The Labour Force In The Industrial Revolution

Summary

1. Hours of work increased at start of industrial revolution (1750-1800) peaking around 1800 and then dropping consistently from then onwards. [Voth]
2. Child labour not as significant as views such as Hammond's would make out and factory acts do not seem to have much impact - let alone a dramatic one ('Child labor in textile factories was not growing relative to adult labor before the legislation; it was declining. The legislation did not slow the replacement of adults by children; it accelerated the replacement of children by women' [refId:nardinelli_1980:754]). Industrialization did not lead to a dramatic increase in the employment (and 'exploitation) of little children: 'The thesis that industrialization brought increasing numbers of children into the factories is not true' [refId:nardinelli_1980:754]. Moreover if children left factories it was probably to take on similar amounts of work in the home (though of a different kind). [Nardinelli]
3. Women's and children's labour force participation and income contribution:
   1. varied significantly by region and occupation
   2. Contributions generally small at end of 18th century and remained so
   3. Women and children's contribution did not vary consistently with family income level i.e. poor families did not have greater contributions from women and children than better off families ( =} demand side constraints).
   [refId:horrell_ea_1995:105]
4. Labour force participation changes were responsive to traditional factors (such as wages and other economic variables). At same downward trend is not accounted for in this framework lending weight to the Pinchbeck thesis of institutional/cultural explanations.

Notes on [refId:voth_1998]

Data

1. Derives empirical estimates for working hours by 1. using witness statements from criminal trials at Old Bailey in London (with additional evidence from wage book of Burnton and Western Canal in Cheshire for 1801 to show that the estimates for London extend to rest of Britain).
2. Looks at 2 sample periods: 1749-1763 and 1799-1803. 2000 observations. Allow us to derive rough time use estimates. In particular when people got up, when they went to bed, time that work began and stopped and finally what days were taken off (such as Sunday, St. Monday etc).
3. Find:
   1. Very significant drop in observance of St. Monday between 1750 and 1800
   2. Similar change in observance of holy days
   3. No statistically significant differences in hours of working
4. Quantitative changes in time are (broken down by changes):

   Item	Hours
   1750	2763 (3020)
   Holy Days	506
   St. Monday	572
   Change in % Agricultural	-340
   1800	3501 (3605)

   [voth_1998:39]
5. Aside: Wonder about the actual data. Do we just have information on what someone was doing around the time of the crime or more information about the day (e.g. when they got up). Discussion on 41ff at least seems to be arguing from 2nd perspective and seems to assume that the time at which witnesses reported what they were doing is drawn randomly from the waking hours of the day. This seems very very dubious to me. (this is addressed on p.45. Reweighting to give part of the day equal weight does not change the results that much).
6. Issues: What about labour in the home. Those he compares with his London sample (from Cheshire canal) are still all labourers.

Implications

Finally use these new estimates of time inputs to resolve the consumption-real wage conundrum (Craft et al + probate inventories indicate increasing per capita consumption over later 18th century (about 10-15%) while Lindert and Williamson real wage index indicates declining real wages). As time inputs were growing very significantly this could offset decline in real wages.
1. TFP must have been even smaller than previously imagined. In fact it will be negative. Not only is total labour force growing rapidly but hours worked per person is also increasing. Strong evidence therefore for an 'Industrious' rather than 'Industrial' revolution.

Notes on [refId:devries_1994]

Summary

Not exactly relevant, but brilliant. Does not put the flesh of details on the bones of theory and conjecture about changing patterns of work and demand in the early industrial revolution (that which would make up the industrious revolution). Wonderfully provocative.

1. Consumer demand grew, even in the face of contrary real wage trends, and the productive achievements of industry and agriculture in the century before the Industrial Revolution could occur because of reallocations of the productive resource of households. In England, but in fact throughout much of Northwestern Europe and Colonial America, a broad range of households made decisions that increased both the supply of marketed commodities and labor and the demand for goods offered in the marketplace. This combination of changes in household behaviour constituted an "industrious revolution". Driven by a combination of commercial incentives (changes in relative prices, reduced transaction costs) and changes in tastes, this "industrious revolution" emanating to a substantial degree from the aspirations of the family, preceded and prepared the way for the Industrial Revolution. This industrious revolution, a change in household behavior with important demand-side features, began in advance of the Industrial Revolution, a fundamentally supply-side phenomenon.

   [refId:devries_1994:256-256]

Interesting

1. 'Men are forced to labour now because they are slaves to their own wants' Sir James Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy (London 1767), (reprinted Edinburgh 1966) p.67 quoted [refId:devries_1994:259].

Horrell and Humphries

1. Controlling for real earnings and income effects, the first half of the nineteenth century was associated with a rapid decline in the labour force participation of married women.
   The importance of the [time] trend in explaining women's participation suggests that economic variables, wages and incomes, and household characteristics are not sufficient to capture the changes occurring. Instead, changing institutional and ideological factors played a role and operated to affect adversely women's employment opportunities.

   [refId:horrell_ea_1995:112]