, Fabrice},
year = {2005},
month = {Oct},
url-src = {http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=810124}
}
@ARTICLE{png_2006,
author = {Png, Ivan},
title = {{Copyright: A Plea for Empirical Research}},
journal = {Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues},
volume = {3},
number = {2},
year = 2006,
pages = {3-13}
}
@ARTICLE{holmstrom_1982,
number = {2},
title = {{Moral Hazard in Teams}},
volume = {13},
issn = {0361915x},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X\%28198223\%2913\%3A2\%3C324\%3AMHIT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-G},
abstract = {This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. This new role is essential for controlling incentives and suggests that firms in which ownership and labor are partly separated will have an advantage over partnerships in which output is distributed among agents. A new characterization of informative (hence valuable) monitoring is derived and applied to analyze the value of relative performance evaluation. It is shown that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally. Competition per se is worthless. The role of aggregate measures in relative performance evaluation is also explored, and the implications for investment rules are discussed.},
journal = {The Bell Journal of Economics},
author = {Bengt Holmstrom},
year = {1982},
pages = {324-340}
}
@ARTICLE{loury_1979,
repec_id = {RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:93:y:1979:i:3:p:395-410},
author = {Loury, Glenn C},
title = {{Market Structure and Innovation}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 1979,
volume = {93},
number = {3},
pages = {395-410},
month = {August}
}
@ARTICLE{hunt_2004,
repec_id = {RePEc:bla:jindec:v:52:y:2004:i:3:p:401-425},
author = {Robert M. Hunt},
title = {{Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation}},
journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = 2004,
volume = {52},
number = {3},
pages = {401-425},
month = {09}
}
@ARTICLE{harris_ea_1985,
repec_id = {RePEc:bla:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:2:p:193-209},
author = {Harris, Christopher and Vickers, John},
title = {{Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race}},
journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
year = 1985,
volume = {52},
number = {2},
pages = {193-209},
month = {April},
abstract = {This paper investigates perfect equilibrium in a model of a race in which two players are competing for an indivisible prize. The winner is the first player to reach the finishing line. It is shown that the behaviour of the winner of the race is often exactly as if he were the only player: the rival makes no difference. Even if competition does affect the winner's behaviour, it does so only in the first stage of the race and not thereafter. It is shown how several factors combine to determine which player will win: relative valuations of the prize, discount rates, efficiency at making progress and initial distances from the finishing line. Insofar as the model applies to patent race, it suggests that the potential competition faced by one firm in a patent race (e.g. an incumbent monopolist) may be of little or no consequence.}
}
@ARTICLE{lee_ea_1980,
repec_id = {RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:94:y:1980:i:2:p:429-36},
author = {Lee, Tom and Wilde, Louis L},
title = {{Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 1980,
volume = {94},
number = {2},
pages = {429-36},
month = {March}
}
@ARTICLE{scherer_1967,
author = {Scherer, Frederic M.},
title = {{Research and Development Resource Allocation Under Rivalry}},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = 1967,
volume = {81},
number = {2},
pages = {349--394}
}
@ARTICLE{grossman_ea_1986,
title = {{Optimal Dynamic R\&D Programs}},
author = {Gene M Grossman and Carl Shapiro},
number = {4},
volume = {17},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198624\%2917\%3A4\%3C581\%3AODRP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
abstract = {We study the optimal pattern of outlays for a single firm pursuing an R\&D program over time. In the deterministic case (a) the amount of progress required to complete the project is known, and (b) the relationship between outlays and progress is known. In this case it is optimal to increase effort over time as the project nears completion. The value of a research project is convex in its payoff on completion and in the difficulty of the project. Relaxing (a), we find in general a simple, positive relationship between the optimal expenditure rate at any point in time and the (expected) value at that time of the research program. We also show that, for a given level of expected difficulty, a riskier project is always preferred to a safe project. Relaxing (b), we find again that research outlays increase as further progress is made.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {1986},
pages = {581-593}
}
@ARTICLE{fudenberg_ea_1983,
repec_id = {RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:22:y:1983:i:1:p:3-31},
author = {Fudenberg, Drew and Gilbert, Richard and Stiglitz, Joseph and Tirole, Jean},
title = {{Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races}},
journal = {European Economic Review},
year = 1983,
volume = {22},
number = {1},
pages = {3-31},
month = {June}
}
@ARTICLE{reinganum_1981b,
repec_id = {RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:25:y:1981:i:1:p:21-41},
author = {Reinganum, Jennifer F.},
title = {{Dynamic games of innovation}},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = 1981,
volume = {25},
number = {1},
pages = {21-41},
month = {August}
}
@ARTICLE{reinganum_1982,
repec_id = {RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:3:p:671-88},
author = {Reinganum, Jennifer F},
title = {{A Dynamic Game of R\&D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior}},
journal = {Econometrica},
year = 1982,
volume = {50},
number = {3},
pages = {671-88},
month = {May}
}
@ARTICLE{lerner_1997,
number = {2},
title = {{An Empirical Exploration of a Technology Race}},
volume = {28},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199722\%2928\%3A2\%3C228\%3AAEEOAT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-\%23},
abstract = {An extensive theoretical literature examines technological competition, and in particular whether leaders maintain their standing. These models, however, have received little empirical support. I examine innovation in the disk drive industry, an environment particularly conducive to identifying racing behavior. Strategic variables prove significant in explaining the decision to innovate. The patterns are in accord with Reinganum's work: firms that trail the leader innovate more. I add controls for technological opportunity, financing constraints, and firm turnover. When firms manufacture drives for internal use or there are many entrants, and strategic interactions may be less important, the effects are less pronounced.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Josh Lerner},
year = {1997},
pages = {228-247}
}
@ARTICLE{odonoghue_1998,
number = {4},
title = {{A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation}},
volume = {29},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199824\%2929\%3A4\%3C654\%3AAPRFSI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-B},
abstract = {I investigate patent protection for a long sequence of innovations where firms repeatedly supersede each other. Incentives for R\&D can be insufficient if successful firms earn market profit only until competitors achieve something better. To correct this problem, patents must provide protection against future innovators. I propose using a patentability requirement-a minimum innovation size required for patents. A patentability requirement can stimulate R\&D investment and increase dynamic efficiency. Intuitively, requiring firms to pursue larger innovations prolongs market incumbency because larger innovations are harder to achieve, and longer market incumbency implies an increased reward to innovation.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Ted O'Donoghue},
year = {1998},
pages = {654-679}
}
@ARTICLE{harris_ea_1987,
number = {1},
title = {{Racing with Uncertainty}},
volume = {54},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28198701\%2954\%3A1\%3C1\%3ARWU\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-V},
abstract = {The paper presents two models of races in which there is both technological uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds. Most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features, but not the two combined. Our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them. In our principal model, which is of a one-dimensional race, it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower, and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases. Under certain conditions the same results hold in our second, related model, which is of a two-dimensional race.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Christopher Harris and John Vickers},
year = {1987},
pages = {1-21}
}
@ARTICLE{beath_ea_1987,
number = {Supplement: Conference Papers},
title = {{Sequential Product Innovation and Industry Revolution}},
volume = {97},
issn = {00130133},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133\%281987\%2997\%3C32\%3ASPIAIR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-4},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
author = {John Beath and Yannis Katsoulacos and David Ulph},
year = {1987},
pages = {32-43},
rgrp-note = {Paper and proceedings I think. Look at products rather than processes and show that may get incumbency or may get leap-frogging.}
}
@ARTICLE{dasgupta_ea_1980b,
number = {358},
title = {{Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity}},
volume = {90},
issn = {00130133},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133\%28198006\%2990\%3A358\%3C266\%3AISATNO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-N},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
author = {Partha Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz},
month = JUN,
year = {1980},
pages = {266-293}
}
@ARTICLE{dasgupta_1988,
number = {389},
title = {{Patents, Priority and Imitation or, the Economics of Races and Waiting Games}},
volume = {98},
issn = {00130133},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133\%28198803\%2998\%3A389\%3C66\%3APPAIOT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-R},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
author = {Partha Dasgupta},
month = MAR,
year = {1988},
pages = {66-80}
}
@ARTICLE{dasgupta_ea_1983,
number = {5},
title = {{Strategic Considerations in Invention and Innovation: The Case of Natural Resources}},
volume = {51},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198309\%2951\%3A5\%3C1439\%3ASCIIAI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
abstract = {Strategic considerations may induce a resource importing country to invent a substitute earlier than it intends to put it to use. There are also circumstances in which it would wish to delay an invention date even if it could obtain it at an earlier date at no extra cost. Similar paradoxical results obtain if resource cartels behave strategically. Setting prices high may be a way of deterring invention. If those engaged in R \& D are not resource users, and the cartel has access to similar R \& D technology, it will pre-empt rivals. This may not be the case if resource users can also engage in R \& D.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Partha Dasgupta and Richard Gilbert and Joseph Stiglitz},
month = SEP,
year = {1983},
pages = {1439-1448}
}
@ARTICLE{green_ea_1990,
number = {1},
title = {{Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law}},
volume = {21},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199021\%2921\%3A1\%3C131\%3ANADIPL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Q},
abstract = {The stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms. It also affects ex ante profitability of research. We compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency. We ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology. The possible rules are "first-to-invent," which applies in the U.S., and "first-to-file," which applies everywhere else.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry Green},
year = {1990},
pages = {131-146}
}
@ARTICLE{matutes_ea_1996,
number = {1},
title = {{Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations}},
volume = {27},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199621\%2927\%3A1\%3C60\%3AOPDATD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
abstract = {Innovators who have made significant breakthroughs may be tempted to get a head start in developing the applications of a new discovery before commercializing any new product. We consider how this socially undesirable waiting period and the pattern of development of subsequent innovations are affected by two patent protection regimes which we call "length" and "scope" protection. Our main finding is that the scope of the patent, and not its length, is the dimension that should be used to induce early disclosure of fundamental innovations while still preserving firms' incentive to do R\&D. Furthermore, the optimal protection increases with rivalry in the markets for applications.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Carmen Matutes and Pierre Regibeau and Katharine Rockett},
year = {1996},
pages = {60-83}
}
@ARTICLE{gilbert_ea_1990,
number = {1},
title = {{Optimal Patent Length and Breadth}},
volume = {21},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199021\%2921\%3A1\%3C106\%3AOPLAB\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
abstract = {In providing rewards to innovators, there is a tradeoff between patent length and breadth. This article provides conditions under which the optimal patent policy involves infinitely-lived patents, with patent breadth adjusting to provide the required reward for innovation.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro},
year = {1990},
pages = {106-112}
}
@ARTICLE{tandon_1982,
number = {3},
title = {{Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing}},
volume = {90},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28198206\%2990\%3A3\%3C470\%3AOPWCL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
abstract = {This paper examines the use of compulsory lincensing as a policy to combat the monopoly problem associated with the patent system. It introduces the notion of an optimal patent--one where the patent life and the licensing royalty rate are both determined optimally. Under certain simplifying assumptions it is shown that the optimal patent will have an indefinite life, for both process and product innovations. Some preliminary calculations suggest that the use of compulsory licensing may lead to substantial welfare improvements, even if the patent life is left unchanged at 17 years.},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Pankaj Tandon},
month = JUN,
year = {1982},
pages = {470-486}
}
@ARTICLE{dijk_1996,
number = {2},
title = {{Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements}},
volume = {44},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199606\%2944\%3A2\%3C151\%3APHACIP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
abstract = {The stringency of novelty requirements that patent offices use in judging patentability defines the height of patent protection. We study patent height in a duopoly where firms compete in product improvements. A competitor who wants to invent around the other's patent is restricted by a minimum improvement level. We show that low patent protection does not affect market equilibrium without patent protection. A patent holder can lose with medium patent heights, but not if patents provide high protection. The non patent holder can gain with medium heights but is increasingly worse off with higher patent protection.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Theon van Dijk},
month = JUN,
year = {1996},
pages = {151-167}
}
@ARTICLE{gilbert_ea_1982,
number = {3},
title = {{Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly}},
volume = {72},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198206\%2972\%3A3\%3C514\%3APPATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-N},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Richard J Gilbert and David M. G Newbery},
month = JUN,
year = {1982},
pages = {514-526}
}
@ARTICLE{salant_1984,
number = {1},
title = {{Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment}},
volume = {74},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198403\%2974\%3A1\%3C247\%3APPATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-H},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Stephen W Salant},
month = MAR,
year = {1984},
pages = {247-250},
rgrp-note = {interesting stuff on licensing. points out that once licensing is allowed result goes away (focuses on bad effects in form of monopolist's rent dissipation but point holds in general).}
}
@ARTICLE{scotchmer_1991,
number = {1},
title = {{Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law}},
volume = {5},
issn = {08953309},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309\%28199124\%295\%3A1\%3C29\%3ASOTSOG\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-S},
journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
author = {Suzanne Scotchmer},
year = {1991},
pages = {29-41}
}
@ARTICLE{reinganum_1983,
repec_id = {RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:73:y:1983:i:4:p:741-48},
number = {4},
title = {{Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly}},
volume = {73},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198309\%2973\%3A4\%3C741\%3AUIATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-H},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Jennifer F Reinganum},
month = SEP,
year = {1983},
pages = {741-748},
rgrp-note = {Response to Gilbert and Newbery showing for a radical innovation incumbent has less incentive than new-comer because it eats its own lunch}
}
@ARTICLE{delbono_ea_1991,
number = {3},
title = {{Incentives to Innovate in a Cournot Oligopoly}},
volume = {106},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28199108\%29106\%3A3\%3C951\%3AITIIAC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-E},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Flavio Delbono and Vincenzo Denicolo},
month = AUG,
year = {1991},
pages = {951-961}
}
@ARTICLE{delbono_1989,
number = {1},
title = {{Market Leadership With a Sequence of History Dependent Patent Races}},
volume = {38},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28198909\%2938\%3A1\%3C95\%3AMLWASO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-X},
abstract = {This note extends the results of Vickers [1986] examining the consequences on the evolution of market structure of having payoffs--and thus profits and incentives--which depend on the technological history of the firms. In a simple duopoly model we determine the conditions under which the technological leadership of a firm is strengthened over time (Increasing Dominance) or is progressively eroded by the rival (Catching-Up). This reformulation of Vickers' model can also accommodate incremental innovations, i.e. technological changes which do not allow the innovator to overtake the rival.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Flavio Delbono},
month = SEP,
year = {1989},
pages = {95-101}
}
@ARTICLE{denicolo_1996,
number = {3},
title = {{Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length}},
volume = {44},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199609\%2944\%3A3\%3C249\%3APRAOPB\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-3},
abstract = {This paper reexamines the issue of optimal patent breadth in extending the earlier literature to the case where many firms race for a patent. It also discusses several examples that suggest the relevance of the nature of competition prevailing in the product market to explain the diverse results found in the literature. Loosely speaking, the less efficient is competition in the product market, the more likely it is that broad and short patents are socially optimal.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Vincenzo Denicolo},
month = SEP,
year = {1996},
pages = {249-265}
}
@ARTICLE{budd_ea_1993,
number = {3},
title = {{A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?}},
volume = {60},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28199307\%2960\%3A3\%3C543\%3AAMOTEO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-4},
abstract = {This paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms. The stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms. The question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard-does the `gap' between firms tend to increase or decrease? We show that several effects are at work. The state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater. Since joint payoffs are related to joint product-market profits less joint effort costs, there are two classes of effect: the joint-profit effect and various joint-cost effects. The latter result in part from the pattern of profits, and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts. Asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences. Moreover, we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint-cost effect. The pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure, and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts, in a mutually self-reinforcing manner. In particular, there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Christopher Budd and Christopher Harris and John Vickers},
month = JUL,
year = {1993},
pages = {543-573}
}
@ARTICLE{lippman_1987,
number = {2},
title = {{Dropout Behavior in R\&D Races with Learning}},
volume = {18},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198722\%2918\%3A2\%3C287\%3ADBIRRW\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-R},
abstract = {We examine a game-theoretic model of a two-firm R\&D race in which expenditures on R\&D and the concomitant increase in experience/learning enable the firms to increase their probability of discovering an invention. The learning process is stochastic. It generates a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for identical firms with the characteristic that the leader never drops out, but the follower drops out if the leader gains a significant lead. The leader can find it optimal to drop out if the firms value the invention differently or have different R\&D efficiencies. Thus, our analysis generates results between vigorous competition and natural monopoly.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Steven A Lippman and Kevin F McCardle},
year = {1987},
pages = {287-295}
}
@ARTICLE{choi_1991,
number = {4},
title = {{Dynamic R\&D Competition under ``Hazard Rate'' Uncertainty}},
volume = {22},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199124\%2922\%3A4\%3C596\%3ADRCU\%22R\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Q},
abstract = {A model of dynamic R\&D behavior is presented in which participants in the race have imperfect information about the (true) "hazard rate" of the R\&D process. In this model, a firm will be ambivalent about a rival firm's success at an intermediate stage. On the one hand, the probability of winning is reduced, since a rival firm is ahead and the technological gap is larger. This effect is always negative. On the other hand, the discovery could be a signal that the project is not as hard after all ("If you can do that, why not me?"), which could shorten the expected time needed for the discovery. This is a positive effect or a rival firm's success, one that is not present in existing models and hence has been ignored up to now. According to the relative magnitude of these two opposing effects, a much richer description of real-world R\&D behavior is obtained. This article also provides a potential explanation of the strategic practice of innovation shelving.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Jay P Choi},
year = {1991},
pages = {596-610}
}
@ARTICLE{malueg_ea_1997,
number = {4},
title = {{Dynamic R\&D Competition with Learning}},
volume = {28},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199724\%2928\%3A4\%3C751\%3ADRCWL\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Y},
abstract = {To account for the possibility that firms are unsure about the ease of innovation, we formulate a differential game of R\&D competition with an unknown hazard rate. We show, as time passes without success, firms become more pessimistic about eventual innovation, reducing their R\&D investment and possibly exiting the race. An increase in the number of competing firms tends to increase firms' R\&D intensities, for given beliefs, but because beliefs evolve at different rates depending on the number of firms in the race, time paths of R\&D investment intensity are not unambiguously ordered with respect to the number of competing firms.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {David A Malueg and Shunichi O Tsutsui},
year = {1997},
pages = {751-772}
}
@ARTICLE{chang_1995,
number = {1},
title = {{Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation}},
volume = {26},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199521\%2926\%3A1\%3C34\%3APSAPAC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-T},
abstract = {In this article, I present a model of cumulative innovation to investigate what factors should influence a court's decision when a patentee alleges that another inventor has infringed the patent with an improved version of the patented product. The model reveals how the optimal patent policy would extend broad protection to those inventions that have very little value (standing alone) relative to the improvements that others may subsequently invent. I also examine whether courts should allow a patentee and competing inventors with improved versions of the patented product to enter collusive agreements. The model indicates that such a policy could create incentives for inefficient entry by imitators who "invent around" the original patent.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Howard F Chang},
year = {1995},
pages = {34-57}
}
@ARTICLE{scotchmer_1996,
number = {2},
title = {{Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products be Patentable?}},
volume = {27},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199622\%2927\%3A2\%3C322\%3APEISSP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-8},
abstract = {Incentives to develop basic technologies are greater if the patentholder profits from applications or other second-generation products. Assuming that such products infringe the basic patent and that there is not much delay between the innovations, I argue that (i) patents on second-generation products are not necessary to encourage their development and (ii) the patentholder of the basic technology collects a larger share of the profit if applications or other second-generation products are not patentable.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Suzanne Scotchmer},
year = {1996},
pages = {322-331}
}
@ARTICLE{harris_ea_1985b,
number = {4, A Symposium on Oligopoly, Competition and Welfare},
title = {{Patent Races and the Persistence of Monopoly}},
volume = {33},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28198506\%2933\%3A4\%3C461\%3APRATPO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Christopher Harris and John Vickers},
month = JUN,
year = {1985},
pages = {461-481}
}
@ARTICLE{kamien_ea_1972b,
number = {2},
title = {{Market Structure, Rivals' Response, and the Firm's Rate of Product Improvement}},
volume = {20},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28197204\%2920\%3A2\%3C159\%3AMSRRAT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {Morton I Kamien and Nancy L Schwartz},
month = APR,
year = {1972},
pages = {159-172}
}
@ARTICLE{barzel_1968,
number = {3},
title = {{Optimal Timing of Innovations}},
volume = {50},
issn = {00346535},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6535\%28196808\%2950\%3A3\%3C348\%3AOTOI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Z},
journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
author = {Yoram Barzel},
month = AUG,
year = {1968},
pages = {348-355}
}
@ARTICLE{kamien_ea_1974,
number = {1},
title = {{Patent Life and R\&D Rivalry}},
volume = {64},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28197403\%2964\%3A1\%3C183\%3APLARAD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-6},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Morton I Kamien and Nancy L Schwartz},
month = MAR,
year = {1974},
pages = {183-187}
}
@ARTICLE{kamien_ea_1978,
number = {3},
title = {{Potential Rivalry, Monopoly Profits and the Pace of Inventive Activity}},
volume = {45},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28197810\%2945\%3A3\%3C547\%3APRMPAT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Morton I Kamien and Nancy L Schwartz},
month = OCT,
year = {1978},
pages = {547-557}
}
@ARTICLE{kamien_ea_1972,
number = {1},
title = {{Timing of Innovations Under Rivalry}},
volume = {40},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28197201\%2940\%3A1\%3C43\%3ATOIUR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-M},
abstract = {The choice of development period and consequent introduction time for a single innovation by an expected profit maximizing firm operating under conditions of rivalrous competition is studied. Factors taken into account by the firm are the increasing cost with compression of the development period, the reduction of profit opportunities with prolongation of the development period, and the probability of rival innovation and imitation which affect the potential rewards available to the firm. Comparisons is made with the timing that would be selected in the absence of rivalry. The effects of intense rivalry are also examined.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Morton I Kamien and Nancy L Schwartz},
year = {1972},
pages = {43-60}
}
@ARTICLE{gallini_ea_1985,
number = {2},
title = {{Licensing in the Theory of Innovation}},
volume = {16},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198522\%2916\%3A2\%3C237\%3ALITTOI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-C},
abstract = {This article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative R\&D game. We ask two questions: What are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure? The gains from trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques (the ex post incentive) and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures (the ex ante incentive). In a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms' initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Nancy T Gallini and Ralph A Winter},
year = {1985},
pages = {237-252}
}
@TECHREPORT{farrell_ea_2002,
repec-id = {RePEc:cdl:econwp:1049},
author = {Joseph Farrell and Richard Gilbert and Michael Katz},
title = {{Market Structure, Organizational Structure, and R\&D Diversity}},
year = 2002,
month = OCT,
institution = {Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley},
type = {Department of Economics, Working Paper Series},
number = {1049}
}
@ARTICLE{harter_1993,
number = {1},
title = {{Differentiated Products with R\&D}},
volume = {41},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199303\%2941\%3A1\%3C19\%3ADPWR\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-H},
abstract = {This paper looks to the literature on one-dimensional, location, models and adds to it a simple process of R\&D. Differentiated-products models have often included sequential entry in order to add realism, but the order of entry is known. Here, the order is not known a priori. Also, interim profits are not ignored, allowing the monopoly profits to affect the outcome. It is found that firms do not necessarily locate at the extrema, but often race for the optimal monopoly variety--the midpoint of the interval.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {John F. R Harter},
month = MAR,
year = {1993},
pages = {19-28}
}
@ARTICLE{sakakibara_ea_2001,
number = {1},
title = {{Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms}},
volume = {32},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200121\%2932\%3A1\%3C77\%3ADSPIMI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-D},
abstract = {Does an expansion of patent scope induce more innovative effort by firms? We examine responses to the Japanese patent reforms of 1988. Interviews with practitioners and professional documents for patent agents suggest the reforms significantly expanded the scope of patent rights. However, econometric analysis using both Japanese and U.S. patent data on 307 Japanese firms finds no evidence of an increase in either R\&D spending or innovative output that could plausibly be attributed to patent reform.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Mariko Sakakibara and Lee Branstetter},
year = {2001},
pages = {77-100}
}
@ARTICLE{flaherty_1980,
number = {5},
title = {{Industry Structure and Cost-Reducing Investment}},
volume = {48},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198007\%2948\%3A5\%3C1187\%3AISACI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-1},
abstract = {A dynamic noncooperative game in which firms choose output and cost-reducing investment sequences is developed. The sequences exhibit several properties of manufacturing industries. Several steady states exist. Under some reasonable conditions only industry structures in which firms have different market shares can be locally stable steady states. So the model presents one explanation of the source of differences among firms in homogeneous good oligopolies.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {M. Therese Flaherty},
month = JUL,
year = {1980},
pages = {1187-1209}
}
@ARTICLE{katz_ea_1985b,
number = {4},
title = {{On the Licensing of Innovations}},
volume = {16},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198524\%2916\%3A4\%3C504\%3AOTLOI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-3},
abstract = {We study a three-stage, asymmetric duopoly game of R\&D rivalry. The stages are: (1) development of an innovation; (2) fixed-fee licensing of the innovation; and (3) sale of the final product. We find that major innovations will not be licensed, but that equally efficient firms will tend to license minor innovations. For some innovations, licensing is both privately and socially undesirable. If at least one of the two producers would refuse to license (were it to acquire the innovation), then licensing will not occur; an excluding firm will obtain the innovation. The possibility of licensing may decrease the returns to innovation if the licensee appropriates most of the licensing gains to trade.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro},
year = {1985},
pages = {504-520}
}
@ARTICLE{judd_1985,
number = {3},
title = {{On the Performance of Patents}},
volume = {53},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198505\%2953\%3A3\%3C567\%3AOTPOP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-0},
abstract = {A tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of continuous product innovation is developed. Patents, or any imitation lag, of infinite duration may achieve too much, too little, or the socially optimum level of innovation. Most surprising, finite-life patents may induce undamped oscillations in innovation.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Kenneth L Judd},
month = MAY,
year = {1985},
pages = {567-586}
}
@ARTICLE{gallini_ea_1985b,
number = {207},
series = {2},
title = {{Optimal R\&D Processes and Competition}},
volume = {52},
issn = {00130427},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427\%28198508\%292\%3A52\%3A207\%3C321\%3AORADPA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-A},
journal = {Economica},
author = {Nancy T Gallini and Yehuda Kotowitz},
month = AUG,
year = {1985},
pages = {321-334}
}
@ARTICLE{reinganum_1984,
number = {2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association},
title = {{Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R\&D}},
volume = {74},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198405\%2974\%3A2\%3C61\%3APIOGTM\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-W},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Jennifer F Reinganum},
month = MAY,
year = {1984},
pages = {61-66}
}
@ARTICLE{futia_1980,
number = {4},
title = {{Schumpeterian Competition}},
volume = {94},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28198006\%2994\%3A4\%3C675\%3ASC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-M},
abstract = {This paper describes a stochastic model of the process of competition via technological innovation as it might occur within a single industry. Individual firms undertake R\&D projects in the hope of acquiring a decisive competitive advantage over their rivals. But such advantages and the economic rents arising from this are only temporary; they eventually disappear in the face of imitation, entry, and innovation by other firms. At the industry's long-run equilibrium, concentration and the pace of technological innovation are jointly determined by the conditions of entry and the extent of innovative opportunity. The model implies relationships among these variables that have in fact been detected in the empirical R\&D literature.},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Carl A Futia},
month = JUN,
year = {1980},
pages = {675-695}
}
@ARTICLE{bhattacharya_ea_1986,
number = {4},
title = {{Portfolio Choice in Research and Development}},
volume = {17},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198624\%2917\%3A4\%3C\%3APCIRAD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
abstract = {We analyze the effects of a "winner-take-all" patent mechanism on the riskiness of the research strategies chosen by competing firms, as well as on the firms' incentives to duplicate research projects. Nash equilibrium choices are compared with the social optimum in a one-shot, simultaneous-move game in which competitors choose the riskiness or correlation of their research performances. We show that neither society nor firms have any preference for correlation per se, while the divergence between social and privately optimal levels of risk depends on skewness characteristics of the probability distribution over discovery dates and on levels of risk aversion.},
pages = {594-605},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Sudipto Bhattacharya and Dilip Mookherjee},
year = {1986}
}
@ARTICLE{chatterjee_ea_2004,
number = {1},
title = {{Rivals' Search for Buried Treasure: Competition and Duplication in R\&D}},
volume = {35},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200421\%2935\%3A1\%3C160\%3ARSFBTC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-I},
abstract = {We analyze an R\&D race in which, in each period, two firms each choose which of two research projects to invest in. Each observes the other's past choices and so strategic search is possible. Equilibrium is efficient if the projects differ only in their probability of being the "right" project. If they differ in other dimensions (e.g., cost), then there may be too much or too little duplication relative to the social optimum.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Kalyan Chatterjee and Robert Evans},
year = {2004},
pages = {160-183}
}
@ARTICLE{katz_1986,
number = {4},
title = {{An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development}},
volume = {17},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28198624\%2917\%3A4\%3C\%3AAAOCRA\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-2},
abstract = {I analyze the effects of cooperative research, whereby member firms agree to share the costs and fruits of a research project before they undertake it. In this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree of product market competition is low, when there are R\&D spillovers in the absence of cooperation, when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible, and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities. I show that a royalty-free cross-licensing agreement among any number of firms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of R\&D through sharing.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Michael L Katz},
year = {1986}
}
@ARTICLE{gilbert_ea_1997,
title = {{Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No's Meet the Nineties}},
volume = {1997},
issn = {10578641},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1057-8641\%281997\%291997\%3C283\%3AAIITLO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-5},
journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics},
author = {Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro and Louis Kaplow and Robert Gertner},
year = {1997},
pages = {283-349}
}
@ARTICLE{aghion_ea_2001,
number = {3},
title = {{Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation}},
volume = {68},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28200107\%2968\%3A3\%3C467\%3ACIAGWS\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-O},
abstract = {Is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth? This question is addressed in the context of an endogenous growth model with "step-by-step" innovations, in which technological laggards must first catch up with the leading-edge technology before battling for technological leadership in the future. In contrast to earlier Schumpeterian models in which innovations are always made by outsider firms who earn no rents if they fail to innovate and become monopolies if they do innovate, here we find: first, that the usual Schumpeterian effect of more intense product market competition (PMC) is almost always outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate in order to escape competition, so that PMC has a positive effect on growth; second, that a little imitation is almost always growth-enhancing, as it promotes more frequent neck-and-neck competition, but too much imitation is unambiguously growth-reducing. The model thus points to complementary roles for competition (anti-trust) policy and patent policy.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Philippe Aghion and Christopher Harris and Peter Howitt and John Vickers},
month = JUL,
year = {2001},
pages = {467-492}
}
@ARTICLE{pepall_1997,
number = {254},
series = {2},
title = {{Imitative Competition and Product Innovation in a Duopoly Model}},
volume = {64},
issn = {00130427},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427\%28199705\%292\%3A64\%3A254\%3C265\%3AICAPII\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-F},
abstract = {This paper investigates imitative competition in a two-stage game of strategic product choice in a vertically differentiated market. The innovator chooses its product strategy anticipating the subsequent entry of a rival firm. The rival firm chooses the degree to which it is profitable to differentiate its product from the innovator. It has the second mover advantage that its costs are lower the more closely it copies the innovator's product. But against this advantage is the drawback that the more similar the two products are, the more intense is the price competition between the two firms. The trade-off between imitation and differentiation is affected by the degree of consumer heterogeneity in the market. Consumers differ by income. The relationship between the incentive to imitate and the distribution of income is important, particularly in evaluating the welfare effects of two different policy responses, patent policy and cooperative alliances.},
journal = {Economica},
author = {Lynne Pepall},
month = MAY,
year = {1997},
pages = {265-279}
}
@ARTICLE{segerstrom_1991,
number = {4},
title = {{Innovation, Imitation, and Economic Growth}},
volume = {99},
issn = {00223808},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808\%28199108\%2999\%3A4\%3C807\%3AIIAEG\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-V},
abstract = {This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. The model has a steady-state equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to discovering qualitatively improved products and other firms devote resources to copying these products. Rates of both innovation and imitation are endogenously determined on the basis of the outcomes of \$R \& D\$ races between firms. Innovation subsidies are shown to unambiguously promote economic growth. Welfare is enhanced, however, only if the steady-state intensity of innovative effort exceeds a critical level.},
journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Paul S Segerstrom},
month = AUG,
year = {1991},
pages = {807-827}
}
@ARTICLE{horowitz_ea_1996,
number = {4},
title = {{Patent Length and the Rate of Innovation}},
volume = {37},
issn = {00206598},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598\%28199611\%2937\%3A4\%3C785\%3APLATRO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-E},
abstract = {This paper models the effect of patent length on the rate-of-innovation and consumer welfare. We find that the patent length that maximizes the rate-of-innovation exceeds that which maximizes consumer welfare. We show a countervailing effect of patent length upon the "size" and "frequency" of innovation. Longer patents increase the size, but decrease the frequency of innovation. The patent lengths that maximize the rate-of-innovation and welfare represent balance points between size and frequency. The divergence of the welfare maximizing and rate-of-innovation maximizing patent lengths has important policy implications that we briefly explore.},
journal = {International Economic Review},
author = {Andrew W Horowitz and Edwin L. -C Lai},
month = NOV,
year = {1996},
pages = {785-801}
}
@ARTICLE{eswaran_ea_1996,
number = {4},
title = {{Patent Policy and the Direction of Technological Change}},
volume = {27},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199624\%2927\%3A4\%3C722\%3APPATDO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-N},
abstract = {In this article we examine the interaction between firms' product and process innovation decisions, and the role patent policy can play in directing technological change toward a socially efficient mix of innovations. Product innovation is a variant on a pioneer's new product; process innovation improves upon the cost efficiency of production. In a model with heterogeneous consumers, we show that an entrant relaxes competition by trading off too much process innovation in favor of product innovation, relative to what the social planner would desire. This bias toward product innovation can be corrected through appropriate choice of patent breadths on product and process innovations.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Mukesh Eswaran and Nancy Gallini},
year = {1996},
pages = {722-746}
}
@ARTICLE{chou_ea_1993,
number = {2},
title = {{The Crowding-Out Effects of Long Duration of Patents}},
volume = {24},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199322\%2924\%3A2\%3C304\%3ATCEOLD\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-B},
abstract = {In this article we demonstrate how a long duration of patents affects investment in new product development. We construct an overlapping-generations model of saving, investment, and product innovation and show that a long duration of patents results in a high aggregate value of monopoly firms that compete for the younger generation's savings with investment in new product development. We analyze the crowding-out effects of long duration of patents and their implications for individuals' welfare under different patent regimes.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Chien-fu Chou and Oz Shy},
year = {1993},
pages = {304-312}
}
@ARTICLE{aspremont_ea_1988,
number = {5},
title = {{Cooperative and Noncooperative R \& D in Duopoly with Spillovers}},
volume = {78},
issn = {00028282},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282\%28198812\%2978\%3A5\%3C1133\%3ACANR\%26D\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Z},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
author = {Claude D'Aspremont and Alexis Jacquemin},
month = DEC,
year = {1988},
pages = {1133-1137}
}
@ARTICLE{pakes_ea_1986,
number = {384},
title = {{Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period}},
volume = {96},
issn = {00130133},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133\%28198612\%2996\%3A384\%3C1052\%3AEOTVOP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-K},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
author = {Mark Schankerman and Ariel Pakes},
month = DEC,
year = {1986},
pages = {1052-1076}
}
@ARTICLE{schankerman_1998,
number = {1},
title = {{How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field}},
volume = {29},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199821\%2929\%3A1\%3C77\%3AHVIPPE\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-9},
abstract = {I present evidence on the private value of patent rights in France for different technology fields and nationalities of ownership, using nonparametric techniques and a parametric model of patent renewal. The distribution of the value of patent rights is highly skewed, patent protection is a significant but not the major source of private returns to R\&D, and these characteristics vary across technology fields. I compute the R\&D cash subsidy that is equivalent to the value of patent rights, measure the variations in value over time, technology fields, and nationalities, and show that these differences are correlated with patent grant rates.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Mark Schankerman},
year = {1998},
pages = {77-107}
}
@ARTICLE{scotchmer_1999,
number = {2},
title = {{On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System}},
volume = {30},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199922\%2930\%3A2\%3C181\%3AOTOOTP\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-N},
abstract = {The patent system is mainly a renewal system: the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees. I ask whether such a system can be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research. In such a model I show that renewal mechanisms (possibly with subsidies) are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on, regardless of the objective function. Under plausible circumstances, patents should have a uniform life, rather than varying in length, as typically occurs under a renewal system.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Suzanne Scotchmer},
year = {1999},
pages = {181-196}
}
@ARTICLE{lanjouw_1998,
number = {4},
title = {{Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value}},
volume = {65},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28199810\%2965\%3A4\%3C671\%3APPITSO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-0},
abstract = {Empirical estimates of the private value of patent protection are derived for four technology areas-computers, textiles, combustion engines, and pharmaceuticals-using new patent data for West Germany, 1953-1988. Patentees must pay renewal fees to keep their patents in force as well as legal expenses in order to enforce them. A dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of optimal renewal decisions is developed incorporating both learning and depreciation as well as the potential need to prosecute infringement. The evolution of the distribution of returns over the life of a group of patents is calculated for each technology using a minimum distance simulation estimator. Results indicate that the aggregate value of protection generated per year is on the order of 10\% of related R\&D expenditure.},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Jean Olson Lanjouw},
month = OCT,
year = {1998},
pages = {671-710}
}
@ARTICLE{cornelli_ea_1999,
number = {2},
title = {{Patent Renewals and R\&D Incentives}},
volume = {30},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28199922\%2930\%3A2\%3C197\%3APRARI\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-6},
abstract = {In a model with moral hazard and asymmetric information, we show that it can be welfare improving to differentiate patent lives when firms have different R\&D productivities. A uniform patent life provides too much R\&D incentive to low-productivity firms and too little to high-productivity ones. The optimally differentiated patent scheme can be implemented through a menu of patent lives (or renewals) and associated fees. We characterize the optimal mechanism and use simulation analysis to compare it with existing patent renewal systems and to illustrate the potential welfare gains from the optimal policy.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Francesca Cornelli and Mark Schankerman},
year = {1999},
pages = {197-213}
}
@ARTICLE{pakes_1986,
number = {4},
title = {{Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks}},
volume = {54},
issn = {00129682},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682\%28198607\%2954\%3A4\%3C755\%3APAOSEO\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-X},
abstract = {In many countries patentees must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force. This paper presents and then estimates a model which uses observations on the proportion of different cohorts of patents which are renewed at alternative ages, and the relevant renewal fee schedules, to estimate the distribution of the returns earned from holding patents, and the evolution of this distribution function over the lifespan of the patents. Since patents are often applied for at an early exploratory stage of the innovation process, the model allows patentees to be uncertain about the sequence of returns that will be earned if the patent is kept in force. The paper solves the implied optimal stopping problem for the micro units, derives the implications of these solutions on the aggregate proportion renewed, and then estimates the parameters of the model from the aggregate data. Separate estimates are obtained from data on post World War II cohorts of patents in each of France the United Kingdom, and Germany.},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Ariel Pakes},
month = JUL,
year = {1986},
pages = {755-784}
}
@ARTICLE{hopenhayn_ea_2001,
number = {1},
title = {{Innovation Variety and Patent Breadth}},
volume = {32},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200121\%2932\%3A1\%3C152\%3AIVAPB\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-U},
abstract = {When innovations are heterogeneous, it may be advantageous to provide a variety of patents. By trading off patent breadth for length, it is possible that fees are not needed in the optimal policy. We present two examples. The first is a quality-ladder model, in which innovations benefit society directly as well as through their use as building blocks to future inventions, and the rate of arrival for the future innovation is unobserved. More fertile innovations get more breadth for a shorter time. Menus may also be useful in the case of horizontal product differentiation.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {Hugo A Hopenhayn and Matthew F Mitchell},
year = {2001},
pages = {152-166}
}
@ARTICLE{weinberg_1992,
number = {2},
title = {{Exclusionary Practices and Technological Competition}},
volume = {40},
issn = {00221821},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821\%28199206\%2940\%3A2\%3C135\%3AEPATC\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-6},
abstract = {This paper examines the effects of exclusionary practices on the process of technological change, modeled as a sequence of innovations. The winner of an early innovation may be able to take (possibly costly) actions that effectively exclude its rivals from competition for subsequent innovations. The possibility of exclusion can change the equilibrium time pattern of investments in research from that of the case of no exclusion. Conditions that make such a change most likely are also conditions under which such a change is most likely to reduce the efficiency of the allocation of resources to technological change.},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
author = {John A Weinberg},
month = JUN,
year = {1992},
pages = {135-146}
}
@ARTICLE{reinganum_1985,
number = {1},
title = {{Innovation and Industry Evolution}},
volume = {100},
issn = {00335533},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28198502\%29100\%3A1\%3C81\%3AIAIE\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-7},
abstract = {The theoretical literature on innovation has been concerned with a single innovation produced by a number of identical agents. By contrast, we consider a market in which one firm is the current incumbent, while the remaining firms are challengers. Moreover, we consider a sequence of innovations, so that success does not imply that the successful firm reaps monopoly profits forever after, but only until the next, better innovation is developed. We begin with a fully optimizing behavioral model and derive the equivalent of the Schumpeterian "process of creative destruction." That is, a firm enjoys temporary monopoly power but is soon overthrown by a more inventive challenger. The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process...The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates [Schumpeter, 1942, pp. 82-83].},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Jennifer F Reinganum},
month = FEB,
year = {1985},
pages = {81-99}
}
@ARTICLE{anton_ea_2004,
number = {1},
title = {{Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property}},
volume = {35},
issn = {07416261},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261\%28200421\%2935\%3A1\%3C1\%3ALPABSM\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-R},
abstract = {Exploitation of an innovation commonly requires some disclosure of enabling knowledge (e.g., to obtain a patent or induce complementary investment). When property rights offer only limited protection, the value of the disclosure is offset by the increased threat of imitation. Our model incorporates three features critical to this setting: innovation creates asymmetric information, innovation often has only limited legal protection, and disclosure facilitates imitation. Imitation depends on inferences the imitator makes about the innovator's advance. We find an equilibrium in which small inventions are not imitated, medium inventions involve a form of "implicit licensing," and large inventions are protected primarily through secrecy when property rights are weak.},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
author = {James J Anton and Dennis A Yao},
year = {2004},
pages = {1-22}
}
@ARTICLE{reinganum_1981,
number = {3},
title = {{On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach}},
volume = {48},
issn = {00346527},
url-src = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527\%28198107\%2948\%3A3\%3C395\%3AOTDONT\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-Z},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},